Abstract

This article addresses military deception, as part of information operations, while targeting the military decision maker. To this end, particular focus is given to the role of traditional and social media.

In this piece, bibliographical research is combined with an exclusive interview with a Romanian expert who requested not to be identified. This interviewee reflects on military deception conducted through media as well as pressure exerted on decision makers by both public opinion and politicians. He also examines the Romanian context, including aspects related to applying Artificial Intelligence to military deception and to counterdeception.

Keywords: counterdeception; information operations; media; military deception; Romania. 

Introduction

[This article, which focuses on military deception (MILDEC), most notably on information- / media-related aspects, combines bibliographical research with an exclusive interview with a Romanian expert who requested anonymity.]

Throughout history, deception has been a human trait and, though informally, deception has always been used in warfare (Hutchinson 2006, p. 217). From the 20th century onward, when it was first being formally used by governments and the military, the theoretical basis for deception started being developed (Hutchinson 2006, p. 217).

Simply put, deceiving means leading someone to believe in something that isn't true (Marine-Air Ground Task Force Information Operations April 4, 2018, p. 1-5). In general terms, deception consists of a deliberate distortion of reality that one person imposes on another: the deceiver's goal is to gain an advantage (Deception 2024, p.1-1). Specifically, military deception amounts to actions deliberately carried out in order to mislead military and paramilitary decision makers, or those in violent extremist organizations, leading the adversary to act or not to act, according to the deceiver's wishes, thereby contributing toward the success of the friendly forces' mission (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms March 2017, p. 154). For this to occur, it is vital to be able to influence the targeted adversary decision maker's behavior, shaping their perceptions and attitudes (Allied Joint Doctrine for Operations Security and Deception March 2020, p.4). MILDEC seeks to confound the enemy, who is thus rendered vulnerable to surprise (Swift April 2024). 

Planning for MILDEC needs to be part of an operation's preliminary stages, aimed at increasing the likelihood of achieving an advantage (Information in Air Force Operations February 1, 2023, p. 15). According to Scholes (February 28, 2024), in deception planning, the most important aspect involves stating the goal of deception, that is, what planners want the adversary to do. It is also significant to know how said adversary makes decisions (Scholes February 28, 2024). Deception entails a psychological process where the idea is to achieve a given behavioral response (inaction or action) (Allied Joint Doctrine for Operations Security and Deception March 2020, p. 2). This is why, as part of information operations, psychological operations (PSYOPS) are often combined with deception (Muntz 2023). The latter can be envisaged as a mind game taking place between the deceiver and the target (Panagiotis August-September 2016, p. 26). The way the target interprets the information received is of particular importance (Panagiotis August-September 2016, p. 26).

We need to consider that decision makers can be in any environment and at any level (tactical, operational or strategic) and that they can be indirectly targeted, through sensors and influencing groups, for instance (Allied Joint Doctrine for Operations Security and Deception March 2020, p. 5 / 7). This calls for an in-depth analysis of the target's information preferences, likely responses and preconceptions (Allied Joint Doctrine for Operations Security and Deception March 2020, p. 5). We should point out the importance of analyzing the deception target's information environment.

A pivotal aspect of any deception operation is the deception story, consisting of a scenario describing the friendly actions that will be presented in order to lead the deception target to take on the desired perception (Military Deception January 26, 2012, p. I-5). As for its makeup, the deception story is both a creative and analytical process covering a wide range of information on enemy data acquisition and processing (Military Deception January 26, 2012, p. I-5).

As part of MILDEC, conduits are understood to be intelligence or information gateways to the deception target, including foreign and domestic media (Army Support to Military Deception February 2019, p. 2-8). In this regard, it is significant to perform a conduit analysis, with detailed mapping of individual conduits, that is, information pathways to the potential deception targets (Army Support to Military Deception February 2019, p. 2-8). We should bear in mind that the deceptive message is not always sent directly to a deception target; it's quite the contrary (Military Deception January 26, 2012, p. I-4). Thus being the case, the message is sent to, for example, intelligence collectors or individuals, in hopes that the deceptive message ends up arriving at the deception target (Military Deception January 26, 2012, p. I-4).

