Images of men holding onto planes following the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 2021 during the US military evacuation of Afghanistan were left seared into the minds of individuals all around the globe. While many found these scenes shocking, some found these scenes predictable and reminiscent of past conflicts that had existed and continued in the region. Weigand describes the Taliban as “ideological fighters, self-proclaimed jihadists, and the current de facto government of Afghanistan,” (Weigand, 2017). She notes that they are typically categorized as religious extremists who want to introduce harsh rules in Afghanistan, including the prohibition of music and the suppression of women. Their mode of governance stands in stark contrast to Western humanitarian ideals, with the fall of the Taliban government in 2001 being seen as a victory against terrorism and human rights abuses. (Weigand, 2017). The takeover of the capital city almost 20 years later, despite US and UK presence within the region, speaks to their power, considering the initial positive welcome Western forces were met with by civilians upon entering in October 2001, (Clark, 2012).  However, many have questioned how this group, based on ideological rhetoric, has been able to regain control and take control over the resilient Afghan population.

Notwithstanding the personal ideological views that our cultures provide us, it is important to consider that insurgency does not begin or exist in a void. To understand the Taliban’s successful insurgency, we need to first understand them not only as terrorists, ideological fighters, or Islamic extremists but as an organized crime network, similar to syndicate and hierarchical structures typically associated with the groups such as the Mafia. The Taliban emerged in the late nineties from an Afghan refugee camp in Pakistan, following the ten-year Soviet occupation, which ended in 1989 that left the country and many of its citizens destitute and fully dependent on foreign aid (Rubin, 2000). Despite a dependency on foreign aid, the corresponding governments, such as Pakistan and the US, made minimal efforts to ensure the aid was received by the correct parties. Rubin highlights the inequities and state of corruption that existed. Hereby, defining corruption as the “Seemingly victimless, hidden trade-off between influence and gain” (Bajrektarevic, 2011). Before reaching its intended beneficiaries, both military and humanitarian aid passed through many international, Pakistani, and Afghan intermediaries, some of whom skimmed off cash and resold arms and commodities. These resources provided capital to expand trafficking and other illicit businesses (Rubin 2000). Gold and Williams noted in their coverage of this topic on their podcast The Underworld that much of the rural area had been destroyed through conflict, and there had been a massive push towards inner cities during the occupation to maintain and control the citizens within a terrain where soviet powers could fight (Gold and William, 2021). However, from the ashes of these communities would arise Afghanistan's largest market to date, poppy cultivation and opium production. With this emerging new economy and the rapid application of neoliberal economic policy, the Taliban saw an opportunity to maintain control over these regions, therefore aligning themselves with the drug trade formally for the first time in their history. Despite the tendency to categories the Taliban as solely a terrorist organization based within jihadist ideals, the operations, organization, and network of this group suggest it functions as a highly organized crime group with goals to maximize profit and maintain power over the large opium industry that exists within the region. 

Organized crime has been notoriously difficult to define but can be seen through an analysis of the end goal. According to the 2000 definition provided by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime “a group of three or more persons existing over a period of time acting in concert with the aim of committing crimes for financial or material benefit” (UNTOC, 2000), which is further supported by the UNODC as a current working definition, (Fromiti, 2020). The convention further breaks the actions of organized crime as the product of primary and enabling activities (UNOTC, 2000), further illustrated by Wright, who describes enabling activities as actions that facilitate the exchange of illicit services and goods and allow the organized crime networks to continue. Primary activities are described as the actions themselves or the means, facilitated by the network for social, economic, or political gain as mentioned above, such as drug trafficking, murder for hire, etc. (Wright, 2006). However, while maximization of profit, cause and effect activities, and multiple actors seem to align with public perception of these networks, one key part in maintaining the longevity of organized crime networks is a hierarchy and maintained of social relationships. Le (2012) postulates that their models focused on a hierarchical structure, models that emphasize local, ethnic, or cultural connections, and economic models of organized crime, with the first two playing a large role in the operational structure. These hierarchical structures are usually implemented and maintained through force and threat of violence, through familial ties and kinship, with certain regional hierarchies taking control of territories by controlling local or major economies, (Le, 2012 p 122). The Taliban can best be described today as primarily a syndicate and central hierarchy, defined by a strong social identity with members from a specific region, following a specific code of conduct, including the use of violence and corruption, when necessary, (Le, 2012 p 123).

