With China’s Belt and Road Initiative’s cumulative construction contracts and non-financial investments valued at one trillion dollars in Africa, it is becoming even more crucial for the United States to increase its development engagement in the region.[1] China has been participating in African development since 2013, when it launched its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with the aim of connecting continents through ancient overland and sea trading routes, to grow its economic and political power.[2] More specifically, China seeks to spread its “soft power”, its culture and political values, while at the same time developing China’s poorer central provinces by giving them BRI contracts. Although some BRI projects are effective in developing basic infrastructure and offering local employment, China’s high-risk loans and lack of transparency, have caused high debt levels in many African countries. As a result, countries such as Ethiopia, Ghana, and Zambia, have defaulted on their debt.[3] Moreover, many BRI projects have been criticized for environmental hazards and harmful working conditions that disregard international labor regulation laws.[4] To counter China’s BRI projects, the United States should provide long-term low-risk loans to foster long-term sustainable development, thereby re-building trust and improving its relationship with African countries.

Even though China’s BRI fosters unsustainable development, many African countries conduct business with China instead of the United States because China offers to develop basic infrastructure through faster and cheaper projects. Yet, many African leaders still express their desire to work with the United States over China, “at the U.N. General Assembly in September 2017, nine African leaders told then-President Trump that ‘we would prefer to do business with the United States and other western countries, but you aren’t there … unlike China.’”[5] African leaders are also choosing China’s BRI because of a lack of trust in the United States arising from the United States’ criticism of African countries for making deals with China, without providing viable alternatives. This dynamic has been exacerbated by the closing of USAID. The United States has also failed to demonstrate that Africa is a priority through its low number of country visits over the past two administrations, contributing to an already weakening trust. Many African leaders, like most world leaders, view visits as a show of respect. During his first presidency, however, President Trump did not visit Africa and President Biden only visited Africa once, within the final months of his presidency. At the same time, China’s President Xi Jinping, made ten visits to Africa between 2014 and 2020.[6]

There are several steps the United States should take to re-build trust with African countries. President Trump should demonstrate the United States’ commitment to the region by visiting African countries and meeting with African leaders. Research has proven that through country visits and face-to-face diplomacy, leaders can better understand each other’s intentions and build trust through interpersonal relationships.[7]

To encourage African countries to work with the United States, as an alternative to China, the United States needs to change its development assistance strategy. Most American development assistance towards Africa is in the form of grants that are earmarked for non-revenue generating sectors, such as health and education. To build trust, the United States should continue implementing these current policies, while also considering Africa’s agenda, and what African countries have turned to China for, which is basic infrastructure. Many African countries seek “stomach infrastructure”—infrastructure that caters to the immediate needs of the population and provides developmental security.[8] To fund infrastructure projects, the United States should adopt China’s strategy of giving Africa loans, but instead of high-risk and unsustainable loans, the United States should offer long-term low-risk loans in conjunction with grants for non-revenue generating sectors. The Center for Strategic and International Studies states, “a major concern with grant-based development projects is that the central banks of indebted nations will convert the funds to local currency and use this to pay off loans owed to China.”[9] Therefore, the United States should make concessional loans available to Africa that could fund infrastructure projects. While many would argue that this strategy would contribute to the debt crisis, these loans would only be allocated only if it is proven that the country could repay the loan in the future. With debt forgiveness flexibility, the United States could forgive loans, or exchange debt for human rights promotion. Development grants could also be issued, but through incremental disbursements, to avoid the grants from being used by African countries to pay back debt owed to China.

To counter China’s BRI projects, the United States needs to demonstrate a strong commitment to the region and re-build trust that has been long lost due to the United States’ lack of engagement. With the shutdown of USAID, it is more important than ever that the United States embarks on a new sustainable development strategy that focuses on engaging in face-to-face diplomacy and offering loans and disbursement-based grants. Through this strategy, the United States can oppose the BRI’s China-centered strategy by becoming a partner with Africa through fostering long-term sustainable growth and prioritizing African interests.

