No Alternative to Bilateral Negotiations

As the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process moves ahead, despite the slow pace and remaining disagreements, external attempts at interference, particularly by the Biden administration, raise questions. The trilateral meeting between US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers, Ararat Mirzoyan and Jeyhun Bayramov, in New York during the UN General Assembly High Level Week was another clear attempt by the US to insert itself into the peace process for US domestic and geopolitical interests. Secretary Blinken seemed to want to be a “mediator” or “party” in the bilateral Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiation format, as he remained throughout the meeting, rather than open the event and then leave to allow for bilateral talks.

This is in contrast to the meeting in Munich between the heads of state, Ilham Aliyev and Nikol Pashinyan, hosted by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in February. After opening the meeting, Scholz left the room to allow the talks to proceed. The same goes for the meeting on 28 February in Berlin between the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan hosted by German FM Baerbock, and the Almaty talks between foreign ministers Mirzoyan and Bayramov hosted by Kazakhstan in May. The US approach in return activates the Russian side as Moscow has already expressed its interest in hosting a meeting between Nikol Pashinyan and Ilham Aliyev during either the upcoming CIS or BRICS summits in Russia according to Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov.

The EU lost its credibility as a “mediator” between Armenia and Azerbaijan following the collapse of the Brussels format with the Granada document. The Granada talks and document were initiated by French President Macron and signed by Charles Michel alongside German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Armenia’s Pashinyan without Azerbaijan’s participation. With irrational and unacceptable provisions in the document, the EU clearly sided with Yerevan and its role in Armenia’s militarisation became evident.

The Russian format for negotiations has also become irrelevant as Azerbaijan has re-established its sovereignty over the whole of Karabakh and achieved the complete withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Azerbaijani territory. Baku prefers bilateral engagement with Yerevan on a peace draft as well as on the border demarcation and delimitation process, having nullified any Russian role in the processes that existed pre-September 2023. Armenia is not keen on meetings in Russia for now either. The US format for negotiations has not yielded any result because of the Biden administration’s reluctance to clearly state that Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan and that the rights and security of the Karabakh Armenians should be ensured within Azerbaijan. Another reason for the failure is the inability of the US State Department to persuade the Armenia and Russia-backed Armenian irredentists to participate in US proposed talks with the Azerbaijani authorities in Sofia, Bulgaria. The Armenia-backed irredentists in Karabakh rejected the proposals in summer 2023.

   Baku’s Constructive Moves

Two episodes show Azerbaijan’s constructive approach to the process and desire not to lose momentum: when Azerbaijan agreed to remove the issue of the Zangezur corridor from the talks and leave it for future discussions, and when it suggested to Armenia signing an interim agreement on the common, basic principles of the future peace deal, considering the fact that Armenia’s territorial claims against Azerbaijan included in its constitution are the biggest obstacle in the peace process. It was Baku that proposed a peace deal to Yerevan in March 2022 and outlined its five principles for the normalisation of relations, when Armenia and external actors were talking about the so-called rights and security of Karabakh Armenians without mentioning clearly that these were rights within Azerbaijan, a paraphrased wording for status as Yerevan was desperate to revive the outdated Minsk Group in order to pursue its territorial claims against Azerbaijan in new circumstances. That the United States also supported the idea of reviving the dead Minsk Group in its official engagements with the Armenian authorities once again confirms the inability of Biden’s State Department to grasp the geopolitical shifts in the region following the liberation of Azerbaijani lands in 2020.

