By Divya Beeram 

Organized crime has entrapped and entangled the Mexican underground, creating institutionalized cartels with economic authority and market power. Across Mexico, cartel syndicalism has embedded itself in civil society through civilian dependence — threatening families and exploiting businesses, leaving locals vulnerable to entrapment, coercion, and cartel recruitment as a matter of survival. I will consider the consequences of cartel syndicalism, specifically analyzing the Sinaloa Cartel and Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), before exploring mechanisms to combat their continued proliferation. I will examine: (1) leveraging cooperation with the private sector of pharmaceuticals under a Know Your Customer (KYC) policy; (2) direct financing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and (3) focused deterrence centralized in Drug Market Intervention (DMI) strategies.

The longest standing and most powerful cartels, the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG span vast networks across states and are deeply embedded in the Mexican way of life. The Sinaloa cartel currently operates under a dual leadership structure. The first is headed by “Ismael Zambada ‘El Mayo’ García” (InSight Crime), the final remaining member of the original syndicate. The second is led by the sons of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, the now-imprisoned drug lord that was previously the head of Sinaloa in its entirety: “Joaquín Guzmán López, Ovidio Guzmán López, Iván Archivaldo, and Jesús Alfredo” (Council on Foreign Relations), known together as the

“Chapitos.” The Sinaloa cartel has strongholds in almost half of Mexico’s states and relies predominantly on extortive tactics. CJNG, unlike Sinaloa, is a monolith controlled by “Nemesio [‘El Mencho’] Oseguera” (Manaut and González) and has been noted as one of the fastest emerging cartels. CJNG instills fear through public displays of violence, such as “setting [cars] on fire” (CBS News). Through these tactics, cartels create a system of no alternatives, where civilians have no other options except capitulating to cartel demands, relying on the syndicate for their economic solvency and for ensuring their personal well-being. 

Burgeoning cartel power in Mexico, sustained by civilian recruitment and a monopsonistic control over supply chain production, has established syndicates as economic titans. Mexican cartels recruit “350 to 370 people each week” (McDonnell) and have permeated the economy, crippling “fisheries” (Felbab-Brown) and “resorts” (Friedman et. al.) by assaying valuation and prescribing artificial prices. The synthetic opioids in circulation find themselves in prescription medication, awaiting use from an unsuspecting consumer. In a study on counterfeit medication in Mexico, “14.6 percent” (Buschschlüter) of medication sold as Oxycodone were, in reality, fentanyl-based pills. To increase consumption through planted fentanyl in pharmacies, cartels have jeopardized private-sector pharmaceutical distribution for citizens. Medical opiates and synthetic opiates are indistinguishable from each other. Yet, neither Sinaloa nor CJNG are satisfied with their influence, which has generated new inter-cartel turmoil: turf wars. In Chiapas, Mexico, the Sinaloa v. CJNG conflict has displaced more than “700 residents” (Zhang and Tseng) as of February 2024, engaging in economic fisticuffs for power over optimal trade routes and sectors. Moreover, the existence of cartels has spurred an exodus of Mexicans into the United States. Last year alone, “180,000 migrants” (Morin) entered the United States, a four-fold increase from the year before, many in hopes of escaping the clutches of drug lords. Cartels have single-handedly destroyed lives and cultures in their pursuit of ultimate control.

My proposed solution to combat rising tension is threefold: a “know your customer” (KYC) policy in the private chemical and pharmaceutical sector, direct financing through the IMF, and a focused deterrence plan using the Drug Market Intervention (DMI) technique. The KYC policy attempts to systematically dismantle synthetic opioid supply chains, limiting cartel revenue through a controlled client base. Nearly “99 percent of fentanyl” (Trone) comes from legal pharmaceutical enterprises in China and India. Current action has primarily attempted to staunch the flow from Mexico, but dismantlement is possible through the key middle-operational layers – the producers. The United States has already begun this work with their promise to “[accelerate] work with the private sector globally” (The White House), but a formal plan has not yet been publicized. The idea of KYC policy originates from financial institutions in verification of customer identity, but has since branched into fintech, virtual assets, and non-profit organizations. KYC’s most notable success emerges in India; in the last year alone, numbers of bank fraud accounts accounted for “only 14.9 [percent] of the previous year's amount” (The Economic Times) as India returns to the policy implemented eighteen years before. While implementing KYC can be tricky due to the funding and attention required to create a truly effective system, India’s current financial policy and China’s willingness to adapt holds promise in fentanyl supply chain disruption. Nearly “40 [percent] of the Sinaloa cartel’s income comes from drugs” (Morelia), so cutting off the supply becomes crucial in the first layer of economic dismantlement. Creating legitimacy in pharmaceutical commerce, KYC, implemented in the private sectors of China and India, stands to be the first step in identifying the illicit entities acting through licit means.

Secondly, DMI prioritizes violence reduction through communication, working in tandem with KYC to target exploitation and ensure swift punishment. DMI is a method of focused deterrence that brings together “non-violent offenders with family members, service providers, and other community leaders” (Pardo and Reuter) in a meeting that requests them to give up their criminal behavior, offering them external job opportunities in exchange. If crime continues, cases are promised punishment to the greatest extent. DMI, when implemented, has proved to “decrease homicides and assaults by as much as 30 to 50 percent” (Abt). The effectiveness of DMI lies in its public outreach, which warms the icy relations between cartel members and the law. However, focused deterrence can only work if prosecution can truly be enacted. Studies have shown that “the deterrent effect of the certainty of punishment is far more consistent than that for the severity” (Nagin), meaning that promises of consequence need to be watertight. This would be uniquely favorable in Mexico because of the impermeable schism between the public and cartel members left by the inaction of Obrador’s policies. DMI creates the possibility to bring the two peoples together. Working humanely with the public and building mutual trust serves to invigorate the community while acting proactively against violence.  Finally, investment from the IMF may bolster the Mexican economy, uplifting those in poverty and providing a palpable alternative to those who view cartel recruitment as their final option. An estimated “175,000 people” (Irwin) are employed by gangs in Mexico. A recent study found that “if they faced a complete interdiction of new recruits, their numbers would fall to 110,000 by 2027” (The Economist), making the paradigm shift towards a method of recruitment reduction. IMF financing would be incredibly beneficial for uplifting the Mexican economy. Using the COVID-19 pandemic recovery as a model, a “10 percent increase in IMF financing was associated with a 0.2 percentage point increase in economic activity” (Naidoo and Sobrinho), helping countries convalesce after a pseudo-apocalypse. Mexico’s situation appears eerily similar – an Armageddon of power and chaos. When “43.5 [percent]” (AP News) of Mexico’s population lives in poverty, economic stimulation may be the best way to give the youth most vulnerable to recruitment a way out. Limiting recruitment maximally tames the power of cartels, tapering it to ever-dwindling numbers impossible to maintain and tacitly concluding the era of cartel control.

My three-pronged solution aims to methodically dismantle each step of cartel proliferation and operation: supply of synthetic opioids, continued criminal activities, and civilian recruitment. Each layer of cartel activity can be examined and weakened, but a true plan of action must leave allowance for growing influence, quashing it dynamically. Perhaps this approach does not only remedy cartels themselves, but also the structural implications ingrained in the public psyche. Indeed, the issue demands a complex solution; this solution intends to take the first step towards combatting cartel power. 

Divya Beeram is a high school student in San Antonio, Texas with a keen interest in the use of emerging technologies to promote sustainable infrastructure development, community health initiatives, and grassroots advocacy to advance United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, especially for at-risk and vulnerable youth.

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