



**IA-Forum Interview: Dr. Hall Gardner**

International Affairs Forum talks about NATO, transatlantic relations, and security issues with Dr. Hall Gardner, Professor and Chair, International Affairs Department, American University of Paris. Author of *American Global Strategy and the War on Terrorism* (Ashgate, forthcoming 2005).

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*International Affairs Forum: Cynical observers have suggested that the war in Kosovo was, in large part, to give NATO a new mission: to keep NATO important and the U.S. involved in Europe. Does NATO have importance other than assuring U.S. involvement with European security affairs?*

Dr. Hall Gardner: The mantra for the war in Bosnia and, even for that “over” Kosovo, was that "NATO must go out of area or go out of business." So giving NATO a new military mission as a means to justify heavy US defense expenditure in Europe did represent a significant rationale for the US to engage in the war, but it was not the only one.

Another factor that worked to draw NATO into the region was the fear that the “out of area” conflict, coupled with a significant refugee crisis, might destabilize the entire Balkans region. Yet, if this were really the major concern, it could have been handled very differently.

The primary issue that came out of the war "over" Kosovo was the US failure to forge a multilateral settlement at the Rambouillet summit. This could have led the Alliance to engage with Russia in a joint NATO-Russian inter-positional operation that would have placed NATO and Russian peacekeeping forces between Serbian forces and Albanian Kosovars. It would have represented one plausible option to put an end to the conflict, and to stop ethnic cleansing in its tracks without needing to resort to aerial intervention on the part of NATO alone. Such an approach would have consequently put the status of Kosovo in a very different situation than is the case today.

Moreover, if the war “over” Kosovo was truly intended to give NATO a totally “new” mission, as your question suggests, it unfortunately failed to do so. On the contrary, the war tended to inadvertently undermine the role of NATO as a war-fighting organization. The war "over" Kosovo revealed NATO's weaknesses as an alliance in respect to “enforcement” operations. In the war "over" Kosovo, the political-military inconveniences and disputes involved in running a "war by committee" effectively undercut American support for NATO itself as a war fighting and enforcement organization.

The UN and NATO had previously quarreled over actions in the war in Bosnia—a major factor that had unfortunately undermined US confidence in the UN and undercut the US willingness to engage in joint “dual key” UN-NATO military actions. While inter-UN-NATO disputes likewise sustained elements of intra-NATO disagreements, those intra-NATO disputes later manifested themselves more overtly in the war “over” Kosovo.

Consequently, in respect to the October 2001 intervention in Afghanistan, the US acted largely alone, albeit with significant British support, along some special force operations led by Germany and France. Although the Afghan intervention was backed by NATO, and although it ironically represented the first time that NATO had invoked its Article V security guarantees (in support of US interests and not those of Western Europe as expected during the Cold war), US forces largely acted alone against the Taliban. NATO itself did not command the mission: its role was largely relegated to peacekeeping in the aftermath of the intervention.

Yet, to get back to the heart of question, NATO does sustain an importance other than assuring U.S. involvement with European security affairs. NATO, for the foreseeable future, must continue to play a role as a collective defense organization. What is often forgotten in the contemporary focus on the "war on terrorism," and increasing NATO involvement in peacekeeping, is that NATO—in its traditional sense of collective defense and security—is still fundamental to providing a nuclear deterrent versus a potentially instable Russia or versus any other nuclear power or WMD threat.

At the same time, however, *NATO actions must not be seen as provocative*. NATO expansion, along with that of the European Union, must not provoke a new partition of Europe. NATO must become part of the solution in the effort to stabilize and rejuvenate the new Europe—and not become part of a new problem. Rather than alienate Russia—and possibly divide the “new” Europe along the Polish-Belarusian border—NATO must help bring Russia into even closer cooperation, at the same time that it works with entire European Union as well.