Azerbaijan’s position of pursuing the process in a bilateral format without any external participation and meddling has yielded positive results, starting with the December 2023 joint statement by Armenia and Azerbaijan without the participation of a third party on the normalisation of relations and reaching a peace agreement. Azerbaijan’s constructive approach to the border demarcation and delimitation process was visible when Baku demanded the de-occupation of the four non-exclave villages in Qazakh District – Baganis Ayrim, Ashagi Askipara, Kheyrimli and Kyzilhajili – which were occupied in the early 1990s. The fate of the four remaining Armenian-occupied exclave villages will be resolved as part of the border demarcation and delimitation process as it advances. In fact, the Armenian side had to agree to Baku’s constructive proposal despite trying to delay the return of the non-exclave villages with its traditional delaying strategy. Thanks to Azerbaijan’s persistence, today there is a nearly 13km delimitated inter-state border between Armenia and Azerbaijan as part of an agreement reached on delimitation of a northern section of the state border. Meanwhile, Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan described the agreement on sections of the border as a “great success”.

Militarisation of Armenia

The rapid militarisation of Armenia following the end of the Second Karabakh War has a negative impact on the ongoing peace negotiations. Armenia has already become the largest importer of Indian weaponry. France is also involved in rearming Yerevan and has signed several arms deals with Armenia. In addition, under French diktat the European Union has opened access to Armenia to its so-called Peace Fund and has already allocated 10 million euros which will increase over time. Moreover, Iran International reported recently that Yerevan and Tehran signed a secret military 500 million USD arms deal, while Iran also functions as a logistics bridge for Indian weapons delivery to Armenia.

The Biden administration’s decision to provide military aid and to get involved in the modernisation of the armed forces of this CSTO member by appointing a military advisor to the Armenian Defence Ministry is shortsighted and dangerous. Holding US-Armenia drills are also part of Armenia’s rearmament by the Biden administration. The US-initiated 5 April joint meeting between the US, EU and Armenia, called Support for Armenia’s Resilience, aimed to bring investment to strategic areas in order to embolden Armenia, despite the fact that almost all strategic assets in Armenia are controlled by Russia. Although military help was not outlined in the joint meeting’s declaration, the subsequent steps taken by the EU to provide access to the Peace Fund, together with the US appointment of a military advisor and joint drills, indicate that the military angle, or rather arming the Armenian armed forces, was the primary objective of the trilateral meeting.

In its rhetoric, Yerevan claims that it is seeking to diversify its sources of military hardware and support away from Russia and says it can purchase weapons as a sovereign country for “self defence”. However, for Azerbaijan, Armenia’s aggression and nearly three decades-long occupation of Karabakh, its irredentist territorial claims against Baku enshrined in the Armenian Constitution and its refusal to amend these or its defence doctrine, which includes clear territorial claims, constitute a threat.

Selective Approach to Rules-Based Order

Ironically, when asked about the rapid militarisation of Armenia, James O’Brien, Assistant Secretary in the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, repeated the Armenian government narrative that every state has a right to purchase military equipment and self-defence and that Azerbaijan has also done well in that regard. O’Brien went on to further justify it as an attempt by Yerevan to reduce its dependence on Russia. This assumption by the Biden State Department official illustrates an inability to differentiate between an aggressor, which as a military ally of Russia occupied and kept under control Azerbaijan’s internationally recognised territories for decades, and the victim of this occupation which was Azerbaijan. For years as a co-chair of the Minsk Group, the United States denied Azerbaijan the right to self-defence by exerting pressure on the Azerbaijani authorities to accept territorial concessions, in other words to cede Karabakh to Armenia, one of the few geopolitical issues where the US has been on the same page as Russia. Despite the fact that the United States was included as a co-chair of the Minsk Group at Azerbaijan’s insistence in 1997 when Russia and Armenia were demanding the inclusion of France, over the years successive administrations in Washington became hostage to the domestic dimension, particularly the presence of the large Armenian community in the US, in its policy formulation in the South Caucasus. Somehow a consensus formed among the US, France and Russia as co chairs, and even with Iran, to sustain the post-1994 status quo with the aim of facilitating the annexation of Azerbaijan’s lands. This involved denying Azerbaijan the right to self-defence and putting pressure on it to accept the post-occupation realities. The inability of the Biden administration to re-evaluate the decades long, misguided US position on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict following Azerbaijan’s de-occupation of Karabakh in 2020 reveals the shortsightedness of the US approach to regional affairs. The selective approach to the application of the rules-based international order, the attempt to revive the already dead Minsk Group and repeated talk about status and self determination for Karabakh Armenians by US ambassadors to Yerevan negatively affected the post-2020 environment in the region. This also contributed to Armenia’s ambition to facilitate Kosovo-style territorial claims under the guise of “remedial secession” which was clearly stated in Armenian PM Pashinyan’s 2021 election programme and was Yerevan’s main policy until Baku re-established control over the whole of Karabakh. In other words, presenting Armenian PM Pashinyan as a strong advocate of peace who took “bold” actions and recognised Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity following 2020 is factually wrong. Pashinyan won the 2021 election based on the promise of facilitating “remedial secession” as state policy. He was encouraged in this by France and the US, as was evident in April 2022 when Pashinyan stated that Yerevan’s international partners had advised him to “lower the bar” and achieve consolidation over Armenia and Karabakh Armenians by recognising Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. This was an attempt to turn Armenia’s irredentism towards Azerbaijan into an issue of “rights and security”, which was really a paraphrasing of “status”, and to advance it in the “remedial secession” formula, as both the US and EU mediators persistently avoided talking about “rights and security” within the borders of Azerbaijan. These attempts were observed in Azerbaijan and understood in detail.  