Within the Taliban Network, the roles are broken up with the Commander and Leader of Faith being at the top of this hierarchy, followed by two deputy prime ministers and one prime minister, with six ministries below that operate and control different categories of the government. This code of conduct can be looked at through their application of Sharia or Islamic Law and Jihadist ideals through their legislation and political decisions. This is further illustrated by the titular role of commander also being connected as a leader of faith. It is important to consider both internal and external factors that contribute to maintaining this type of hierarchy, and the Taliban's code of conduct was systematically applied to take over different regions. The Taliban and Western occupations struggled for control of territories (Center for Preventive Action, 2021) after maintaining control of the province of Kandahar for many years (Peters, 2009) and eventually set their sights on Kabul to take complete control of the government in 2021. This shows a larger shift from regional to standard syndicate hierarchy as the network became the de facto government. The primary difference between a regional and standard hierarchy is the decentralization of power; the process of allowing local organizations and group leaders to wield considerable independence and autonomy over a specific geographical region, (Le, 2012 p 123).?

While looking at Jihadism and Islamic Fundamentalism, often referenced generally and vaguely as extremism (Raifee, 2013, p. 70-73), it is important to remember that this phenomenon did not begin with Islam and was similarly employed by many British protestants fleeing religious persecution in the 1600’s, (Raiffe, 2013, p. 70-73). Raiffe further suggests that Jihadism is similarly understood as the rejection of western democracy and secular forms of governance as adopted by the West. These terms are used in reference to potential clash of value systems combined with feelings of guilt, compassion, or empathy triggered by the outcome of foreign policies of the immigrant’s host countries as a means to suppress Muslims and the Umma as a whole (Raiffe, 2013 p.70- 73). Although the initial response to Western military intervention was positive, many began to feel as though civilians were bearing the brunt of the conflict and little protection was given to residents of conflict zones, (Clark 2012). Many combined Afghan politics and the endless war with the conflict and occupation of Palestine, further solidifying the already building sentiment of a Western attack on the Umma, or Muslim world, (Clark, 2012). The Taliban now wholeheartedly uses international jihadist discourse, claiming to fight against “Crusaders” and “the Jewish and Christian armies and their Afghan slaves” who want to “eliminate Islam, (Clark, 2012). Rhetoric that employs an emotional response can be seen as a recruitment tool, with the Taliban benefiting from individuals seeking justice for a community destroyed through a conflict of external actors. The unstable and insecure environment created by Western military intervention created a hot spot for organized crime groups to exploit vulnerable individuals who are looking for ways to process the devastation and are not provided support for any type of solution or outlet. The Taliban spoke to this cry, focusing on a “bottom-up” approach through a socialization process that indoctrinates Muslim communities and populations into adopting values, beliefs, and norms that support its agenda (Raifee, 2013, p. 70-73). This created and exploited a new generation of individuals sympathetic to the Taliban rhetoric who had simultaneously been victimized by the same levels of violence throughout their lives. 

Despite legislation from the late 90’s and anti-drug sentiments relayed by the Qu’ran and Muslim scholars, this has not proved to be a deterrent to illicitly funding their network. The 1997 decree banning the usage, product, and distribution of opium, heroin, and hashish (Peters, 2009), it is not a surprise that the Taliban became involved in the opium trade. Peters contends that, “In the rural environment, where there is little use for hard cash, much economic dealing is done in opium and other commodities of value,” (Peters, 2009). The United Nations and Washington contend the Taliban are involved in all facets, from poppy planting, opium extraction, and trafficking to exacting "taxes" from cultivators and drug labs to charging smugglers fees for shipments bound for Africa, Europe, Canada, Russia, the Middle East, and other parts of Asia. (Landay, 2021).  By 1999, the Taliban controlled most of the country including all the Pashto south. Afghanistan’s poppy crop represented about 75 percent of global production. Ninety-seven percent of it was grown in Taliban-held areas. (Peters, 2009). Despite the open defiance of Sharia law, Alda and Sala note that insurgents increasingly will turn to crime to generate funding and will acquire logistical support from criminals, (Alda and Sala, 2014). Upon the realization that banning opium production would turn their allies in rural communities against them, the Taliban allowed local mullahs or community leaders to collect a 10 percent agricultural tax or ushr, which would be collected and distributed at a local level, (Gold, 2012). Peters further expands on the taxation system, noting that Taliban insurgents also collect a tax from local shopkeepers, farmers and other small business owners, working over local communities “much like mafioso”, (Peters, 2009), using threats of violence and coercion in order to achieve the finances needed. This contends with Le (2012) who stated firmly that many organized crime networks will utilize violence when operating within the boundaries of syndicate hierarchies, Le, 2012). Even during the Western Military occupation, U.N. officials reported that the Taliban likely earned more than $400 million between 2018 and 2019 from the drug trade and a May 2021 U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) report quoted a U.S. official as estimating they derive up to 60% of their annual revenue from illicit narcotics, (Landay, 2021). Distribution is regionally dependent, but the majority of distribution falls to the Afghan and Pakistani smuggling group known as the Haqqani Network. 

