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Global South Rising? Middle Powers in the Changing World Order
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General Mark Milley, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently told Foreign Affairs magazine in an interview that “today we are in a tri-polar world” (Foreign Affairs 2023). Those who have considered the world unipolar for the last 30 years and still do so may frown at this admission. These three poles, as General Milley suggests, are the USA, China, and Russia1. There might be, however, one mistake as to General Milley, who forgot to mention a fourth possible pole. This fourth pole is the so-called Third World, now known as the 'Global South'. Gradually, this particular pole is gaining importance in world politics, perhaps as a side effect of the new polarization surrounding the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

From One to Two

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world had come under the sway of the only surviving superpower, the United States. From the mid-1980s, however, it was already apparent that the once formidable superpower, the Soviet Union, would not be able to withhold itself. In the early 1990s, the fragmented and weakened Russia was recognized as the successor to the former USSR, but no one considered it a superpower then. It still had vast natural resources, a significant nuclear arsenal, and other military capabilities, but was so economically fragile and so overwhelmed by internal strife that it lost its superpower status. The collapse of the USSR led to Francis Fukuyama’s famous declaration of ‘the end of history’, by which he meant that Western values and politics had triumphed after a long, apparently never-ending strife. After two decades, a new challenge comes to the fore. President Putin has not only brought back the old glories of Russia but also enabled it into a position to challenge the West. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the manifestation of that challenge.

Before the invasion, the US-led Western alliance was already divided, perhaps not overtly but covertly. Occasional objections can be heard from some of the US allies due to its failed promises, confusing priorities and somewhat imposing nature. France, in particular, had an interest in creating intra-European alliances independent of Washington. Due to its involvement in numerous wars over the past 30 years, the United States has grown weaker, both internally and externally. Acting the role of global policeman requires strong muscles and a sizeable wallet. Internal political and ideological divisions made the country more vulnerable. Within these couple of decades, Russia managed to get its domestic situation in order, and China strengthened its place in the world as a new superpower.

The Rise of China and the War in Ukraine

A new factor of the 21st century world order is the emergence of China as a superpower2. It is widely considered a superpower not only due to its military capability but also for its dynamic economic prowess. Right after the Russian invasion, China’s role as a superpower has been felt more strongly ever than before. Earlier this year, China brokered reducing tension and resuming diplomatic relations after a seven years halt between Saudi Arabia and Iran, proposed to mediate between Israel and Palestine, and presented a ‘peace plan’ to end the Russia-Ukraine war (Rozen 2023). Xi Jinping received a warm welcome from Putin earlier this March, and Beijing is the only major government that has a friendly relationship with Moscow. Now Putin is practically waging a lonely war, and if he has China on his side, the burden will be less cumbersome for him.

Russia's attack on Ukraine is undoubtedly a major blow to the NATO-member European countries. In response to the invasion, they remarkably kept them united and engaged in a 'proxy' war on behalf of Ukraine. While the West is united against Russia, some Third World countries choose a different path. With the argument that the war was against their national interests, the countries of the Global South individually and, in some cases, collectively took a ‘neutral’ position.

Two decades ago, there would not have been any big debate on this question. The Third World would have accepted America’s will without hesitation. But now the situation is changing drastically. Some countries in the South are eager to tie up with China to avoid US dominance. Countries like Brazil, South Africa, oil-rich Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states are taking initiatives in this regard. With Moscow’s support, China is seeking recognition of its currency, the yuan, as the new international currency instead of the dollar. Along with the BRICS countries, Saudi Arabia has already expressed its interest in accepting the yuan as a medium of cross-border transactions.

Moscow and Beijing together clearly consider a US-dominated unipolar world system a barrier to their national and regional interests. Just weeks before the invasion of Ukraine, Putin and Xi declared their “no limits friendship.” From this announcement, some presumed that China might provide military support to Russia. To them, it is not difficult to imagine what China would have done if Russia had planned to occupy Kyiv in two weeks and change the political map of Europe. But within a month of the war, it became clear that Moscow had failed to achieve what it desired before the war. Right now, Russia can’t triumph overnight.

Given this situation, China took an apparently neutral position. It is not in a position to miss out on its ongoing lucrative economic ventures in the West. Its strategy was evident at the United Nations, where it abstained on every vote condemning Russia. While strongly arguing for the integrity of national sovereignty, it continued to criticize Western military aid to Ukraine. At the same time, China refused to provide Russia with any weapons despite its relentless appeal.

The Global South in the Changing World Order

The role of the Global South is largely similar to that of China. Most of the Global South countries accepted US leadership in the Afghanistan-Iraq war. But things are a little bit different in the case of Ukraine. They largely condemned the Russian invasion, but despite the call of the United States, did not involve themselves in the cause. More than 50 countries of the Global South abstained from voting on the Ukraine issue at the United Nations. The war caused fuel prices to rise, disrupting vital food supplies. During the Covid-crisis, it became apparent to them that superpowers can no longer be relied upon. As a result, they chose their own path, avoiding both superpowers.