Over the course of recorded warfare history, military commanders and planners, seeking to decisively gain the upper hand, have sought to deceive their adversaries, as concerns various aspects such as an attack's timing, size or location (Rein 2018, p. 1). Deception was and still remains a crucial aspect of military operations (Rein 2018, p. 1). For a future leader, MILDEC is a vital instrument (Rein 2018, p. 1).

Deception can take on a variety of forms, including the following, among others: feints (Military Deception January 26, 2012, p. I-9); disclosing misleading or false information, to generate ambiguity or confusion regarding future actions; decoys to draw attention away from real assets; camouflaging real assets (Hood August 22, 2023).

Information operations and MILDEC 

The ease with which common individuals in today's society can access information has changed the military's perspective on deception (Lawrence July 10, 2024). We can consider that deception is a discrete information-related activity (Allied Joint Doctrine for Operations Security and Deception March 2020, p. 2), and that it is even integrated into information operations (Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations January 2023, p. 43). The practice of deception entails accepting information as the most significant aspect in achieving a competitive advantage (Hutchinson 2006, p. 215). [With a more comprehensive vision, information operations (covering military information support operations (MISO), deception, electronic warfare, cyber operations and information-related capabilities) constitute the basis for arriving at a decision advantage (Cowan July 4, 2025). In reality, information-related capabilities are crucial for effective deception, which comprises a critical aspect of multi-domain operations (MDO) (Cowan July 4, 2025)].

In deception activities, there is information projection, that is, disclosure of information, for the purpose of informing, influencing or deceiving a targeted system or an observer, and information denial; this latter case seeks to destroy or disrupt the information that the opponent needs (Deception 2024, p. 1-3). A talented deception planner can creatively combine information denial with information projection and, thus, manage to obtain a few information-based advantages, as is the case with surprise (Deception 2024, p. 1-3). However, according to Grohe (November 6, 2007, p. 16), in reality, in the Information Age, the adversary, with access to multiple information / intelligence sources, including satellites, will be able to predict, with some degree of accuracy, that an attack will take place. As for the other part, the Operational Commander's best use of deception can go by way of not revealing to the adversary the exact time and main point of attack (Grohe November 6, 2007, p. 16).

According to Martin (June 2008, p. 2), deception amounts to a set of actions seeking to manipulate the adversary’s information network. This can include the adversary's intelligence system. This expert feels that, as part of a deception campaign, to achieve an information advantage, adversary information and information systems constitute critical targets (Martin June 2008, p. 8). It should be pointed out that deception can even involve manipulating information itself (Lawrence July 10, 2024). [There is a lot in common between MILDEC and operations security (OPSEC), as the latter aims at the following aspects in relation to the adversary: denying information; preventing that which is real from being known; limiting the ability to detect and observe friendly activities, from which useful information can be derived (Marine-Air Ground Task Force Information Operations April 4, 2018, p. 3-2).]

Information channels, which are part of deception planning, are used by the deceiver to relay information to the enemy (Panagiotis August-September 2016, p. 32). Obviously, intelligence channels serve to convey information to the targets (Panagiotis August-September 2016, p. 32). In this scenario, there are technical channels (TECHINT), for instance, satellites and computers, as well as human channels (HUMINT), such as agents and double agents (Panagiotis August-September 2016, p. 32).

Propaganda can also be another information channel, as it seeks to influence the populace in general as well as the target’s beliefs (Panagiotis August-September 2016, p. 32). In this sphere, in order for the deceiver to attain their objectives, they can use instruments that include the following: traditional media, social media and e-mails (Panagiotis August-September 2016, pp. 32-33).

Diplomacy can be regarded as a channel that the deceiver may use for conveying certain pieces of information to the intended target (Panagiotis August-September 2016, p. 33). The respect and credibility attributed to diplomats in general does not prevent diplomacy from being used for passing on false information to the adversary (Panagiotis August-September 2016, p. 33). 

It should be added that the ‘‘agents-of-influence’’ are also considered information channels, while pointing out their ability to be in close contact with government members and, under such circumstances, influence their perspectives and decisions regarding noteworthy topics (Panagiotis August-September 2016, p. 33). This can happen without being aware that those agents are working for foreign governments (Panagiotis August-September 2016, p. 33).