The US needs to sustain its presence in Europe through a significantly reformed NATO, but simultaneously work with both the EU and Russia in order to find more cooperative approaches to security. For these reasons, I have proposed the formation of regional "security communities" that could be implemented throughout central and eastern Europe, and possibly in the Middle East (Israel/Palestine), as well as Iraq that would seek to defuse tensions in areas of actual or potential conflict. Depending upon the situation, the security of these regional security communities would be guaranteed by multinational peacekeeping and by overlapping security guarantees involving the EU and Russia—as well as the US and NATO.

*IA-Forum: European governments don't seem to have the money, or a public that would understand a shift in priorities, to increase spending on military. What do you see as the prospects for building a European military that has the proper infrastructure, logistics capability, and intelligence gathering capabilities to live up to expectations of self-sustainment? If done, would this decline NATO's importance? If done, what impact would this have on transatlantic relations?*

Dr. Gardner: First, I agree that it will take a while for Europe to organize itself. The Europeans are still focused on the political- economic aspects of EU enlargement; they have barely begun to focus on the security issues involved in the creation of a New Europe. In general, they have not thought very deeply about the possibility that EU enlargement might result in significant social and political tensions along the borders of EU and non-EU member states—in terms of illegal immigration, trade in contraband, narcotics and prostitution. The possibility of significant political economic instability, involving secessionist movements or demands for radical political change in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia itself (for example, Kaliningrad), are real and may grow over time particularly as the EU solidifies its grasp over the region.

In 2004, the EU announced the formation of a EU defense ministry and foreign ministry (EU-Consilium) in embryo, which would be strengthened following ratification of the European Constitution (and which is expected to be ratified by all EU members in 2006). The French believe that a joint European command center can then be established in the next 5-10 years. EU countries spend about \$232 billion a year on defense as a whole; only the UK, France and Greece spend over 2% of GNP. Yet even here, the Europeans have been handicapped by a lack of integration among their armed forces, and by reliance upon obsolete equipment. The EU needs transport, airlift, naval ships, and air-to-air refueling capabilities. If Germany were to augment its defense spending, it could transform overall expenditure levels in Europe radically, but Berlin is presently absorbed in the costs of German and European unification, and in domestic social reforms.

Europeans in general have not really begun to thoroughly consider controversial issues such as a coordinated nuclear and conventional defense of Europe. Moreover, Berlin has begun to pressure the US to finally withdraw its nuclear capabilities from German territory some fifteen years after the end of the Cold War. If Berlin finally succeeds in pressuring Washington to take its weaponry home, or in taking its nuclear weaponry offshore (particularly now that the US is presently downsizing its bases in Germany), then France and the UK will need to pick up the pieces and begin to coordinate the nuclear defense of Europe. At the same time, their activities will need to be transparent enough to cooperate in some nuclear planning with the US and Russia.

If Europe can get its act together, a more integrated and stronger Europe through a Common Foreign and Defense Policy could benefit the US, and supplement NATO. At present, the United States provides NATO with all its communications jamming equipment, 90% of its air-to-ground surveillance and reconnaissance equipment, and 80% of its air refueling tankers. U.S. defense contractors built almost all of NATO's

intercontinental bombers. The problem is that US defense budget is monstrous, and cannot meet all possible contingencies without help from the Europeans or others.

It is likewise not certain that the Pentagon is spending in areas absolutely needed for the kinds of warfare that the world may face in the future. At present, based on public figures (and not based on elements of defense spending hidden in other parts of the budget, such as NASA and veterans benefits), Washington plans to spend approximately \$420 billion for FY 2005—an amount which is roughly three times more than the defense spending of China, Russia and India, combined with states such as Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. Much excessive US spending is also a consequence of redundant forces caused by rivalries within the US armed services—and not by objective analysis of the power capabilities of actual or potential rivals. It is not just the Europeans who want to develop duplicate forces to those already possessed by the US army, navy and marines!

