Brief Historical Perspective:

The U.S. emerged as a global political and military leader, succeeding the British Empire during the final and critical stages of World War II. In July 1944, the foundations of the IMF and the World Bank were established, with the U.S. dollar designated as the global reserve currency at the Bretton Woods Conference (Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, 2008). Consequently, under mounting financial and political pressures, the British began to relinquish control over their satellite states, most notably British India, which was considered the crown jewel of the colonial Empire. In 1946, the Cabinet Mission (Cabinet Mission Plan Archives, n.d.) was dispatched to assess the feasibility of granting independence to British India. The consultations, combined with the evolving ground realities, culminated in the partition of British India along religious lines, leading to the creation of Pakistan as a Muslim-majority state situated on both the eastern and western flanks of the subcontinent. At the time, West Pakistan held significant strategic importance as it served as a buffer between the Soviet Union and access to the Indian Ocean. Additionally, it acted as a geopolitical barrier between the tribal regions of Afghanistan and the more settled territories of India. These strategic and military imperatives necessitated a close alliance between the Pakistan Army, which emerged from the British Indian Army and maintained its core strength in West Pakistan, and the Pentagon. U.S. relations with Pakistan’s military largely remained stable, although occasional strains did emerge. One such instance was the 1965 Indo-Pak war, during which Pakistan’s military establishment found it difficult to reconcile the Western bloc’s prioritization of regional strategic balance over Pakistan’s interests.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked the beginning of a new phase in U.S.-Pakistan relations. Under the Carter administration, the United States articulated a commitment to Pakistan’s defense along with maritime security in the Gulf region, commonly referred to as the Carter Doctrine. However, General Zia-ul-Haq considered these measures inadequate due to limited economic assistance and a lack of transfer of sophisticated weaponry.

With the onset of President Reagan’s tenure, a significant shift occurred, characterized by substantial economic and military aid to Pakistan. This support aimed to facilitate the U.S.-backed proxy war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan and assist in managing the influx of over two million Afghan refugees into Pakistan. According to various Western and Pakistani sources, General Zia insisted on economic assurances and complete autonomy in orchestrating the Afghan resistance. Concurrently, the U.S. deprioritized support for democratic and secular opposition to Zia’s military regime. Despite the peculiar nature of this alliance, the partnership proved strategically effective and one of the few places where the U.S. has achieved all its strategic goals. The U.S.-sponsored campaign to support Afghan militants against Soviet forces contributed decisively to the eventual Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Following the confirmation of the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan under the Geneva Accords in April 1988 (Klass, 1988), the United States appeared to disengage from South Asia, particularly from Pakistan. In 1990, this was institutionalized with enforcement of the Pressler Amendment (Confrontation and Retreat: The U.S. Congress and the South Asian Nuclear Tests - Key Legislation | Arms Control Association, n.d.), when President G.W. Bush declined to issue the mandatory nuclear non-proliferation certification required to sustain U.S. military aid to Pakistan. Washington recalibrated its regional strategy by cultivating a long-term strategic partnership with India. Perceiving strategic marginalization, Pakistan increasingly turned to deepening defense and economic cooperation with China as part of its efforts to maintain a minimum credible deterrent against India.

India leveraged its evolving ties with the West to diversify its defense acquisitions, which were traditionally reliant on Soviet platforms by incorporating Western fighter aircraft, artillery systems, helicopters, and other technologies. Simultaneously, India attracted substantial Western investments and technology transfers in key sectors such as Information Technology and large-scale industrial manufacturing, resulting in significant export growth. This convergence of strategic and economic engagement laid the foundation for India's sustained economic growth and its emergence as a pivotal actor in the U.S.-Indo South Asia strategy.

Post 9/11

Following the events of September 11, 2001, the United States and its allies launched the "War on Terror," committing extensive economic and military resources first to Afghanistan and subsequently to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Interestingly, Iran played a significant role in both conflicts, leveraging the turmoil to eliminate its primary regional adversaries, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, thereby establishing a new strategic equilibrium in the region.

Meanwhile, Pakistan's role was reduced primarily to that of a proxy and a logistical supply route for U.S. operations against Taliban insurgents. A critical examination of U.S. foreign policy during this period reveals that the dominant strategic consensus among American policymakers envisioned India as a long-term partner, particularly for the containment of a rising China. But while the United States and its allies remained deeply entangled in protracted conflicts, dedicating immense resources to counterinsurgency efforts, China benefited from a relatively unchallenged trajectory of sustained economic and industrial growth. This period of geopolitical distraction provided China with a rare strategic window to consolidate its domestic development without facing significant internal or external threats.