The Peace Process as a Geopolitical tool in US-Russia Rivalry

US State Department official James O’Brien’s comments before the Senate show that the Biden administration is trying to use the narrative that Russia did not protect Armenians as a geopolitical tool to facilitate a break between Yerevan and Moscow. O’Brien’s blatant remarks that Russia failed as a security guarantor of Armenia when “Azerbaijan retook territories around Nagorno Karabakh” which led to anti-Russia sentiments among Armenian society reveal that the Biden State Department is using the restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity as a pretext to pump up anti-Russia sentiment in Armenia to achieve a geopolitical goal – a so- called break between Yerevan and Moscow. In other words, it is evident that Armenia’s frustration with Russia has nothing to do with “values” or the “democracy versus autocracy” narrative, but is about Russia failing to fight Azerbaijan directly, unlike the 1990s, and to sustain Armenian control over Azerbaijani lands. James O’Brien also damages the peace process by presenting it solely as an anti-Russia move, which in return prompts a reaction from Moscow.

Secretary of State Blinken’s false claims in October 2023 that Azerbaijan will invade southern Armenia were part of a US strategy to justify providing all necessary military and financial support to Armenia, which is still a military and strategic ally of Russia and CSTO member. The claims demonstrated that the United States is using Azerbaijan’s restoration of its sovereignty to encourage Armenia to break from Russia but has failed to achieve it, as statistics show the opposite. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow-Yerevan trade turnover has increased significantly and continues to grow. It the first seven months of 2024 it more than doubled to reach over nine billion USD. Armenia has become one of Russia’s main re-export and sanctions evasion hubs. Moscow remains Yerevan’s biggest foreign trade partner, followed by the UAE and China, which together account for more than 70 per cent of Armenia’s foreign trade. Data show that Russia’s share in Armenia’s foreign trade grew from over 35 per cent in 2023 to almost 46 per cent in January-April 2024. Armenia makes huge profits from the re-export schemes to bypass Western sanctions on Russia while presenting a “Western integration” image, backed by rhetorical narratives in Western media circles. US cars, for example, find a way to Russia via Armenia. According to the economist Robin Brooks, Armenia’s exports to Russia are up 430 per cent from before the invasion of Ukraine as a result of the re-export of EU and Chinese goods to Russia. The Asian Development Bank forecasts a 5.7 per cent growth rate in Armenia’s GDP in 2024, a slowdown from 8.7 per cent in 2023, but with a rebound in 2025. Sanctions evasion schemes are a major contributor to the rapid GDP increase in Armenia. It is interesting that despite the fact that Armenia remains a key sanctions evasion and re-export hub for Russia, the US and EU remain silent on this, turning a blind eye to Yerevan’s profits. According to data published by The New York Times, in 2022, Armenia imported 515 per cent more chips and processors from the United States and 212 per cent more from the European Union than in 2021, and re-exported 97 per cent of them to Russia, as Western microchips are vital in Russia’s missile production for use in Ukraine. In other words, despite the Biden administration’s insistence that it is trying to make the most of the collective societal grievance in Armenia towards Russia, Yerevan-Moscow economic ties and trade turnover are rapidly increasing. By remaining silent about the ongoing re-export and sanctions evasion activities in Armenia, the US and EU provide the opportunity for Pashinyan’s government to profit financially and purchase more weapons from India and other sources. That is why Azerbaijan is concerned. For all the verbal attacks on Russia Pashinyan’s government has taken no solid action against Moscow. Russian military bases remain in Armenia, Russia’s economic ties with Armenia are expanding and Armenia has not left either the CSTO or the EEU. And while the US and EU have made diversification of the Armenian economy a key area, the realities and statistics show Armenia-Russia economic ties are expanding.