Due to the excessive US defense burden, which has been augmented by the “war on terrorism” and by largely unexpected military peacekeeping presence in Iraq (at least the Pentagon admits underestimating the extent of the resistance!), the US has begun to cut its defense costs by eliminating bases throughout the USA and world—while simultaneously seeking to deploy in bases that are closer to actual and potential threats. Following its March 2003 intervention in Iraq, the US began to downsize 70,000 forces in the “old” Europe and build more cost effective bases in the “new” Europe: Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Some 5,000 to 10,000 troops are to be deployed in Poland, combined with the upgrading of Polish bases. The Pentagon has begun to shift bases from the UK and Germany (except Ramstein Airforce base in Germany, a major site of US nuclear weapon storage) to Italy. The “old” Europe is thus becoming more of a “logistical center,” with Italy at the center, for action in the South rather than a Cold War encampment prepared for an “imminent” Soviet invasion to the East.

A Europe which spends more on defense, even if some of its defense systems are redundant with those of the US, could engage in power sharing with the US and Russia. Power sharing could permit the US to focus on the “new threats” emerging in Asia and elsewhere outside the European theatre, but hopefully in a multilateral context. Not only does Europe need defense capabilities (if it cannot rely entirely on the US!) but it also needs force projection capabilities in order to make its own diplomacy more effective. Diplomacy needs both carrots and sticks; without enough sticks the Europeans will always need to fall back on the US for political-military enforcement—if its diplomacy should fail to achieve desired results. A weak European defense will continue to give the US significant leverage over the European diplomacy—that is, until Europe can build adequate defense and force projection capabilities.

The US possesses high tech defense capabilities for war fighting, yet it also needs low-tech peacekeeping—which the Europeans can provide. It appears that the US will be stuck in Iraq (and NATO in Afghanistan) for quite a while. The Pentagon now appears to be planning fourteen “enduring bases” with a drain on manpower resources (over 100,000 troops through 2006)—at least until Iraqi oil fields can be developed and the

country can be stabilized with a self-confident Iraqi police and military force. My guess is a decade—or more. But if a crisis develops elsewhere, and if the US needs to engage ground forces, there will be big trouble—as the all volunteer force and reservists are already stretched too thin.

Certainly, the Europeans can help supply trained peacekeepers and police for various peacekeeping missions throughout the world, as they are in ex-Yugoslavia and now Afghanistan. Nevertheless, here, the Europeans refuse to accept a two-tiered alliance, in which the Americans do the war fighting and the Europeans “pick up the garbage.” This is another reason why the US and NATO must begin to share decision-making power with both Europe and Russia, and begin to settle a number of disputes through concerted diplomacy where possible. It also shows why it was a colossal blunder of the Bush administration not to go into Iraq without the support of the Europeans and without a UN Security Council mandate...

*IA-Forum: Can Europe define itself against the United States? Is it reasonable to think that politicians might like to build Europe up as the 'counterbalance' to the US?*

Dr. Gardner: It is true that there is a tendency for Europeans to try to define themselves *against* the US in order to help build an identity for a still *undefined* Europe.

The new European constitution is being justified by its supporters as the only means to counter the political-economic pressures of both the US and China. On the other hand, opponents of new Constitution claim to oppose it, not so much because of the Constitution itself, but because the Constitution is regarded as introducing a new style of political and economic liberalism *a l'américain!*

The fact that former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing helped frame the new European constitution has raised fears that Europe will move away from its more traditional form of social democracy and toward American style liberalism. This is due, in part, to the fact that Giscard d'Estaing, when French president, was regarded as instrumental in opening the doors to the free market and to immigration from outside Europe. Another consideration is that whether or not the new European Constitution passes all EU members by 2006, socio-economic questions will tend to move to the forefront—while defense issues will tend to be pushed even farther away—that is, if and when a general economic recovery can take place.

