Constitutions are foundational documents that shape the political and legal structure of a nation. In democratic systems, they are intended to establish a clear separation of powers, protect individual rights, and ensure that governance is responsive to the needs of the people.

However, leaders in countries like Venezuela, Russia, and Turkey have exploited constitutional amendments to centralize power, eroding democratic institutions. Indonesia faces similar risks with proposals like presidential term extensions and reintroducing state policy guidelines (PPHN), raising concerns over potential abuses of power. This article examines these issues through global comparisons and suggests reforms to safeguard democracy.

Hence, the following lines are examining how the mechanism of constitutional amendments can be misused to consolidate power and undermine democratic norms, a phenomenon known as abusive constitutionalism. By analyzing cases from Turkey, Russia, Venezuela, and China, it explores how leaders manipulate legal frameworks to entrench authority and foster a cult of personality. The paper highlights preventative measures such as eternity clauses, the basic structure doctrine, and civil society engagement as safeguards to protect democracy. It also considers how Indonesia can strengthen its constitutional framework to prevent authoritarianism.

Using conceptual legal research and a comparative approach, this study aims to answer three key questions: (1) What drives the proposed constitutional amendments in Indonesia? (2) How do these proposals align with principles of constitutionalism and democracy? (3) What safeguards can prevent abusive constitutional practices in Indonesia? It seeks to address the research questions by evaluating how constitutional amendments have led to abusive constitutionalism, focusing on Indonesia's current proposals. Cases from countries such as India, Colombia, and Venezuela provide insights into how term limit extensions, power shifts, and personalization undermine democratic principles. The study emphasizes the role of civil society in maintaining accountability.

II. Constitution, Legal Order and Political Power

2.1 Comparative Framework: Abusive Constitutionalism in a Global Context

Abusive constitutionalism, as defined by David Landau, refers to the manipulation of constitutional mechanisms to undermine democracy under the guise of legal reform. This global phenomenon has been observed in countries like Hungary, Venezuela, Turkey, China, Colombia, and Indonesia. Tactics include extending presidential terms, weakening checks and balances, co-opting judicial institutions, and consolidating power under the rhetoric of stability or national progress.

In Colombia, the 1991 constitution limited the president to a single term to prevent the rise of authoritarian leaders, seeking to entrench power. However, President Álvaro Uribe Vélez sought to amend the constitution to allow re-election, raising concerns about democratic backsliding. Similarly, in Venezuela, constitutional reforms extended the presidential term from one four-year term to two six-year terms, enabling Hugo Chávez to consolidate power. Like Colombia’s example, these amendments were framed as necessary for national progress, but they ultimately allowed for the rise of authoritarian rule.

In Hungary, the ruling party employed both amendments and replacements to the constitution to consolidate power. This included adding more constitutional court judges, restructuring key state commissions, and making it more difficult to amend the constitution in ways that could challenge the ruling party’s dominance. These measures illustrate how constitutional reforms can be used as tools for entrenching power, rather than reforming governance. Similar trends are observable in Indonesia, where proposed constitutional amendments, such as reintroducing the National Guidelines (PPHN), may serve to further centralize authority in the hands of the president.

Rosalind Dixon and David Landau’s concept of Abusive Constitutional Borrowing highlights how democratic frameworks are repurposed for authoritarian control, often by weakening institutions like constitutional courts or anti-corruption bodies. Research shows that while leaders frequently attempt to evade term limits through constitutional changes, public resistance, rather than judicial intervention, is often the key deterrent.

The global patterns suggest that Indonesia’s proposed amendments may not aim to improve governance but rather consolidate power, exemplifying Landau’s concept of abusive constitutionalism.

2.2 SEA as a Case Study: Current Constitutional Proposals

This section examines the largest country of Southeastern Asia, that or RI's proposed constitutional amendments, specifically the reintroduction of the National Guidelines (PPHN) and the extension of the presidential term, highlighting their potential to reshape the country's political landscape. While these proposals are framed as governance and stability enhancements, they raise concerns about democratic principles and the risk of power consolidation. While Article 37 provides a structured framework for constitutional amendments, it centralizes power within the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), raising concerns about potential abuse. The MPR could prioritize the interests of the ruling party, potentially undermining democratic accountability.

Key concerns include:

1. Reintroduction of the PPHN: This could centralize policy control under the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), weakening the independence of other state institutions.
2. Presidential Term Extension: Extending the presidency to three terms risks eroding safeguards against power personalization and weakening democratic consolidation.

Though Article 37 legitimizes the amendment process, it also reveals vulnerabilities where mechanisms intended to enable constitutional change can be exploited for undemocratic purposes. This aligns with global trends in abusive constitutionalism, where amendment processes are used to entrench power rather than strengthen democracy. The subsequent analysis will assess whether these proposals represent genuine reforms or potential abuses.

2.3 The Role of the Cult of Personality in Consolidating Power

The cult of personality is a political strategy where leaders create a heroic and idealized image to centralize authority, often undermining institutional governance. Personalization of power centralizes decision-making, undermining institutional integrity and democratic norms. While it may offer short-term stability, it often results in volatile governance. A comparative analysis of China, Russia, and Turkey illustrates how personalization of power influences governance and constitutional changes.