An Operational Commander, in their plan of deception, needs to take into account the information sources used by the adversary as well as the information that is readily available to the latter (Grohe November 6, 2007, pp. 2-3).

In the information age, progress in the field of information and communication technologies has benefited both deception and counterdeception (Panagiotis August-September 2016, pp. 51-52).

Media and Military Deception

Malik (October-December 2009, p. 125) attributes a high degree of importance to news media, within the context of contemporary warfare. This author states that military commanders currently can take considerable advantage of working together with media (Malik October-December 2009, p. 125).

The media's relationship with the military depends on the extent to which their civil status can be affected by working with the armed forces (Payne Spring 2005, p. 84). In the midst of a conflict, said relationship will always be noted for some tension between impartiality and balance in journalists' work and the military objectives of those fighting (Payne Spring 2005, p. 84).

In the West, the military shows considerable interest in knowing how it is possible to influence contents disseminated by media (Payne Spring 2005, p. 84). One such way involves deception (Payne Spring 2005, p. 84).

Through the media, deceptive information can be passed on to enemy commanders (Heckman February 2000, p. 9). Deception in the media goes by way of publicly disclosing false information, using, for instance, articles, reports and photographs (Napora December 31, 2023). Currently, using Artificial Intelligence (AI), (deep fake) images can be generated, as part of MILDEC (Mirghahari July 17, 2023). We live in a time when there are several types of deceptive digital influence, such as the following: identity deception; information source deception (Forest Spring 2021, p. 22).

According to Heckman (February 2000, p. ii), in order to deceive the enemy, we need to manipulate the media. Lying to the media can eventually become counterproductive and, as such, this should be properly evaluated (Heckman February 2000, p. ii). This is why (not to mention that disseminating information could affect operational security), an alternative to lying that can be considered involves manipulating the media by controlling the dissemination or access to the truth (Heckman February 2000, p. ii). 

As concerns deceptive information, the media are highly effective channels, due to their assigned credibility and the ease with which they are accessed, even in real time (Heckman February 2000, p. 2). When the enemy thinks that their opponent's media are independent, the former feels they are credible intelligence sources (Heckman February 2000, p. 2).

Media manipulation, when necessary, could be carried out using both active and passive methods (Heckman February 2000, p. 5). The latter is tantamount, for instance, to highlighting certain aspects related to military activities while not mentioning others, during press conferences (Heckman February 2000, p. 5). By way of example, active media manipulation can include certain information leaks from the military, to certain domestic and foreign journalists, or disseminating misinformation on the Internet (Heckman February 2000, p. 6). Social media are also regarded as instruments of deception (Malhotra 2016, p. 61).

In the sphere of active manipulation, we should point out the military's imagination, given their importance in coming up with new and effective forms of manipulation (Heckman February 2000, p. 6). It is certainly of interest to manipulate the media to which the enemy has access (Heckman February 2000, p. 6). 

On the one hand, in order to protect operations without resorting to lying, we have the military managing the information by not allowing certain pieces of information to be disseminated, up until the time, later on, when they can become public knowledge (Heckman February 2000, p. 6). On the other hand, we have the media wanting to obtain exclusive information in order to disseminate it as quickly as possible; this way, they might even reveal the military deception (Heckman February 2000, p. 6). There is a greater likelihood of this happening within a context of intense competition among the media (Heckman February 2000, pp. 6-7). From the standpoint of Heckman (February 2000, p. 7), in a few circumstances, the military should control the media to prevent critical information from being disseminated, either accidentally or on purpose. While this is deemed by the media to be censorship, the military calls this operational security (Heckman February 2000, p. 7). The military commander and staff should reflect in depth on MISO's backing of MILDEC operations, while seeking to determine to what extent the possible benefits of deception outweigh any loss of credibility, in either the short or long term, in relation to the media and to audiences, both locally and regionally (Military Information Support Operations November 21, 2014, p. II-7).

The relationship between the success of deception and the media's access to ongoing operations is highly sensitive (Information in Air Force Operations February 1, 2023, p. 16). This access is necessary, as it becomes part of an overall strategy, in the field of Operations in the Information Environment; however, if not properly planned and coordinated, deception efforts can also be hampered (Information in Air Force Operations February 1, 2023, p. 16). 