Ironically, should the European states fail to ratify the new Constitution, and hence fail to strengthen European integration, the US might then be blamed for working to undermine European unity, and preventing Europe from challenging America. Dammed if you do; dammed if you don't! The new proposed European Constitution may have a rough time passing in France and some other countries. While Spain has voted “for,” opinion polls in Denmark, the Czech Republic, Poland, as well as France, the Netherlands, and the UK, have expressed opposition. Although some American officials

may secretly hope that Europe will not pass the Constitution, it won't be Washington that prevents the new European Constitution from passing.

Despite Europe's efforts to define itself *against* the Americans, the identity of Europe is still an open question. This is true as long as Turkey, Russia and Ukraine remain outside an expanding EU. Should any of these states ultimately join the EU, it will raise a whole new set of security problems—in addition to raising questions as to the costs of political-economic adjustment in a time of budget cuts.

Americans tend to either over- or under-estimate European power. Europe is either seen as a future fortress (which it will never be) or as an absolute pacifist that incapable of effective military action. Both perceptions are wrong. In this respect, American observers have tended to exaggerate European efforts to become "independent." They have opposed a Europe that can think and act for itself; thus they tend to exaggerate the *future* EU capacity for *independent* military action. On the other hand, they also complain that the US will only respect the EU only once the latter truly begins to flex its muscles and take up its responsibilities.

As it represents a new form of loose confederation, it is dubious that the EU will become a "hard pole" that can wholeheartedly countermand the US in a "multipolar" world. At the same time, although the EU may not actively oppose US actions (it certainly can move into neutrality), the US will soon find the new European Union much more difficult to divide and pressure into compliance.

*IA-Forum: European governments and public attach much importance to topics such as the Kyoto treaty and a very cautious treatment of GM foods. These priorities are not shared in the same way by the U.S. administration. Do you suppose that the war in Iraq was merely to last straw on the Transatlantic Camel's back? Can either position on these topics be considered illegitimate or are those different values with which administrations on both sides of the pond need to deal with - without letting it affect other common goals?*

Dr. Gardner: I tend to think the European positions on the issues of Kyoto and GM foods (not too overlook the International Criminal Court) are more correct than the positions of the Bush administration. We should be more careful about GM foods on the principle, "better safe than sorry." The Bush administration made a big mistake on the Kyoto question; Washington not only needs to take leadership on the issue of global warming, but even more so on the global energy crisis and developing energy alternatives to fossil fuels. Washington really needs to move more rapidly on its 2003 "Hydrogen Posture Plan" initiative to accelerate the development of advanced fuel efficient technologies, such as hybrid gas-electric and fuel cells, coupled with producer and consumer tax incentives—so as to fully realize an alternative energy infrastructure by 2030–40, as promised.

At the same time, however, you are right that differences of these kind of issues should not get in the way of the more positive aspects of security cooperation. Both the US and EU could probably nuance their positions on crucial long-term issues such as

global warming and energy conservation, and GM foods. But the reality is that the latter issues, coupled with others, such as agricultural subsidies, and competition between Boeing and Airbus, claims to Iraqi oil fields, as well as US demands that the Europeans to play a greater peacekeeping and police role in Iraq and elsewhere, not to overlook the International Criminal Court, will continue to play in the background of security issues, making transatlantic cooperation more complicated and difficult.

*IA-Forum: If America vocally chooses to go a very different way than its European allies, is it bound to run into accusations of acting 'unilaterally'?*

Dr. Gardner: When perceived "vital" security interests are at stake both Europeans and Americans may act unilaterally. France and the UK acted unilaterally in the 1956 Suez crisis and the US has not entirely forgiven them. American resentment for Suez in 1956 appears to play a role in the background of the US refusal to support a more autonomous European defense and security capability. In respect to the war in Bosnia, it was Germany (and the Vatican) which acted unilaterally by recognizing Croatia against the counsel of the US, EU and UN, thus turning what was a civil war in ex-Yugoslavia into an international conflict. The Bush, Sr. administration had initially given the Europeans the chance to settle the Bosnian conflict on their own... Who messed it up afterwards depends upon your perspective...