Sara Munson is a rising junior majoring in International Relations at William & Mary with special interest in global health, international security, and international development. She is a part of the Global Scholars Program which assesses pressing global issue and part of a student-driven team researching indigenous diplomacy in Williamsburg, Virginia. 

[1]Wang, Christoph Nedopil. “China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2023.” Green Finance & Development Center, 5 Feb. 2024, greenfdc.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2023/.

[2] Jie, Yu, and Jon Wallace. “What Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)?” Chatham House, 19 Dec. 2022, www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/what-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri.

[3]ADF. “As Chinese Debt Comes Due, African Nations Struggle with Repayments.” Africa Defense Forum, 13 Feb. 2024, adf-magazine.com/2024/02/as-chinese-debt-comes-due-african-nations-struggle-with-repayments/.

    [4] Nesbitt, Francis Njubi. “America vs China in Africa.” Foreign Policy in Focus, 1 Dec. 2011, fpif.org/america_vs_china_in_africa/.

[5] Link, Jordan. “5 Things U.S. Policymakers Must Understand About China-Africa Relations.” Center for American Progress, 5 Oct. 2021, www.americanprogress.org/article/5-things-u-s-policymakers-must-understand-china-africa-relations/.

[6] Nantulya, Paul. “China’s Deepening Ties to Africa in Xi Jinping’s Third Term.” Africa Center For Strategic Studies, 29 Nov. 2022, africacenter.org/spotlight/chinas-deepening-ties-to-africa-in-xi-jinpings-third-term/.

[7] Holmes, Marcus, and Cambridge University Press. Face-to-Face Diplomacy: Social Neuroscience and International Relations. Cambridge University Press, 2018.

[8] Alozie, Nicholas O., and Kathy Thomas. “United States vs. China in Africa: The Policy Battle for Hearts and Minds and the Difference It Makes.” Journal of Public Management & Social Policy, vol. 22, no. 3, Jan. 2016, pp. 1–24. EBSCOhost, research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=67d22dfb-3c8a-35b5-a84d-4b8e37befe22.

[9] Runde, Daniel, et al. “Reintroducing Concessional Loans Into the Development Toolbox.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 20 Aug. 2024, www.csis.org/analysis/reintroducing-concessional-loans-development-toolbox.

Bibliography

ADF. “As Chinese Debt Comes Due, African Nations Struggle with Repayments.” Africa Defense Forum, 13 Feb. 2024, adf-magazine.com/2024/02/as-chinese-debt-comes-due-african-nations-struggle-with-repayments/.

Alozie, Nicholas O., and Kathy Thomas. “United States vs. China in Africa: The Policy Battle for Hearts and Minds and the Difference It Makes.” Journal of Public Management & Social Policy, vol. 22, no. 3, Jan. 2016, pp. 1–24. EBSCOhost, research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=67d22dfb-3c8a-35b5-a84d-4b8e37befe22.

Holmes, Marcus, and Cambridge University Press. Face-to-Face Diplomacy: Social Neuroscience and International Relations. Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Jie, Yu, and Jon Wallace. “What Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)?” Chatham House, 19 Dec. 2022, www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/what-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri.

Link, Jordan. “5 Things U.S. Policymakers Must Understand About China-Africa Relations.” Center for American Progress, 5 Oct. 2021, www.americanprogress.org/article/5-things-u-s-policymakers-must-understand-china-africa-relations/.

Nantulya, Paul. “China’s Deepening Ties to Africa in Xi Jinping’s Third Term.” Africa Center For Strategic Studies, 29 Nov. 2022, africacenter.org/spotlight/chinas-deepening-ties-to-africa-in-xi-jinpings-third-term/.

Nesbitt, Francis Njubi. “America vs China in Africa.” Foreign Policy in Focus, 1 Dec. 2011, fpif.org/america_vs_china_in_africa/.

Runde, Daniel, et al. “Reintroducing Concessional Loans into the Development Toolbox.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 20 Aug. 2024, www.csis.org/analysis/reintroducing-concessional-loans-development-toolbox. 

Wang, Christoph Nedopil. “China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2023.” Green Finance & Development Center, 5 Feb. 2024, greenfdc.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2023/.