The interviewee's perspective

In an exclusive interview, the Romanian expert feels that, in the gray zone, that is, in a situation where the boundary between war and peace is deliberately blurred, deceptive information plays a critical role. He stresses that, within the said context, deception is a strategic asset, given that it serves to shape the adversary’s perceptions without triggering a conventional conflict. The interviewee adds that one of the forms of strategic deception consists of conveying a false image of the military capabilities, concealing weaknesses or hyping up strengths. To this end, he underscores the possible considerable importance of deception on deterrence.

In peacetime, this expert believes that we need to be aware of the need to keep the narrative consistent for a longer period of time, to be able to create the desired perception in the adversary. 

The interviewee states that traditional media and the Internet, including social media, as both channels of influence and sources of ambient information, can manage to shape perception. He explains that leaks, official statements, strategic messaging and visual signaling can be used in order to project false narratives. With regard to visual signaling, he provides a few examples: online videos, military parades and exercises. He feels that all of the said instruments are useful for generating ambiguity and leading the adversary to commit miscalculations, as this is a vital objective of deception in the gray zone.

The interviewee considers that an invaluable counterdeception technique consists of examining discrepancies between what a country's media broadcast to domestic audiences and messages geared to foreign target audiences. Still, he acknowledges that, to prevent said contradictions from being detected, in reality, deceptive narratives are often replicated, even domestically. According to him, this occurs particularly in countries with authoritarian regimes or in contexts where information is highly controlled. This specialist points out that, to maintain the deception's credibility, at a strategic level, even domestic audiences need to be misled. 

Concerning the dissemination of deceptive information, domestically, through both traditional media and social media, the interviewee states that, as a result of a skillful shaping, public perception can indirectly pressure military leaders. According to him, this pressure can especially occur in democracies or societies with a strong civil oversight in relation to the military. He recognizes that military decision makers, who have classified information at their disposal, seek to shelter themselves from public opinion and be objective; however, actually they are not completely uninfluenced, namely as concerns strategic-level decisions related to expenses in the sphere of defense, national will and conscription.

As pertains to political pressure, the Romanian expert adds that political leaders are often key conduits to military influence. According to him, this is why an effective strategy could include directing deceptive information specifically designed for said politicians, as targets. He underscores that, within a context of political supervision of the military, as is particularly the case in NATO systems, military decisions are not altogether free from political pressures. Taking this into consideration, the interviewee maintains that counterintelligence services should monitor influence operations with political decision makers as targets. He recommends that every intelligence service, both military and civil, join forces and share information, in order to arrive at common intelligence and a precise idea of what is happening in this sphere. To this end, according to him, it becomes necessary to identify channels of communication, such as lobbyists, think tanks, foreign media narratives or misrepresented intelligence. In this case, the interviewee points out that counterdeception, on top of detecting content, should also include understanding who is influencing whom and using what means. 

This specialist states that, as part of MILDEC, covert online operations are on the rise, through, for instance, blogs, social media personas and fake websites. He adds that the strategic impact of said operations is significant when coordinated with kinetic or diplomatic activities. With regard to counterdeception, he onsiders that detecting the operations in question entails combining the following aspects: open-source intelligence (OSINT), content forensics, behavioral analytics and pattern analysis. He further states that, after detecting said covert online operations, responses can include digital takedowns, exposure, attribution efforts, narrative inoculation strategies aimed at minimizing the impact, or potential exploitation conditions, that is, deceiving the deceiver.

The interviewee feels that, currently, as part of Romania’s national defense and military doctrines, deceptive information is not explicitly found at as high a level as with other doctrines, such as the U.S. Joint Doctrine on MILDEC. He asserts that, in Romania, there is an adaptation of NATO’s AJP 3.10.2. However, according to him, it is through references to stratagems, information operations and influence activities that deception is implicitly acknowledged. He reveals that, in Romania, there is training in deception, but formally this does not constitute a dedicated specialty. This expert acknowledges that a dedicated deception operations curriculum, in harmony with NATO standards, would improve Romania's capabilities in this sphere. 