The emergence of the BRIC grouping and later BRICS (Ferragamo, 2024), with the inclusion of South Africa in 2009, underscored the evolving coordination and mutual aspirations of China, India, Russia, and the then-leadership of Brazil and South Africa. China's unexpected economic rise was accompanied by significant investments across various sectors, including industry, technology, infrastructure, and, notably, education. Through the provision of generous scholarships, Chinese students were encouraged to pursue advanced studies in the United States, Canada, and Europe. This educational strategy facilitated a transition from a culture of imitation toward a robust ecosystem of genuine research and innovation, fundamentally transforming China's scientific and technological landscape. Simultaneously, India experienced rapid growth, fueled by its expanding young and skilled workforce, making it an increasingly attractive destination for foreign investment in the services and industrial sectors.

The official launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with the huge sum of dedicated resources (McBride et al., 2023) in 2013 once again brought Pakistan’s strategic significance to the fore. As a critical node for regional connectivity, particularly through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Pakistan reemerged as a potential catalyst whose stability and cooperation could profoundly impact the success or failure of China’s broader investment strategy, especially across the Middle East and South Asia. Interestingly, the growing economic cooperation between India and China, coupled with their mutual understanding of conflict management, is reflected in the continued adherence to a policy prohibiting the use of firearms to prevent escalation along their contested borders (“Understanding the China-India Border Skirmish - Baron Public Affairs,” 2020). This highlights the limited potential of India to serve as a military counterweight to China from a Western strategic perspective, a reality that was starkly demonstrated during the border skirmishes in the Galwan Valley in 2020 (India-China Dispute, 2020; “What Was the India-China Military Clash in 2020 about? | Reuters,” 2024).

U.S.-Pakistan Relationship and Future Challenges

A critical examination of U.S. foreign policy from 2000 to 2020 reveals a series of miscalculations and conflicting strategic approaches, particularly before and after the first term of President Trump. The waning influence of the United States in the Middle East became increasingly apparent, most notably through the Saudi-Iran peace agreement brokered by China (Ali, 2023). Similarly, the visit of the Palestinian President to China marked another significant diplomatic development (Wang, 2023).

China’s growing investments and Pakistan’s military dependence on Chinese hardware, along with China’s deepening engagement with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, further underscore emerging strategic threats. These developments necessitated a comprehensive reassessment of the policies pursued by American foreign policy experts following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The strategic realignments in Western policies have become increasingly evident, but several key issues need to be critically addressed:

• Was the rise of China manifested in its economic, military, and technological advancements leading to its current level of global political influence adequately anticipated by Western policymakers in previous long-term policies?
• Was there a viable path to achieve long-term, sustainable strategic objectives in the Middle East by leveraging regional counterbalances, potentially avoiding crises such as the ongoing conflict between Hamas and Israel?
• Whether the emerging momentum towards regional cooperation and de-escalation between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Iran, despite U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, had been accurately anticipated?

One of the most pressing concerns evident from the trajectory of U.S. defense and foreign policy is its predominantly reactionary nature, reflecting a persistent misalignment with long-term strategic forecasting. While China has actively initiated major geopolitical moves, the U.S. has largely been relegated to countermeasures. Regardless of the success or failure of these responses, the broader issue remains the absence of a proactive, long-term strategic vision grounded in lessons learned from past policy failures.

Historically, Western policymakers following World War II demonstrated a profound understanding of cultural and historical dynamics, drawing on extensive experience from the colonial period. This resulted in informed critical decisions, such as the partition of British India into three distinct entities, and the strategic use of Western Pakistan as a balancing force in South Asia and the Middle East. In the current geopolitical landscape, the West’s traditional advantages in military power, technology, human capital, and economic strength are gradually declining, particularly in comparison to rising powers like China. Considering this shift, U.S. policymakers should reconsider their strategies and perhaps take inspiration from the approaches used by European powers, especially the British, during the eighteenth century.

From Pakistan’s perspective, China's contemporary strategy of expanding its global political influence predominantly through infrastructure investments without providing the requisite security assurances reveals a vulnerability in its approach. Western hegemony, by contrast, has been sustained through consistent policy application, strong resolve, and tangible sacrifices on the ground to secure strategic objectives. Recent developments surrounding the CPEC illustrate growing disillusionment. China’s perceived retreat from key strategic projects following terrorist attacks highlights a lack of determination and the necessary resolve to act even as a true regional power. This perceived hesitancy and spineless attitude has prompted even staunch advocates of Pak-China cooperation, despite significant U.S. pressure, to reconsider their stance.