The US then acted unilaterally by intervening in Iraq in 2003 (although not in 1991). The problem is that neither unilateral German actions in respect to Bosnia, nor unilateral US actions in respect to Iraq, were really in the long-term interests of either country, nor were these actions in the long term interests of their allies. But when the leadership of states want to act unilaterally at the time when action is demanded, there is really no way to show that such actions might prove to be counterproductive, and that they might lead to even more dilemmas and deeper crises. The issue is really a question of *hubris* and impatience in wanting to resolve the crisis as soon as possible and in not wanting to be bogged down in costly, infinite discussions that may ultimately lose domestic and international political support.

The difficulties encountered by efforts to use the appropriate mix of diplomacy *and* force often leads to demands for more radical actions and military "solutions." Yet even those more radical actions do not necessarily resolve the crisis either, but often create new ones, which may even be worse, as I believe has proved the case for Iraq, and to a lesser extent Afghanistan. To my mind, continued multilateral pressures in respect to Bosnia, Kosovo, as well as Iraq, however imperfect, would have had relatively more positive results in the long term... but we'll never know for sure...

*IA-Forum: Russia and its attempts to influence neighboring countries' policies, its dealings with Chechnya, and handling of the free media raises questions about its reliability as a partner for the west and democracy. How should Europe and the U.S. deal with Russia/Putin?*

Dr. Gardner: There is a real danger in exaggerating the Russian “threat” as "An Open Letter to the Heads of State and Government Of the European Union and NATO" written on 28 September 2004 and signed by a number of leading neo-conservatives, tends to do. The latter strongly criticizes President Putin's steps toward an "authoritarian regime." The letter paints an alarmist picture and offers nothing concrete as to what to do about the problems that Russia does face. In this respect, the question of free media in Russia is problematic but not quite as bad as generally depicted. The number of new newspapers, magazines and books published in Russia has actually increased by almost ten percent annually; Russian internet sites are highly critical of the government. Opposition views are aired on the nationally controlled media. (But look at the difficulties Ralph Nader faced in trying to open up debate on the major TV networks in the US, whether one agrees with his point of view or not!)

Making accusations, without making positive suggestions as how to do things differently, and most crucially, without also practicing what one preaches, will only make US-Russian relations even worse and exacerbate Russian suspicions. Russia will be quick to point out hypocrisies and double standards in US policy and behavior. Russians make parallels between US actions in Iraq to its own actions in Chechnya, for example (regarding the Iraq situation as worse). The state of Russian prisons is lamentable, but those in the US are in bad shape as well. President Putin was quick to note that George Bush had been “chosen” by the Supreme Court for his first term— and that Russia will “democratize” at its own pace.

Without excusing the present situation, the steps away from Soviet totalitarianism only began in the Khrushchev period; they were then picked up by Gorbachev. Some of the wilder excesses of the Yeltsin years are now being countered by the Putin administration, albeit not always in the right way. Rightfully or wrongfully, fears that Chechen demands for secession could lead to similar secessionist demands in other regions throughout the country have led to brutal acts of repression in the Caucasus.

These factors, combined with fears that the globalized world economy will drain Russia of its capital, or lead the Russian "patriarchs" to invest their fortunes elsewhere, tend to augment domestic demands for a strong authoritarian government. Faced, on the one hand, with fears of further territorial disaggregation and further decapitalization, and then with the real possibility of a *revanchist* backlash, on the other, an authoritarian Russian government, may, unfortunately, represent the less problematic option. Without downplaying the need for significant political and economic reforms, Russia, as an “illiberal democracy,” appears here to stay for quite a while.