The interviewee states that Romania is taking its first steps in integrating Artificial Intelligence (AI) in military applications in general, covering information operations. He maintains that AI, despite not being fully operationalized within the Romanian context, can now constitute support for some domains. He believes that, as part of counterdeception, AI can contribute toward automating the detection of foreign deception campaigns. According to this specialist, AI can also be used for examining the adversary's information ecosystem, in order to detect their vulnerabilities. He feels that AI can generate deceptive content at scale and, in this regard, he refers to deepfakes and synthetic media. Lastly, he adds that AI can improve behavioral prediction for tailored deception. He considers that it constitutes a challenge to strike a balance between every possibility and its ethical use, operational security and doctrinal control.
From the interviewee's standpoint, a military expert in information deception should possess the following features:

"- Strong analytical and critical thinking skills

- Understanding of operational art and planning

- Familiarity with psychological operations, intelligence analysis, and cognitive biases

- (In-depth) knowledge of narrative construction, perception management, and adversary decision-making models"

Conclusion

Deception should take up a prominent place in military operations. As part of this work, we assume that, in the military sphere, actions are preceded by corresponding decisions, at tactical, operational and strategic levels. Thus being the case, it becomes significant to be able to influence adversary military decision makers, using one or various means to relay deceptive information to them, so that they make wrong decisions that will impact actions, thereby benefiting the other party. Said means can be human and/or technological. It is vital to get to know adversary military decision makers in depth, including their information environments, so as to arrive at the best way to directly or indirectly influence them. In this regard, intelligence services are particularly significant. To prevent this from happening, we need to highlight the role of counterintelligence services.

All of this points to the crucial importance of information in the military sphere. Deception is part of information operations and, in this domain, it is also related to PSYOPS. The efficiency of MILDEC goes by way of its ability to shape the target's perceptions and attitudes. Within the context of the gray zone, where the boundary between peace and war is blurred, deceptive information is highly significant, even in terms of deterrence, and so it can also be regarded as a strategic asset.

In the field of MILDEC, traditional and social media can be used for disseminating deceptive information to adversary military decision makers. The credibility and ease of access to said means by recipients are aspects that deceivers will try to manipulate in order to influence adversaries. We should not altogether rule out that, to avoid detection of contradictions by the adversary's counterintelligence services, the same deceptive narrative is frequently disseminated not only to foreign target audiences but also to domestic ones.

The media's relationship, including in the field of journalism, with the military should be carefully evaluated. If audiences find out that the military has manipulated the media, with its professionals being aware of this or even in connivance with this, the media's credibility could be affected, to the extent that their independence and impartiality are called into question. This can also hamper future information operations involving the media.

Especially as concerns strategic aspects, military decision makers are not completely uninfluenced even by indirect pressures from public opinion, due to the media's influence. This can happen chiefly in democratic societies and in contexts where there is civil oversight of the military. Said decision makers can also be influenced by politicians: the latter can also be the targets of (deceptive) information operations. This should warrant the attention of counterintelligence services.

It should be pointed out that, within the sphere of MILDEC, there is a growing number of covert online operations, in relation to which, once they are found out, a variety of measures can be taken.

In Romania’s national defense and military doctrines, deceptive information is not explicitly found on as high a plane as in other countries, such as the U.S. However, as concerns MILDEC, in Romania, NATO is a benchmark in terms of evolution. Certainly educating and training MILDEC professionals are essential for endowing them with suitable capabilities to fulfill their missions.

Within the Romanian context, we recognize AI's potential for developing information operations and several aspects related to deception and counterdeception, thus constituting a challenge to balance all this with demands in terms of ethics, operational security and doctrinal control. 

Currently, in the world of information / communication, it is vital to be able to influence other people, even through both traditional and social media.

Jorge Marinho,  PhD in Communication Sciences, BA in International Journalism

Júlio Ventura, MA in Political Science and International Relations, BA in Law, accredited parliamentary assistant - European Parliament (Brussels, Belgium)
Lourenço Ribeiro, BA in Sociology, MA student in Public Policy at Iscte – University Institute of Lisbon (Portugal)

Interview

*This interview was conducted, via email, on May 26, 2025

Photo by: Jorge Marinho

First Published by Marinho Media Analysis / June 11, 2025: http://www.marinho-mediaanalysis.org/articles/military-deception-and-media-a-romanian-perspective