In China, Xi Jinping has constructed a cult of personality through state propaganda, portraying himself as indispensable to China's future. The removal of presidential term limits in 2018 marked a significant step toward consolidating indefinite rule, shifting governance from a collective leadership model to a centralized and personalized system. This strengthens Xi’s authority but risks long-term instability.

Similarly, Vladimir Putin has cultivated a strongman image tied to Russia's global resurgence. Constitutional changes in 2020 reset term limits, allowing him to stay in power until 2036. Unlike China, Russia maintains a façade of democratic institutions, which are systematically weakened to ensure control.

In Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has used populist rhetoric to reshape governance. The 2017 constitutional referendum transitioned Turkey from a parliamentary to a Semi-Presidential system (of the French type), granting Erdogan extensive executive powers while eroding judicial and legislative independence. His leadership demonstrates how personalization can align institutional frameworks with individual authority.

All three leaders use propaganda, legalistic and legal mechanism of constitutional amendments, and weakened institutional checks to consolidate power. However, their methods differ: China relies on institutional propaganda, Russia undermines democratic processes while maintaining a democratic façade, and Turkey invokes populist narratives. 

While Indonesia faces some risk of developing a cult of personality under a charismatic leader like President Prabowo Subianto, its democratic safeguards act as barriers. The multi-party system, decentralized governance, and two-term presidential limit reduce the risk of power concentration. Additionally, Indonesia's historical experience with Suharto’s authoritarian regime has fostered societal resistance to personalization of power. However, threats like media control, weakened institutions, or populist appeals remain, making vigilance and reform essential for preserving democracy.

2.4 Abusive Constitutionalism: Detection and Prevention

The personalization of power, as observed in China, Russia, and Turkey, often manifests through constitutional amendments that consolidate authority. To counteract such trends, it is essential to explore mechanisms that protect constitutional integrity and democratic principles from being abused—a concern that resonates with Indonesia's ongoing constitutional debates.

Abusive constitutionalism, where leaders manipulate constitutional amendments to entrench their power, poses a significant threat to democratic integrity. Lessons from India, Colombia, and Venezuela highlight strategies to prevent such practices, focusing on eternity clauses, the basic structure doctrine, and civil society involvement. These mechanisms aim to protect the constitution’s fundamental principles from being jeopardized by constitutional amendments.

Eternity Clauses

Certain core democratic principles, like executive power limitations, should be enshrined as unalterable. For example, Colombia used eternity clauses to block amendments extending presidential terms, with civil society and courts preserving institutional integrity. Likewise, Indonesia’s constitution already includes immutable clauses (e.g., protecting the unitary state), but clauses related to term limits and the balance of powers should also be safeguarded.

Basic Structure Doctrine

This doctrine, pioneered in India, ensures that fundamental constitutional principles cannot be amended. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), India’s Supreme Court ruled that constitutional amendments cannot alter the constitution's core framework. Indonesia’s judiciary could adopt similar judicial review mechanisms to block amendments concentrating power in the presidency or weakening checks and balances.

Civil Society

Active civil society is crucial for resisting constitutional abuses. Public pressure and grassroots activism can expose and challenge manipulative amendments. For example, Venezuela’s failure to maintain an independent judiciary or robust civil society allowed repeated amendments that eroded democracy under Hugo Chávez. In contrast, Colombia and India demonstrate how civil society and judicial action can resist overreach.

Indonesia’s vibrant civil society and constitutional safeguards have so far resisted elite-driven amendments, such as proposals for term extensions or system changes justified as necessary for stability. However, increasing media control and elite-driven reforms in Indonesia make public engagement and judicial oversight ever more crucial to prevent potential abuses of democratic principles.

Summary and outlook

This analysis highlights the risks posed by selected countries’ proposed constitutional amendments, which aim to strengthen the executive branch through measures like extending presidential terms and reintroducing the PPHN of largest country in SEA. These changes mirror trends in Russia, Turkey, and China, where centralizing power fosters a cult of personality, erodes institutional independence, and undermines democratic principles.

The amendments could diminish democratic accountability, weaken institutional safeguards, and pave the way for authoritarian rule by concentrating power among political elites. To counteract such risks, these countries must strengthen checks and balances, adopt mechanisms like eternity clauses and the basic structure doctrine, and ensure robust civil society engagement in constitutional processes.

A political culture emphasizing pluralism, transparency, and institutional independence is imperative to preserving democratic values and preventing the personalization of power. The analysis concludes that while constitutional reforms may be justified as necessary for progress, history shows their potential to consolidate power and erode democracy, emphasizing the importance of preventive measures against authoritarianism.

Authors:

Prof. Dr. Djawed Sangdel, Managing Rector of the Swiss UFEM University, Geneva. The State MP of the Swiss Confederation’s Genevé Grand Conseil.

Damla Mesulam of Leiden University, The Hague, specialized in International Relations and Organizations. Her research spans EU-Turkey relations, sustainability, and social justice activism. Currently, she is research fellow of the International Institute IFIMES in Hague, Netherlands.