A modern air force can play a decisive role in shaping the outcomes of war at the operational and strategic level. Air forces are the spearhead of any war campaign which may be either defensive or offensive in nature. In the past decade or so, South Asian region has seen rapid rounds of escalation and the use of air forces by both India and Pakistan is increasingly transforming the nature and intensity of the conflicts.

As Prime Minister Modi publicly said that “If IAF had Rafale today, the result would have been different.” Thus, Indian government has spent billions of dollars to modernize its air force citing perceived two-front regional threat perception. Recently India has finalized a $40 billion package to modernize its air force along with other supporting equipment. The purchase of 114 Rafale jets constitutes a major portion of this allocation i.e. almost $35.6 billion.

But the question remains that can these multi-billion dollars spending sprees of fighter-jets rescue the troubled Indian Air Force?

The Indian Air Force (IAF) is facing reported crashes and mishaps during the routine flights. In the first 4 months alone, 4 reported incidents have occurred that paints a concerning picture for the operational capacity of IAF. Critics have alarmed that the fighter squadrons have fallen to a crisis level. There exists a shortfall of 13 fighter squadrons, where the operational strength is 29 against a sanctioned strength of 42. The resultant force structure deficit has pushed IAF at a tough spot regarding the operational capacity.

An individual Su-30 crash or hard-landing may be explained in proximate terms such as technical malfunction, human error, or adverse operating conditions, but the recurrence of such incidents indicates a pattern of institutional and operational strain and cannot be classified as episodic failures. Different structural and operational constraints have dampened the IAF performance over the decades.

It is not only that some aircraft are old, but that the IAF seems to be stuck in a state of "ageing fleet entrapment," where aging aircraft become functionally essential owing to insufficient progress in replacing them and bringing about force modernization. In such a scenario, aging aircraft keep flying past their life expectancy and continue to be part of the frontline force composition. This leads to increased exposure to airframe stress, system malfunction, high maintenance requirements, and decreased airworthiness. The consequence is an inherently negative loop: slower replacement makes the force more reliant on aging aircraft, and increased reliance makes it technically more vulnerable and operationally less resilient.

A reduced and inadequately serviced fleet means that there is always a balancing act between readiness and training. The aircraft must be used at once for pilot training, conversion training, readiness purposes, and even as a signalling device. When there is a shortage, there will be a struggle for the same aircraft to perform all these roles. The end result is a smaller buffer zone because the same aircraft is expected to fight wars and train at the same time.

Lack of indigenous capabilities and necessary infrastructure for the overhaul and refurbishment of fighter jets make the matters even worse. The local aerospace industry has not yet developed the necessary capabilities for swift recapitalization. When there is an over-reliance on limited production facilities for aircraft, any delay within a single project affects the whole fleet. The grounding of Tejas fleet is another manifestation of unsuccessful indigenisation efforts under the much celebrated Aatmanirbhar ambitions of Modi government.

Pilot training and production of capable human resource to manage and operate complex fighter jet platforms is also a stumbling block for the IAF in achieving full operational capacity. The IAF has currently has a ratio of 1.5 pilots per aircraft as compared to Pakistan Air Force (PAF) with 2.5 pilots per aircraft. And Indian pilots rely more heavily upon simulation rather than actual training or flight hours. This creates critical gap in the handling and operationalising of modern machines like fighter jets.

The questions of training, building better human resource, aircraft serviceability, timely replacing the legacy platforms, building indigenous capabilities to support aircraft replenishment, and most importantly, securing supply chains for the spare parts are structural and institutional in nature. Spending billions of dollars on new platforms while neglecting the aerospace ecosystem at home would be a costly endeavour that may not deal with the real and deep-rooted problems plaguing the Indian Air Force.

However, if these fundamental discrepancies are not remedied through proper replacements, increased production capability, and enhanced force planning, incidents will continue to be manifestations of an overarching organizational issue, rather than being seen as anomalies. Spending spree may help in the short run and may cover these structural and organisational flaws but it will only exacerbate the problem if not attended sagaciously.

Muhammad Haseeb Riaz is a Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies, CISS, Islamabad.