By Dr. Ore David Koren

The September 11, 2001, attacks introduced millions of Americans to the lethal capabilities of terrorist organizations. In the aftermath, the War on Terror focused primarily on defeating terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and ISIL, while trying to pressure states that provided them safe havens. This emphasis on counterterrorism, however, overlooked a significant shift in global security: over the past two decades, the landscape of conflict has increasingly seen the rise of proxy militias as key actors.

A proxy militia is an armed nonstate group that operates with the support of a state, often to extend that state’s influence or achieve its goals indirectly. Unlike rebel groups, which typically fight against the state, proxy militias often work alongside governments, serving as part of the state’s security apparatus or political enforcers. These militias are backed by their sponsors with resources, training, and political support, making them more deeply integrated into the local power structure.

Their proliferation has been driven partly by the War on Terror, when the U.S. began using Shiite and Kurdish proxy militias in coalition efforts to counter ISIL in Iraq and the Assad regime in Syria. It accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic and with the re-emergence of a new “Cold War,” where conflict increasingly occurs through proxies rather than direct state confrontation. As many states worldwide face internal challenges from population pressures and economic stagnation, the door has opened for alternative security organizations, such as proxy militias, to take root and expand.

In Ukraine, for example, both the Ukrainian and Russian governments operated their own proxy militias. Other examples include the Janjaweed in Sudan, vigilantes in Nigeria, the Kamajors in Sierra Leone, and the Iranian Basij. In fact, the Basij has been so effective in aiding domestic control and repression that proxy militias have become a key strategic tool for Iran, extending influence from Iraq and Lebanon to Gaza and Yemen.

What sets proxy militias apart from traditional insurgents or terrorists is their dual role as both paramilitary and political actors. They operate within the political and social fabric of their region, often enjoying local legitimacy and support. Unlike, terrorist groups, proxy militias may be seen as more legitimate, particularly by those who benefit from their presence or align with their political or ethnic affiliations. These organizations leverage close ties with local civilians and support from state sponsors to expand their influence. Countering proxy militias presents modern militaries with a complex challenge, demanding responses that balance military pressure with strategic diplomacy.

In recent months, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has launched a combined arms campaign against two of the most powerful Iranian proxy militias operating in some of the world’s most densely populated areas: Hamas, a former terror group and an unrecognized political movement that in 2017 became a de-facto Iranian proxy militia by receiving government funding, training, and equipment; and Hezbollah, an easy contender for the title of the world’s most powerful proxy militia.

Hamas has constructed an extensive tunnel network beneath civilian homes in one of the world’s most densely populated regions, using hospitals, schools, mosques, and even U.N. facilities, as cover for military activities. Hezbollah has similarly fortified southern Beirut’s Dahya district, creating a vast underground system of bunkers, tunnels, weapons caches, and weapon factories, beneath residential high-rises. Additionally, Hezbollah has built a sprawling network of tunnels and bunkers throughout villages and open areas in southern Lebanon in preparation for an attack on Israel. Some of these structures are reportedly so large that detonations have triggered seismic alerts, as was recently observed during a detonation of a Hezbollah tunnel.

And yet, despite facing two highly complex battlefields, the IDF has managed to cripple these groups, minimizing its own and often, contrary to critiques, civilian casualties. While the war is still ongoing, if offers lessons that may be useful for other Western forces on how to militarily tackle this imminent global challenge.

Heavy Reliance on Airpower, Automation, and Combined Operations

Proxy militias benefit from deep local knowledge and the ability to switch between civilian and military attire. This blending with the population creates an information asymmetry, allowing militias to inflict significant harm on even well-trained opposing forces who lack the same level of local support and insight.

To solve this informational problem, the IDF’s operational approach relies heavily on airpower, integrating both manned and unmanned systems with infantry and armored support, as well as other critical assets. In practice, this means that before troops engage a target on the ground, the area is intensively analyzed, and an attack cell is engaged. This attack cell includes infantry or armor, field intelligence, artillery, combat drones, and air support. Commanders demarcate a “line of engagement” to prevent friendly fire, but crucially, the preferred approach is to eliminate enemy forces via air or artillery before ground troops are exposed to direct fire. This minimizes troop casualties, allowing forces to maintain constant aerial surveillance and eliminate enemies from a distance whenever possible. To further protect troops, the IDF also utilizes ground robots, including rovers and remote-guided bulldozers.

