The military strikes on Iran have damaged the nuclear facilities, which might strengthen Iran’s resolve to pursue a nuclear weapon. In the wake of recent strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, several critical questions have been raised regarding the credibility of the International Organizations and the future of global nuclear proliferation. While Israel argues that Iran’s nuclear program poses an imminent threat to regional security, the pertinent question remains: Does attacking Iran ensure that it will refrain from developing nuclear capabilities in the future?

Israel attacked Iranian nuclear infrastructure under the pretext of a preventive attack, a concept that is highly debatable under international law. Israel claims that Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities are an imminent threat. However, before the attack, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported no evidence of an active, undeclared nuclear weapons program and reaffirmed that Iran does not currently possess nuclear weapons.

Nonetheless, Iran violated JCPOA enrichment protocols after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. Iran increased the level of enrichment up to 60%. However, merely enriched uranium up to 60%, which is not weapon-grade uranium, does not constitute an imminent threat. Also, if Iran were one or two years away from developing nuclear weapons, that timeline would not constitute an imminent threat justifying military action. If the states genuinely sought to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, they must bring Iran back to the nuclear deal over unilateral military action.

The attacks on nuclear facilities have only temporarily halted Iran’s nuclear ambitions, not eliminated them. Experts believe these strikes have delayed progress by merely 1–2 years. On the contrary, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) successfully froze uranium enrichment and significantly reversed Iran's bomb-making capabilities for 10 to 15 years. Today, Iran has 400 kg of 60% enriched uranium. Had the Trump administration not withdrawn from the JCPOA, Iran would likely not have considered increasing its enrichment levels. Iran is now arguably closer to acquiring a nuclear weapon than it was in 2018, underscoring the fact that diplomacy, not unilateral military action, offers the most effective and lasting solution for nuclear restraint.

The only viable and sustainable path to non-proliferation is to bring Iran back into compliance with the “New Nuclear Deal.” So the solution is no more future attacks, to incentivize Iran to rush for a bomb; the solution is to go back into a deal and negotiate an agreement. If the world truly wants to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, it must remember that this time “the pen is mightier than the sword.”

Why Attacking Iran Will not Halt its Nuclear Ambitions:

Amidst the nuclear talks between the US and Iran, Israel launched an attack on three atomic facilities: Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. Experts believe that the strikes caused considerable damage to the facilities, but the actual Battle Damage Assessment remains unknown. The United States used 14 bunker-buster bombs to hit the facilities at precise targets.

After the attack,  the Iranian parliament has suspended cooperation with the IAEA. There are speculations that Iran’s parliament is drafting a resolution to withdraw from the NPT. If Iran withdraws from the treaty, it would rattle the very cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. For more than two decades, NPT has successfully limited the further production of nuclear weapons. Iran’s withdrawal would be the most consequential breach after North Korea suspended the NPT in 2003 and tested weapons in 2006.

That shows that coercion will only further entrench Iran, leading it to perceive that only the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent can prevent it from aggression. The way North Korea’s nuclear deterrent effectively worked, so that no state is willing to risk taking any such adventure. And if Iran builds the weapon, it would pave the way for other states, like Saudi Arabia, to pursue the bomb, potentially triggering a cycle of nuclear proliferation in the region.

To stop Iran from developing a bomb, US military officials are in the opinion of invading and occupying the country and destroying every facility, which seems quite impossible. The liable option is to have an agreement in which Iran agrees to stop enriching uranium at 60% or 90%.

In the wake of recent attacks, the director general of the IAEA said Iran can re-constitute its program. Iran will replace the scientists who were killed and restore its technical expertise. Moreover, prior to the attack, if Iran were able to save a large quantity of enriched uranium, that is up to 400kg, it would take less time to weaponize it. States cannot end Iran's nuclear program through bombing. Rather, diplomatic arrangements like establishing the “Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East” or the new nuclear deal like the JCPOA have proven to be more effective, not paving the way for Iran to build a weapon.

Why Attacking Nuclear Facilities is a Bad Idea?
Attacking Nuclear facilities is a bad idea because it is not going to stop Iran from having nuclear weapons; rather, it has increased the Iranian temptation to build the bomb because the state cannot eliminate its nuclear ambitions by bombing it. Military actions have only exacerbated their sense of insecurity, pushing them to seek nuclear weapons as a means to counter Israel's nuclear monopoly in the region. Even Israel's national security adviser, Tzachi Hanegbi, said there is no kinetic solution to this because air power cannot do it alone, as some of their facilities are underground. Only a series of bombings can annihilate those facilities.

In history, Israel tried the same playbook by bombing the Osirak reactor and the Syrian reactor. They always hold it up as some great examples. In international politics, it is always the capability, not the intent; Iraq, Iran, and Syria lack that capability. Despite that, Israel bombed Saddam's nuclear facility in Osirak in 1981, which was a peaceful research reactor. Interestingly, the reactor was under IAEA protocols, and Iraq signed the NPT in 1972, so there was zero chance that Iraq might develop a nuclear weapon.

Moreover, the Israeli bombing of Osirak had significant consequences that accelerated Saddam's interest in nuclear weapons, and he launched a covert nuclear program. The underlying message it conveys is to get a bomb; otherwise, you will get bombed. This approach undermines global non-proliferation efforts and has long-term catastrophic consequences.

Striking peaceful nuclear facilities seriously hurts the credibility and guarantees of the IAEA, UN, and the broader NPT regime by eroding the state's trust in international institutions. When a non-signatory state attacks a signatory state, it underscores the harsh reality that NPT membership does not guarantee protection against any nefarious action taken by a non-NPT state.

Military strikes against nuclear facilities set a dangerous precedent, encouraging other states, like North Korea that undertake similar action against South Korea or Japan under the guise of an imminent or preventive threat. In any untoward case, if states like Japan and South Korea get bombed, such attacks will have a ripple effect, by increasing the state's appetite and inclination towards acquiring weapons. That’s why non-nuclear weapon states should be given protection under the Negative Security Assurances. 

If states begin to bypass diplomatic mechanisms and resort to unilateral military action, the global non-proliferation regime could crumble, leading more countries to pursue nuclear deterrents out of fear. That opens a new avenue of nuclear proliferation in the world. Hence, if nuclear weapon states continue to behave recklessly, all the non-nuclear weapon states will conclude that only a nuclear weapon can save their national interest and sovereignty. That’s why attacks on nuclear facilities should not become the new normal.

Sana Ahmed is a Researcher at SVI, Islamabad.