The realigned U.S. policy after the BRI project, the role of Beijing in the Saudi-Iran peace deal, has paved the way to the Houthi and Gaza crises, along with Pak-India skirmishes, and the latest Iran-Israel exchanges. But these events have exposed the limitations of the U.S. to guard its interests in the region without conflict. While these aggressive adjustments in U.S. policy may have yielded short-term outcomes, they might not be sustainable. Some of the concerns can be summarized as follows:

• The emergence of China as a global political player did not result from access to ports such as Gwadar or Hambantota, but rather from China's sustained economic progression within its borders. Similarly, the Talibanization of Afghanistan and U.S. involvement in recent India-Pakistan and Iran-Israel conflicts have led to the perception of the U.S. as an unreliable partner, both in India and among GCC countries. This notion had already been established in Pakistan. This raises a critical question: Is achieving short-term strategic goals at the cost of exposing regional proxies a mark of intelligence success or failure?
• Western human intelligence assets, recruited, trained, and deployed in the region under flawed policies after the collapse of the USSR, remain largely intact. Can these assets, with their inherent biases, personal interests, and agendas, truly adapt or even be capable of supporting the revised policy framework? Are they still strategic assets or have they become liabilities and part of the problem?

Several of the questions outlined above may warrant in-depth analysis in dedicated articles; nonetheless, they reflect only a subset of the broader set of critical issues and challenges. Although it may sound strange, one of the most tangible paths toward regional stability lies in reviving the spirit of U.S.-Pakistan cooperation established in the 1950s, while adapting to the granular complexities of contemporary realities and emerging challenges.

References

Ali, Z. (2023, June 23). Saudi-Iran Deal: A Test Case of China’s Role as an International Mediator. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/06/23/saudi-iran-deal-a-test-case-of-chinas-role-as-an-international-mediator/

Cabinet Mission Plan (Cabinet Mission, 1946) Archives. (n.d.). Constitution of India. Retrieved April 21, 2025, from https://www.constitutionofindia.net/historical-constitution/cabinet-mission-plan-cabinet-mission-1946/

Confrontation and Retreat: The U.S. Congress and the South Asian Nuclear Tests—Key Legislation | Arms Control Association. (n.d.). Retrieved July 13, 2025, from https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000-01/confrontation-and-retreat-us-congress-and-south-asian-nuclear-tests-key-legislation

Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, B. of P. A. (2008). The Bretton Woods Conference, 1944. Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/98681.htm

Ferragamo, M. (2024, December 12). What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? | Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brics-group-and-why-it-expanding

India-China dispute: The border row explained in 400 words. (2020, June 16). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53062484

Klass, R. (1988, June 1). Afghanistan: The Accords. Foreign Affairs, 66(5). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1988-06-01/afghanistan-accords

McBride, J., Berman, N., & Chatzky, A. (2023, February 2). China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative | Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative

Understanding the China-India Border Skirmish—Baron Public Affairs. (2020). Baron Public Affairs. https://www.baronpa.com/library/www.baronpa.com/library/understanding-the-china-india-border-skirmish

Wang, V. (2023, June 14). China, Hosting Mahmoud Abbas, Pushes Mediator Role With Israel—The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/14/world/asia/china-mahmoud-abbas-xi-jinping.html

What was the India-China military clash in 2020 about? | Reuters. (2024, October 25). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/what-was-india-china-military-clash-2020-about-2024-10-25/

Omer Nawaz holds a Ph.D. in Computer Science from Blekinge Tekniska Högskola (Blekinge Institute of Technology), Karlskrona, Sweden. He currently serves as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Software Engineering at the University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan. He earned his M.Phil. in Internet Systems from Sweden in 2011, following a Master’s degree in Computer Science from the International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan, in 2003.

In addition to his technological research interests, and academic responsibilities, Dr. Nawaz serves as Superintendent of boy’s hostel at the University of the Punjab since 2015, where he actively engages with diverse student communities, including those organized around Islamic ideologies and ethnic affiliations such as Pashtun and Baloch groups and their tussle for influence in public sector universities of Pakistan. These roles have afforded him unique insights into the sociopolitical dynamics shaping student activism and identity politics in Pakistan.

Dr. Nawaz has a keen interest in international relations, particularly in issues related to migration and refugee policy. Through direct interactions with individuals displaced during the Afghan crisis, he has gained first-hand understanding of European refugee policy frameworks and the socioeconomic challenges faced by expatriates. He closely monitors the cultural and societal impacts of Afghan migration on Pakistan, particularly concerning integration, identity, and regional stability.