This position can be perceived as proof of the Third World’s diplomatic maturity. The reality is that neither the United States nor Russia are as powerful as they used to be, and it would be no longer be beneficial for some of the Global South countries if they continued to support the two great powers. It is from this perception that the ‘neutral’ position of the Global South came into being. India, Brazil, and South Africa are leading this new strategic equation.

An explanation of this new strategic equation was given by Nirupama Rao, former Foreign Secretary of India. To her, USA, China, and Russia are equally important to India. The tussle between Washington and Moscow has opened up new opportunities for third-world countries like India. Not only are they able to buy Russian oil and gas at a ‘double discount’, but they have also arranged to pay for the fuel in their currencies.

She wrote in the Foreign Affairs magazine, “Europe and Washington may be right that Russia is violating human rights in Ukraine, but Western powers have carried out similarly violent, unjust, and undemocratic interventions-from Vietnam to Iraq. New Delhi is therefore uninterested in Western calls for Russia’s isolation. To strengthen itself and address the world’s shared challenges, India has the right to work with everyone” (Rao 2023).

In the same issue, Brazilian expert Professor Matias Spektor (2023) argued that the war has weakened both the Western alliance and Russia. Now they are no longer able to impose their will on the South. The resulting consolidation is the fourth pole, the Global South.

The Future of the Global South

The majority of the global population lives in the global south. Their combined wealth is one-third of the total global gross domestic product (GDP). There is no denying that the Global South is waking up, says Ravi Agrawal (2023), Editor-in-Chief of the Foreign Policy magazine.

Admittedly, despite the common interests, the Global South is not a ‘monolithic’ group yet. They did not form any strategic political and military alliance. This new group may look similar to the non-aligned movement of the fifties and sixties due to the strong presence of countries like India and Indonesia, but the situation is completely different than before. Some countries in this group have forged alliances with major powers for their own benefit. For instance, India has joined the US-led four-nation ‘Quad’ military strategic alliance to counter its regional rival, China. South Africa defies US sanctions by sending weapons to Russia. Brazil is trying to get closer to China. This decision of the Global South is completely driven by their national interest and pragmatism.

Some may find a multipolar world more capable of ensuring world peace. As the experience of the past century has shown, a world dominated by one or two superpowers is not favorable to global peace at all. Whatever is said about the equality of each and every state irrespective of their power and size, the reality was, only the superpowers had the exclusive right to control the international system. By virtue of the veto power in the Security Council, they were making and breaking laws at their will. Now this old power structure is falling apart. Our world will never be the same as it was before.

Notes

  1. Some scholars, however, argue that the current world order is bipolar in nature, with the US and China striving for global dominance. For a better understanding, see Tunsjø (2018) and Græger et. al. (2022).
  2. China is considered by some as a potential superpower. They argue that China might be a regional power and one of the influential drivers of geopolitical change today, but they are yet to claim the title of a superpower (Bekkevold 2023).

References

Agrawal, R. (2023, January 25). Why the World Feels Different in 2023: From Climate Negotiations to Sports to Diplomacy, the Global South is becoming more Powerful. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/12/global-south-geopolitics-economics-climate/.

Bekkevold, J. I. (2023, March 2). Why China Is Not a Superpower. Foreign Affairs. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/02/china-superpower-us-new-cold-war-rivalry-geopolitics/.

Foreign Affairs (2023, May 2). How to Avoid a Great-Power War: A Conversation with General Mark Milley. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/how-to-avoid-great-power-war-mark-milley.

Græger, N., Heurlin, B., Wæver, O. and Wivel, A. (Eds.) (2022). Polarity in International Relations: Past, Present, Future. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rao, N. (2023, April 26). The Upside of Rivalry: India’s Great-Power Opportunity. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/india/modi-new-delhi-upside-rivalry.

Rozen, J. (2023, May 13). China hones its Global South diplomacy. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2023/05/china-hones-its-global-south-diplomacy/.

Spektor, M. (2023, May 4). In Defense of the Fence Sitters: What the West Gets Wrong About Hedging. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/global-south-defense-fence-sitters?utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=special_send&utm_campaign=event_sub_mj2023_issue_launch_event&utm_content=20230426&utm_term=issue-launch-event.

Tunsjø, ø. (2018). The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics: China, the United States, and Geostructural Realism. New York: Columbia University Press.

Khaled Imran is currently pursuing his postgraduate studies in International Politics at the University of Pécs. His research focuses on authoritarian politics, digital authoritarianism, and authoritarianism in small states.

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