The problem is that the US and Europe can not sit back and wait for Russian behavior to change—without actively engaging Russia in areas that serve the interests of all sides. Rather, the US needs to engage with Russia in joint peacekeeping, and with joint NATO-Russian patrols of Baltic air space. In April 2005, important steps were taken to forge the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Russia and other NATO members. This has opened the way for joint exercises and other projects, and provides a legal basis for granting NATO troops transit rights through Russia, including



the temporary deployment of armed forces on foreign territory for peacekeeping exercises, anti-terrorist training operations, and emergencies, in accordance with the Partnership for Peace program. This is a positive step forward despite all the other rhetoric and mutual imprecations...

Given the possibility that Russia may accept greater international assistance to help it deal with its own problems, it should then be possible to help Russia find a way to more gradually devolve controls over regions that may begin to demand secession, for example, and thus moderate those demands. In this respect, the NATO Status of Forces Agreement should ultimately result in the formation of a joint NATO-EU-Russian peacekeeping command to be deployed in Kaliningrad.

A peacekeeping HQ in Kaliningrad would represent a means to solidify the security relationship between Russia, Europe and the United States, and help anchor Kaliningrad, which is presently "isolated" from Russia, and prevent it from "seceding" from Moscow by giving it a new "internationalized" status. This would help start the long process of framing the appropriate security conditions for the development of eastern Europe, the Caucasus, central Asia, and perhaps the Middle East, and help to provide greater autonomy and independence for various states and regions throughout the former Soviet Union—in part by formulating overlapping NATO, EU and Russian security guarantees for each region and through the deployments of multinational peacekeepers.

*IA-Forum: Tony Blair recently said that lifting the EU embargo on arms sales to China would send the wrong signal about human rights abuses and have a negative impact on transatlantic relations. Moreover, concerns have been voiced that lifting the embargo may strengthen China's military capability. Do you agree?*

Dr. Gardner: Here, on this matter, I strongly agree with the US and UK. The primary issue confronting the global system is how to manage China's rise to major power status. European arms sales to China would, in fact, send the wrong signal about human rights abuses and strengthen China's efforts to gain Taiwan by force. At the same time, I am not certain the US has been engaging in the right form of diplomacy designed to lessen the apparently burgeoning tensions over North Korea and between China and Taiwan.

It's not at all clear how effectively such European arms sales will be supervised, even if the EU does formulate a general "code of conduct" to regulate future arms sales to China, as it has promised. The prospect of European arms sales to China may also put pressure on the US to break the arms embargo imposed after the Tiananmen Square repression in June 1989, or else increase arms sales to Taiwan, at the same time that it could exacerbate arms rivalries with Russia. European arms sales would represent a "no win" situation that would only serve to improve Beijing's long-term advantage over Taipei.

Not to engage China in diplomatic terms is to risk a Sino-Russian re-alliance, at the same time that Russia needs to be drawn away from support for China. (Recent steps toward a closer Sino-Russian defense alliance represents another reason why not to alienate Moscow.) The tacit threat of a possible continental EU-Chinese-Russian combo (a front that came together before the Iraq war) does not help either. Another scenario is that an "encircling" EU-Chinese entente that would eventually exacerbate traditional Russian fears of "encirclement." This would ironically create a situation somewhat reminiscent of the Franco-Russian Dual alliance that upset both Imperial Germany and Great Britain, in the years before World War I. To my mind, American global strategy must work to avert either a Russo-Chinese alliance or a Euro-Chinese entente at all costs...

*IA-Forum: The White House states that one of its goals, as a part of the American International Strategy, is to "strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends." How would you grade U.S. efforts to accomplish this to date? What further actions must be taken to achieve them?*

Dr. Gardner: I think it is clear that the US should have dealt with one crisis at a time. The Bush administration had virtually unanimous international and domestic support for its intervention in Afghanistan against the Taliban and *Al-Qaida*; yet that generally favorable American world image with respect to Afghanistan has faded sharply after the essentially unilateral American intervention in Iraq. I would grade the Bush administration a "B-" for the intervention in Afghanistan and a "D-" for Iraq.