The use of airpower wherever possible is another key characteristic of the IDF’s operational approach. The Israeli military has successfully used airstrikes to eliminate dozens of high-ranking Hamas and Hezbollah leaders. This approach ensures rapid exploitation of precise intelligence, as targets, including remote or fortified structures, can be reached and neutralized with speed and accuracy. While ground troops may engage when necessary, the preference for air and drone strikes underscores an operational philosophy centered on minimizing risk to personnel while maximizing impact through combined arms.

The use of combined arms with heavy reliance on aircraft and UAV firepower also substitutes, although imperfectly, for the need to take and hold territory, by targeting enemies, withdrawing, and reengage as enemies regroup. By engaging enemies intermittently, the IDF applies consistent, focused pressure while avoiding the substantial costs of occupation. This strategy has proven effective in pressuring enemy leadership, as seen in repeated strikes in Rafah, which may have pushed Hamas’s Sinwar to attempt an escape, leading to his elimination.

Similarly, in South Lebanon, the IDF uses combined arms attack cells to engage in targeted operations on specific areas and villages, where it captures the territory, eliminates or captures Hezbollah troops, destroys tunnels and infrastructure, then retreats. This allows the IDF to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy and minimizing its capacities, while minimizing, where possible, the risk of troop exposure to direct fire.

Targeting Commanders, Key Assets, and Smuggling Routes

Proxy militias have additional advantages, including access to weapon caches and backing from their sponsors. Like traditional military organizations, their leaders and commanders bring tactical knowledge and specialized skills that enhance combat effectiveness. At the same time, much like political parties, they can rally local support, strengthening their operations and cause. These features pose a challenge for militaries aiming to weaken these groups, yet they also provide specific “pressure points” that can be strategically advantageous.

Rather than trying to eliminate every enemy operative, the IDF focuses on high-impact targets: political and military leaders, senior and mid-level commanders (including force, division, and battalion leaders), and key weapons caches. It also targets smugglers and smuggling routes (including those in Syria) to disrupt the flow of Iranian weapons to Hamas and Hezbollah. This strategy includes destroying bridges and passes linking Syria and Lebanon, striking critical midpoints in Syria, and maintaining control over the Philadelphi Corridor, which Hamas has used to smuggle weapons from Egypt.

The purpose of this approach is not to decimate foot soldiers, but to destabilize the enemy’s organizational structure, breaking down morale and creating pressure for defections. The elimination of senior leaders—such as Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine, and Hamas’s Muhamad Deif, Ismail Haniyeh, and Yahya Sinwar—not only carries symbolic weight but also serves a strategic purpose. They also serve a strategic purpose, signaling that command structures are vulnerable while harming attempts for strategic planning and response.

Mid-level commanders, who manage tactical operations, are prioritized as well, as their elimination creates immediate operational disruptions. In Hezbollah’s case, targeting senior and mid-level commanders effectively erases the combat experience the organization has accumulated from its involvement in Syria and, earlier, in South Lebanon during 2006 and before 2000. In Hamas’s case, eliminating battalion and regiment leaders who participated in the Second Intifada and its 2006-07 conflict with Fatah also erases important experience. The constant elimination of these commanders—some Hezbollah force commanders who took over after a comrade was assassinated did not even survive in their new position for more than a few days—also harm morale and create pressures on rank-and-file troops.

To complement the impact of decimating leaders and commanders, the IDF also prioritizes destroying weapon caches and preventing weapon smuggling. Most attacks in Beirut are intended to destroy missile and drone caches and factories, located under civilian buildings. The IDF also prioritizes attacking tunnels and roads connecting Syria and Lebanon to choke Hezbollah’s lifeline from its sponsor. In Gaza, the IDF destroyed tunnels used for weapon production and smuggling.

Achieving Control over New Warfare Domains

A major challenge in both Gaza and Lebanon was the intricate system of tunnels, that totaled hundreds of miles in length, cost billions of dollars, and took years to dig. After the October 2023 attack, Hamas called for the IDF to meet its end at the “tunnels of resistance.” The IDF was unprepared for tackling this challenge, mainly because no military had faced a similar tunnel challenge of that magnitude in the past. With thousands of shafts hidden in civilian houses and under thick scrublands, simply locating these tunnels was a major challenge.