Biden Administration Risks Damaging US Interests in the South Caucasus

Following the restoration of Azerbaijani sovereignty in 2023, Assistant Secretary of State James O’Brien announced that the US had commissioned supposed independent investigators to look into the departure of Armenians from Karabakh, despite UN fact-finding missions twice concluding that no forced removal or oppression against Karabakh Armenians had been committed or recorded in September 2023. In fact, James O’Brien’s so called investigators turned out to be linked to the Armenian government. Armen Grigoryan’s twisted report was published by the US State Department-linked Freedom House which employs a large number of Armenian staff and is known for Azerbaijan bashing. The State Department’s stance, which ignores the objective UN fact-finding mission reports, risks alienating Azerbaijani society and thus damaging US interests in the region.

The State Department has kept up its pressure on Azerbaijan through its Commission on International Religious Freedom too. The commission recommended Azerbaijan’s inclusion on its Special Watch List based on a report which portrays as “Shia activists” Iranian-linked spies, hate preachers and those engaged in terrorist activity who are known for calling for the overthrow of the secular state and its replacement with an Iran-friendly regime. The report also included Armenian narratives about supposed damage to religious sites in Karabakh. Moreover, the US-funded Radio Liberty has for years taken a selective approach to coverage of the occupation of Azerbaijani lands by Armenia, in contrast to its coverage of occupation in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, and following the liberation of Karabakh has only intensified its bias against Azerbaijan. The use of an Iran-friendly, authoritarian politician such as Ali Karimli, who played a significant role in the politicisation of Iran-linked radical preacher Taleh Baghirzada and was one of the initiators of the famous 2013 opposition letter to Vladimir Putin, to pitch an article to The Economist with weak arguments is another part of the US State Department’s informational pressure on Azerbaijan. Despite the fact that Azerbaijan-US relations in the early 1990s enabled the United States to be present in the region and to jointly accomplish regional and transnational energy projects, and that Azerbaijan is a key country in the energy security of US allies such as the EU, Israel and Turkey, the Biden administration did not waive the infamous Section 907 to the Freedom Support Act, which bans US aid to the Azerbaijani government. As James O’Brien acknowledged, this is a means to pressure Azerbaijan for re-establishing its sovereignty. Cutting military aid to Azerbaijan means emboldening Iran, as nearly all this aid was intended to secure the Azerbaijan-Iran border and combat drug trafficking.

The Biden administration is denying US military aid to key allies Azerbaijan and Georgia, while granting aid to Armenia, which has not even broken its economic or military ties with Russia and has not left the Russia-led security and economic institutions. Due to the domestic dimension of the presence of the large Armenian diaspora in the US, the Biden administration’s policies in the South Caucasus risk the US losing its partners in the region and damaging its interests.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a PhD researcher whose research area covers the South Caucasus region, Azerbaijan and Iran. He holds a MA Degree from City, University of London.