Although the US worked through the UN and in a multilateral context with respect to the Taliban and *Al-Qaida* in Afghanistan, the US did not capture bin Laden—and hardly broke up his network. True, the Taliban have been uprooted from power, but they have been rebuilding their strength, as have various warlords and drug kings, who are unfortunately inter-mixed with the Afghan government. Opium production is up at least 10 to 20 times: Afghanistan now produces some 90% of the world's opium. NATO is attempting to move westward out of Kabul, but at the risk of destabilizing the country, particularly along the Afghan-Pakistani border.

In Iraq, the US definitely did not plan for the obvious in the aftermath of the war, even if one accepts the (false) premise that the intervention was ultimately unavoidable. The sanctions regime, combined with the bombing campaign since 1998, was working; Saddam would have eventually fallen. While the US (or Kurdish forces) did capture Saddam Hussein, America's own actions have fueled Sunni nationalist resistance by seeking to force all Ba'ath party members out of positions of power, rather than just those top leaders accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. By not deploying sufficient forces in the aftermath of the military intervention, pan-Islamic forces have been able to slip into the country, and are effectively destabilizing the country, along with mafias and common criminals.

It is furthermore likely that even the “democratically” elected government in Iraq will ultimately turn against US interests. The alienation of the Sunnis, in particular, but also the Turkoman and Christian communities, without necessarily gaining the allegiance of the Shi’ites, will continue to cause major problems, as will Kurdish demands for greater “autonomy.” The Iraqis will want to keep oil prices as high as possible in order to rebuild the country; in general, they would also prefer US forces to withdraw as soon as possible, but that prospect appears dubious at present... it will take years for Iraq (as well as Afghanistan) to get back on its feet.

Despite the fact that both the Afghan and Iraqi people have begun to vote for the first time, the US is not "winning" this war, but engaging in what represents a lopsided war of attrition, in which one side, with tens of thousands of combatants worldwide, and which appears to be gaining more and more supporters, spends very little in terms of actual costs to wage a new form of highly *mediatized* warfare. By contrast, the American side has been impelled to spend billions of dollars. Forcing the US to spend billions of dollars—money that could be used for other vital concerns—leads the other side of the “terrorists” to claim that it is "winning" against the world’s lonely superpower...

How can the US “win” the “hearts and minds” of populations (that generally do not trust the Americans to begin with)—when the US uses torture techniques in both Iraq and Guantanamo that appear intended to denigrate Arab/Islamic culture, values, and beliefs? Look at the rioting that has just taken place (in May) in Jalabad over an unconfirmed *Newsweek* story that interrogators had placed Korans on toilets... Certainly, the protest in Afghanistan was manipulated, and takes advantage of the fact that democratic state structures have not yet had the time to take root, but even apologies from *Newsweek* will not mollify the rage that still obtains its fuel from the generally cynical approach of neo-conservatives within the Bush administration and their lack of diplomatic finesse in dealing with the complex problems of the “greater” Middle East and elsewhere...

The only way to “win” this war is through concerted diplomacy and through greater development assistance that really goes to those who most need it. To do this, the US does need to “strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism” as the White House put it, but at the same time, Washington must be careful that US and allied actions do not exacerbate the situation, as has appeared to be the case in Iraq, and increasingly in Afghanistan, while relations with both Iran and North Korea likewise appear to be plummeting. In this respect, secret special force operations may be necessary to wipe out various militant pan-Islamic cells where possible; yet the US must engage in a more active diplomacy in helping to resolve the core geopolitical disputes by working with the regional powers most concerned.