Instead of shying away from subterranean challenges, the IDF made it a top priority. Recognizing the strategic significance of underground warfare, the IDF deployed its elite combat engineering forces and K9 units, while also assigning its premier military unit, 262 (Matkal), to lead the effort. This approach was further reinforced by the development of specialized drones and robots designed to scout the tunnels before soldiers entered.

As a result, within a few months, the IDF completely changed the subterranean warfare map. Rather than avoiding the tunnels, IDF troops dominated them, operating undetected by Hamas and prioritizing the destruction of key tunnels to cripple entire networks. Their ability to move through the tunnels with impunity may have been a key factor in forcing Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar to surface, where he was eventually eliminated.

Tunnels are a key feature of proxy warfare, used by both militias and sponsoring regimes. Adapting to subterranean combat will be crucial for Western militaries. The IDF's success in mastering underground warfare highlights a broader trend: new domains and forms of warfare—such as space gliders, drone swarms, and lasers—are emerging at an alarming pace. In this environment, military adaptability is paramount. A flexible culture, intelligence, and strategy are no longer just assets; they are necessities.

Minimizing Civilian Harm Amid Urban Warfare Challenges

One of the most difficult realities of modern urban warfare is the unavoidable risk to civilian lives, especially when adversaries deliberately position themselves within civilian populations, where they often enjoy a lot of support. Proxy militias like Hamas and Hezbollah exploit this environment by leveraging local support to embed key facilities and bunkers within civilian infrastructure, even planning to use civilians as human shields. Hamas’s leader Yahya Sinwar has explicitly made the use of civilian casualties a key part of his strategy and Hamas regularly.

The reality of modern warfare is that trying to dismantle these proxy militias by eliminating targets in dense urban areas will cause civilian casualties. For example, the War on Terror has been associated with an estimated three-to-four noncombatants killed for every enemy combatant eliminated, with the ratio potentially being even higher. Since 2000, urbanization levels worldwide more than doubled, making many regions where proxy militias operate (and in contrast to where militaries often operate) especially dense with civilians. Targeting these areas requires a sober assessment of the benefits of eliminating a given threat compared with the civilian risk; the higher the level of threat posed, or the value of the target is, the more that civilian casualties are likely to be tolerated.

To reduce civilian harm wherever possible, the IDF has adopted various methods to warn civilians in advance, including paradropping speakers, automated phone calls, and drones that emit combat sounds to encourage civilians to evacuate, even at the risk of reducing operational success. These techniques are coupled with precise munitions that can take down a target building while leaving neighboring structures intact. Civilian casualties are unavoidable in war, especially when the enemy uses them as human shields. This practice of forewarning and targeted strikes helps minimize collateral damage, balancing the need to eliminate key threats with efforts to limit harm to civilians outside the target area.

The resulting death toll, particularly in Gaza, is highly polarizing. Hamas estimates—which may  be inflated, include all civilian deaths (including indirect causes like displacement or health issues or unrelated deaths), and do not separate combatants from civilians—claim 43,552 dead as of this writing. The IDF estimates approximately 18,000 of the reported deaths are combatants, suggesting a combatant-to-noncombatant ratio of up to 2.4—consistent with norms from the War on Terror. In Lebanon, the Health Ministry estimates over 3,136 deaths at the time of writing. The IDF estimates that between 2,000 and 3,000 of these were Hezbollah operatives, suggesting a combatant-to-noncombatant ratio between 1:0.4 and 1:0.05

What the IDF Shows Not to Do

The conduct of the IDF also demonstrates some of the pitfalls that fighting proxy militias can pose. One is inadequate framing in military operations, particularly when engaging international audiences who are often unfamiliar with local contexts, as well as civilians in war zones. In Gaza, the IDF’s operations are often portrayed as defensive and face intense scrutiny for civilian impact, even when similar campaigns elsewhere have caused greater tolls.

The U.S., for example, has arguably done an effective job framing battles like Fallujah and Mosul as liberation efforts to efforts to free civilians from oppressive regimes, helping these campaigns to be perceived as just victories, despite very high civilian tolls. In Lebanon, by framing its efforts as a regional stabilization campaign to reduce Hezbollah’s influence, Israel saw less international backlash and greater acceptance, even among many Lebanese, suggesting strategic framing can shift perceptions.

Another major challenge is countering low-cost, effective attacks like drones, rockets, IEDs, and tunnels. Systems like the Iron Dome and David’s Sling intercept most rockets, but some still get through; similarly, drones evade Air Force interceptions despite high success rates. To combat IEDs, the IDF deploys explosive barrels and “suicide APCs” to detonate traps in urban areas, while dismantling tunnels requires ground troops and extensive explosives. The high cost of preempting these threats creates an asymmetry favoring proxy militias, making them powerful, low-cost assets for their sponsors. Prioritizing affordable countermeasures is essential; for instance, the IDF missed potential gains from collaborating with Ukraine on drone defenses.

Broader Takeaways for Western Warfare

While Israel is waging an existential war, other Western states still have strategic flexibility, allowing them to avoid costly conflicts and minimize civilian harm. This buffer, however, is shrinking. For instance, the Houthis—a rebel group turned Iranian proxy—have disrupted global shipping through low-cost technology, supporting Iran’s efforts to pressure Israel both directly and indirectly.

Because the U.S. and U.K. do not view the Houthis as an existential threat, they have taken a primarily defensive stance, intercepting missiles and drones targeting ships and, more recently, increasing airstrikes on weapon caches. However, this has not deterred attacks. While this perception might be changing, Western powers nevertheless remain cautious, unwilling to escalate in Yemen and seeking to avoid civilian casualties, as Houthi bunkers and weapons caches are embedded in populated areas. Without a strategic shift, this restraint is likely to limit the impact of these operations on the Houthis’ capabilities.

At the same time, the applicability of IDF lessons requires careful qualification. These strategies may prove valuable in adapting to conflicts involving proxy militias like the Houthis or Iranian-backed groups in Iraq, as well as evolving coalitions of different Al Qaeda and Islamic State factions. However, their relevance diminishes in contexts like defending Taiwan or Ukraine, where organized state militaries present a fundamentally different challenge.

Another constraint lies in intelligence capabilities. Israel demonstrated significant penetration of Hezbollah’s operations, though its insight into Hamas was comparatively limited. The extent of U.S. or Western intelligence infiltration into adversaries like the Houthis remains uncertain. Such variations critically influence the effectiveness of precision targeting strategies and the acceptable thresholds for collateral damage.

Effectively implementing these lessons offers significant promise for Western security and geopolitical strategy. By crippling Hezbollah, Israel not only neutralized a major existential threat but also paved the way for a rebel takeover in Syria—where Assad’s regime collapsed within a week without its elite shock troops to defend it. In Lebanon, this created the potential for a new political future, including the prospect of electing a president for the first time in years.

Ultimately, ensuring that a proxy militia remains nonviolent likely requires diplomatic solutions. But diplomacy, crucial as it is for long-term stability, cannot succeed in isolation; it must be backed by a credible and, if necessary, sustained threat of targeted military intervention. The fate of UN Resolution 1701—which aimed to keep south Lebanon non-militarized—demonstrates the failure of entrusting this responsibility to third parties with limited interest or capability.

Where military pressure succeeds, it can sever the ties between proxy militias and their sponsors, enabling a nonviolent path forward. In Lebanon, leaders have signaled that Hezbollah may continue as a political entity, but only if its capacity as an armed militia is dismantled. Since the cease fire, the IDF had repeatedly attacked what it considers as ceasefire violations by Hezbollah, killing dozens of armed operatives.

For diplomacy to succeed, Israel will likely need to continue conducting military interventions intermittently to prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament, particularly in South Lebanon, to avoid a return to the post-2006 instability. Here, Afghanistan’s hard-won lessons underscore that maintaining precise, even limited, military capabilities alongside diplomacy are essential to prevent losing ground after initial successes.

Dr. Ore Koren is an  Associate Professor of international relations Indiana University Bloomington and an internationally recognized expert on political violence, He holds a PhD in Political Science and an MSc in Applied Economics from the University of Minnesota. His award-winning research uses innovative approaches to examine how economic and political development shape violence by nonstate actors, including rebel groups, proxy militias, and mercenaries. Supported by grants from the National Science Foundation, the British Government, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and the United States Institute of Peace, among others, his work has been published in numerous leading peer reviewed journals and two books. Dr. Koren's opinion pieces on these topics have appeared in Foreign Policy, Barron’s, and The Conversation, among others. He also consults regularly for international organizations and nonprofits, including the United Nations, the United States Institute of Peace, and the Stimson Center.