The US Director of National Intelligence first recognized this relationship when Jalaluddin Haqqani, a former leader and founding member of the Haqqani network, later allied with the Afghan Taliban as that group’s Minister of Tribal and Border Affairs when the Taliban held power in Afghanistan during the mid-to-late 1990’s. This relationship was further solidified and established in 2015 between the Haqqanis and the Taliban, when the new leader and nephew of Jalaluddin, Sirajuddin was named as a deputy to newly appointed Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansur, (DNI). Sirajuddin was simultaneously given the position of interior minister, allowing him control over passport issuing as well as the power to oversee state governance and election procedures. His uncle Khalil, recently killed in a suicide bombing in December 2024, was given the internal role of refugee minster, (Smith, 2021). The collaboration between the Haqqani Network and the Taliban is essential to both of their longevity. They not only work with the Taliban to smuggle drugs across to Pakistan and Iran eventually making their way to Europe, but they are also the group primarily responsible for bringing the precursor chemicals that turn opium into heroin, (Peters, 2012). Regardless of seemingly competing interests, it is likely that collaboration will occur when each group determines that their inherent fear of contact outweighs the risks, (Alda and Sala, 2014). Alda and Sala further explore the steps of these intersections as coexistence, cooperation, and convergence. These terms define the periods where different groups occupy the same space, before deciding to cooperate based on shared mutual interests before converging and engaging in common or associated behaviors, (Alda and Sala, 2014). The Haqqani network became aligned with the Taliban interest during the first takeover in the nineties following law enforcement crackdowns on heroin in Pakistan, (Peters, 2009) and were given positions in the de facto government, a sentiment which was echoed again following the second takeover with two high ranking Haqqani network leaders being given ministerial positions within the government. 

This can also be looked at through Le’s analysis of different hierarchies in organized crime, and be labeled as a regional hierarchy, where power is decentralized and allocated through different geographical regions and areas, (Le, 2012). The US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper supported these claims as well and went even further to state that the crime-terror nexus was one of the largest threats to national security. He reported on the consistent patterns of insurgent groups turning to illicit income and the acquisition of logistical and operational support from criminal networks when they are unable to complete the actions themselves, (Clapper, 2013).  Referring to previously mentioned primary and enabling factors (Wright, 2006), there are clear examples of enabling factors such as threats of violence to maintain financial control over a large part of the economy in a time when many individuals had no cash to offer but parts of their land. Clapper successfully predicted this type of coercion in his 2013 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, stating that the drug trade historically and currently remained a significant portion of revenue for the Taliban, (Clapper, 2013).  EUROPOL shared similar definitions and findings in 2017, stating that OCGs operate in a criminal economy dictated by the laws of supply and demand and are favored by social tolerance for certain types of crime such as the trade in counterfeit goods and specific frauds against public authorities or large companies, (EUROPOL, 2017). Through manipulation of an informal economy that was given social allowance due to extenuating circumstances, the Taliban was able to successfully implement a taxation on the illicit opium and drug economy to fund their power and de facto regime with the support and integration of pre-existing crime networks within the region. 