In particular, this means engaging in a concerted and “alternative realist” strategy, along side the Europeans, as well as with the Russians and Chinese where possible, to ameliorate, if not resolve, the interrelated disputes involving India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Israel and Palestinians, not to overlook the geopolitical, and now nuclear, tensions with North Korea left over from the Cold War. In cases of Iran and North Korea, the US may need to work out bilateral security assurances, in addition to setting up a multilateral

frame work for trade or development assistance—but only if the appropriate conditions are finally met. It will likewise take concerted efforts to achieve positive political and economic reforms throughout the Arab/ Islamic world in general, while engaging a bit more quietly in the “war on terrorism.” The predicament is that Washington cannot afford to risk alienating the Europeans, the Russians or the Chinese in the interim as it continues to fight its “war on terror.” Dealing with Russia, and China in particular, will present the greatest challenge in the decades to come...

Bio: Hall Gardner

Hall Gardner is professor and chair of the Department of International Affairs and Politics at the American University of Paris. He completed both his M.A. (1982) and PhD. (1987) at the Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He taught at the Johns Hopkins-SAIS-Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies (1988-89) and at Johns Hopkins SAIS-Washington (1989-90) before coming to the American University of Paris in 1990.

With a focus on preventing major power conflict, Gardner's publications include, *Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia and the Future of NATO* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997); *Surviving the Millennium: American Global Strategy, the Collapse of the Soviet Empire, and the Question of Peace* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994). He is editor of, and contributor to, *NATO and the European Union: New World, New Europe, New Threats* (Ashgate, 2004); *The New Transatlantic Agenda: Facing the Challenges of Global Governance* (London: Ashgate, September 2001); and *Central and Southeastern Europe in Transition: Perspectives on Success and Failure* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000)

He spoke at the NATO 50th Anniversary Academic Conference held in Brussels and Bonn in May 1999 and at the Atlantic Council conference held in Slovenia in October 2001. He organized (and spoke at) the conference *NATO and the European Union: New World, New Europe, New Threats* held at the French Senate in December 2001. He was invited by Mikhail Gorbachev to speak on the topic ‘Transcending the New Global Disequilibrium’ at the World Political Forum (founded by Mikhail Gorbachev, Bill Clinton and the former president of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso) held in Torino Italy, in October 2003. His paper ‘Transcending the New Global Disequilibrium’ appears on the WPF website,

<http://www.theworldpoliticalforum.org/b1.php?id=9>.)

His forthcoming book, *American Global Strategy and the War on Terrorism* is to be published by Ashgate in September 2005. Amitai Etzioni, author of *From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations*, has stated, "A truly remarkable book. Few if any other volumes provide such an encompassing overview of the most

troubling issues that the world faces in the wake of the Cold War's end and the 2001 attack on the United States homeland. Neither neo-realist nor neo-con, just straightforward, powerful analysis."

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American Global Strategy And the 'War on Terrorism'  
by Hall Gardner

Contemporary international events, and indeed, even the US presidential election, demonstrate the continuing need for debate and discourse over the direction and emphases of US foreign policy. American Global Strategy and the War on Terrorism addresses a wide range of themes that are crucial to understanding the post-11 September 2001 crisis and to formulating an effective American and global foreign and security policy to deal with that crisis. Gardner seeks to re-conceptualize the 'war on terrorism' and to analyze the nature of American domestic and international policy making within the context of historical and structural constraints upon US policy.

The book contends that US strategy needs to shift gears and work more diligently to minimize the risks of even wider regional conflicts, possibly involving major powers, through engaging in truly multilateral strategies and through 'strengthening' the UN. This study should be read by contemporary policymakers and scholars of foreign policy.

Hall Gardner is presently Professor and Chair of the International Affairs Department of the American University of Paris, France.

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On American Global Strategy and the War on Terrorism, author Amitai Etzioni says: "A truly remarkable book. Few if any other volumes provide such an encompassing overview of the most troubling issues that the world faces in the wake of the Cold War's end and the 2001 attack on the United States homeland. Neither neo-realist nor neo-con, just straightforward, powerful analysis."

---Amitai Etzioni, author of From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations