The rise of China as a formidable economic and technological power has undeniably generated profound apprehension within the United States. China's swift advancements across key sectors such as technology, artificial intelligence, and manufacturing capabilities have necessitated a strategic imperative for the United States: finding effective means to contain this emergent competitor. One compelling avenue for consideration involves drawing upon historical precedent, specifically, the strategic paradigm employed by former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during the Cold War. Kissinger, through astute manipulation of the ideological and political fissures between the Soviet Union and China, successfully isolated Moscow by cultivating closer ties with Beijing. This historical success prompts a critical contemporary question: Can the United States adopt this approach to contain China by fostering enhanced relationships with Iran and Russia, particularly by leveraging the potent instruments of the energy sector and diplomatic engagement?

Henry Kissinger's legacy is intrinsically linked to his pragmatic approach to international relations, characterized by strategies centered on maintaining a global balance of power and adeptly managing international crises. His diplomatic toolkit included notable tactics like "shuttle diplomacy," effectively utilized during the 1973 Yom Kippur War to mediate between warring parties and the "détente" strategy to de-escalate tensions and manage the arms race with the Soviet Union. However, his most iconic contribution remains "triangular diplomacy," a strategy designed to exert pressure on the Soviet Union by forging closer ties with its rival, China. In the 1970s, during the height of the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union, triangular diplomacy capitalized on the deep historical, ideological, and border disagreements between the two communist giants despite their shared adversarial stance towards the United States. Recognizing China as the comparatively weaker adversary and the one with significant animosity towards the Soviet Union, Kissinger initiated a strategic engagement. This culminated in his clandestine visit to Beijing in 1971 and President Nixon's historic meeting with Chairman Mao in 1972. This carefully orchestrated rapprochement effectively widened the chasm between China and the Soviet Union, ultimately contributing to Moscow's isolation. In essence, the United States allied with an adversary (China) that had a profound rivalry with its principal adversary (the Soviet Union) to weaken the latter strategically.

In a potentially audacious reversal of this classic strategy, the current US administration under Donald Trump might consider a parallel yet inverted approach: seeking to isolate China by cultivating closer relationships with Iran and Russia. This proposed strategy deviates significantly from the original triangular diplomacy. Instead of aligning with a weaker adversary at odds with the primary rival, it involves approaching two nations, Iran and Russia, which are currently aligned with the primary adversary, China. The core objective is to undermine the existing alliance between Iran, Russia, and China by improving US relations with the former two, thereby creating leverage, particularly through energy dynamics, to exert pressure on China. This can be understood as the United States attempting to befriend the allies of its adversary (Iran and Russia, who are aligned with China) with the explicit aim of fracturing their alliance and strategically pressuring China.

The potential "reverse Kissinger" strategy hinges upon three critical components. Firstly, it necessitates clearly identifying and exploiting China's significant dependence on energy resources from Iran and Russia. Secondly, it aims to generate substantial leverage by facilitating an increase in energy supply from these two countries to the global markets. Thirdly, perhaps most challenging, it seeks to weaken the burgeoning trilateral alliance between Iran, Russia, and China through carefully crafted diplomatic incentives and economic overtures.

China's position as the world's largest energy consumer renders it heavily reliant on oil and natural gas imports. Data indicates that in 2024, China imported over 70% of its required crude oil and 40% of its natural gas. Given that Iran and Russia collectively possess approximately 20% of the world's proven oil reserves and a staggering 40% of its gas reserves, their role in meeting China's energy demands is indispensable. Furthermore, China's energy dependence on these nations is solidified by its 25-year strategic cooperation agreement with Iran and its deepening energy partnership with Russia, particularly in the face of Western sanctions against Moscow.

A central pillar of this proposed strategy involves a concerted effort to improve relations with Iran. Recent indirect negotiations between Iran and the United States suggest a degree of willingness in Washington to explore pathways for de-escalation. While Iran has offered assurances regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, the United States continues to press for more stringent limitations. A potential agreement could involve lifting certain sanctions in exchange for verifiable nuclear constraints. Such a development could allow Iran to significantly increase its oil production, potentially reaching around 4 million barrels per day. Reintroducing substantial volumes of Iranian oil into the global market could disrupt Iran's current oil exports to China, thereby imposing economic pressure on Beijing, which imports over 550 million tons annually (via shadow tankers). Crucially, this move could also distance Iran from China, potentially undermining the foundational 25-year Tehran-Beijing agreement.

Concurrently, on the Russian front, the United States has shown indications of seeking a reduction in tensions surrounding the conflict in Ukraine. A proposed temporary 30-day ceasefire, specifically focusing on energy infrastructure, signals a desire to explore avenues for ending hostilities. A reduction in the intense pressure currently exerted on Russia could potentially mitigate its increasing reliance on China. In recent years, Western sanctions have pushed Russia into a closer economic partnership with China, resulting in Russia exporting over 100 million tons of oil to China annually. A strategic rapprochement between the United States and Russia could weaken this burgeoning dependence on energy.

The potential "reverse Kissinger" strategy, primarily leveraging energy dynamics, offers a theoretical framework for containing China by fostering closer ties with Iran and Russia. An increased flow of oil and gas from these two nations to global markets could theoretically not only pressure the Chinese economy by diversifying its supply options but also weaken the trilateral Tehran-Moscow-Beijing alliance.

However, this complex strategy's practical success and ultimate viability are contingent upon overcoming significant obstacles. Foremost among these is the deep-seated historical mistrust that characterizes US relations with both Iran and Russia. Furthermore, implementing such a strategy requires delicate management of relationships with traditional US allies, who may view warming ties with Iran and Russia with skepticism. Finally, the strategy's success hinges on the United States' ability to offer genuinely attractive diplomatic and economic incentives compelling enough for Iran and Russia to reconsider their strategic alignment with China. Without successfully navigating these formidable challenges, this ambitious approach risks failing to contain China and could, paradoxically, lead to a strengthening of the alliances among US rivals while simultaneously isolating the United States diplomatically.

Bahram P. Kalviri is a PhD scholar in Political Science at the University of Hyderabad, India, specializing in International Relations with a focus on the Middle East's intricate and evolving political landscape.