While the heroin trade may be the major focus of the Taliban's illicit economy, it is important to note that it is not the only illegal trade in which the Taliban has participated. The Taliban are known to have participated in Human Trafficking, defined by the UN Palermo Protocol as, “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation,” (United Nations, 2000). The little-known practice of Bachi Bazi, or boy play, has been listed as one of the major human rights violations to occur within the regime. Bachi Bazi is described by the Ministry of Justice in 2017 as involving underage boys performing erotic dances in female attire, often being coerced to satisfy clients sexually, (Ministry of Justice, 2017). It is the subjecting young underage boys to various forms of physical, psychological, and sexual abuse, including coerced performances, dance, and sexual acts in the presence of the older man, the Baz, (Gevorgyan and Matevosyan, 2023, vol. 3), Despite explicit banning of the practices in 2017 by the Afghanistan Law on Protection of Children, these practices are still present today. According to a Human Terrain Team Report into Pashtun Sexuality, purity culture surrounding women further perpetuates this harm, referencing the common saying within the community “Women are for children, boys are for pleasure,” (Human Terrain Team (HTT) AF-6 Research Update and Findings Pashtun Sexuality Background).  Many of the victims of this practice are Afghan nationals, who have no choice but to turn to this type of work due to high unemployment rates of up to thirteen percent and poverty rates of just under fifty percent, (Gevorgyan and Matevosyan, 2023, vol. 3). They go on to argue that this phenomenon becomes particularly difficult to monitor in recent times with the 2022 ban on music, prohibiting music to be heard and listened to in public spaces.  This is likely to have driven some forms of the practice deeper underground and thereby even further away from the possibility of protection for the boys and adolescents involved, (Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: New Dangers Facing Men and Boys in Afghanistan, 2022). 

The Taliban's involvement is almost indisputable. The All-Survivors Project (2022) points out that while it was not possible to gather data on precise numbers of children associated with the Taliban, interviewees reported that it was commonplace to see boys at checkpoints and in Taliban military vehicles, (Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: New Dangers Facing Men and Boys in Afghanistan, 2022). This contends that the practice of Bachi Bazi is ever present within the culture and concerns shown by Human Rights organizations such as All Survivors Project regarding the hidden nature of these practices moving forward are well founded and calls for condemnation from the international community are warranted. The practice of Bachi Bazi continues to keep individuals and families in cycles of poverty, as many young boys end up in situations of servitude, or being forced to work unfair wages and hours to provide for their families, (Gevorgyan and Matevosyan, 2023, vol. 3). This can be seen as another tactic by the Taliban to control poor families who are often dependent on sons to work as their source of family income. 

While it can appear straightforward to categories what Western media calls “Islamic Extremism” or “Jihadism” as a separate entity, it proves problematic when looking at the larger picture of these networks and neglects to highlight the inherent organizational and illicit nature of these groups. The Taliban has emerged as a dominating power in Afghanistan despite many regimes that have attempted to redistribute and reestablish control. The Taliban built an empire by playing into the anti-western sentiments felt by communities destroyed by war and inserted themselves into the major domestic and international economies through force and economic manipulation, before turning the product into illicit substances such as Heroin and distributing them to other regional networks who in turn distribute the product globally. The Taliban has been able successfully to merge their organization from a regional hierarchy with no central location, to eventually taking over Kabul, the capital city and economic hub of the country, and evolving into a syndicate hierarchy that includes all regions under their control within it. Coercion, taxation practices, and sexual violence through practices such as the Bachi Bazi are all methods and examples of enabling practices the Taliban de facto government uses to continue to keep its citizens destitute and maintain power over the region and the global opium trade. Despite the global tendency to “other” the de facto government of Afghanistan, considering the Taliban as a separate only delays equity to the country and region by indicating to the Afghan people and global diaspora that their cause deserves a separate but equal solution, which if history can teach us anything, only moves us farther from a place of justness. While ideology used to control individuals may be seen in this case as based in religious philosophy, the Taliban can be seen as an organized crime network, acting with a balance of primary and enabling activities to maximize profit and control the billion-dollar opium industry. 

Jenna Ellis of the St. Mary’s University in (Twickenham) UK. She was previously working with survivors of crime in the United States. Since spring 2025 Ms. Ellis is the London-based IFIMES Information Officer.
 

Citations: 

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