The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, showed the world the devastating power of nuclear weapons. The need to possess nuclear weapons by the Soviets then became imperative to exist as a superpower. The relationship between the two superpowers were often defined by a strategic balance characterised by a high degree of mutual vulnerability. Proliferation for the United States and the Soviet Union sometimes meant helping other nations build nuclear weapons. The United States reluctantly assisted the United Kingdom and later, much more reluctantly, France. Helped by the Soviets, in 1964, the Chinese conducted their first nuclear weapon test. Thus, the end of the Second World War can be seen as when the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons began to increase. At the same time, globalization, which was still an evolving phenomenon, started to connect the world in new and intricate ways, more importantly with the spread of technology - that have been used to support proliferation.

It is remarkable to note how slowly China's nuclear arsenal has expanded. Meanwhile, France and the United Kingdom have reduced their nuclear arsenals to a small number of air-delivered bombs and their submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). There were serious concerns that South Korea and Taiwan would develop nuclear weapons by the middle of the 1960s and into the 1970s. Despite having the means to do so, the Japanese and Swedes were committed to maintaining their non-nuclear status. The Israelis entered the club in the late 1960s. at the time, some in the U.S. intelligence community wanted to deny Israel F-4 aircraft unless they stopped their nuclear program, but Lyndon Johnson eventually allowed the transfer of these warplanes. While the US did not assist Israel in acquiring nuclear weapons, it also did not take strong action to prevent Israel from ostensibly developing sophisticated weapons and cutting-edge delivery systems. India decided to develop nuclear weapons after China conducted its first nuclear weapon test in 1964. In 1974, India conducted a test of a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). It was so peaceful that they did not even instrument it, so they did not know the yield. Pakistan followed suit with its own indigenous program.

Globalization cannot be considered the main reason behind proliferation, but it has indeed altered its nature as trafficking networks became global, mostly supported by the wider accessibility of WMD-related materials and technology. This has occurred not just as a result of an increase in trade volumes but also as a result of civilian applications of these materials giving proliferation networks access that was previously inaccessible to them. As countries responded with the implementation of national and multilateral export controls, to prevent such transfers to unauthorised end-users, the networks have responded and evolved. These networks have started buying single basic sub-components from various sources rather than entire WMD linked systems, making it difficult for customs, security, and intelligence services to determine the true use and destination of such materials. It is important to note that purchasing supplies or equipment is one of the key indicators that gives security and intelligence services a head start on spotting any on-going WMD proliferation activities. The proliferation networks’ structures have therefore become more complex in order to further elude the security services by involving more actors in their operations, turning to the trade of sub-components, and choosing additional mechanisms that avoid detection. Furthermore, it was the governments or State-owned enterprises that previously controlled the market for WMD-related supplies and machinery. As the markets became more globalized, private brokers and their networks of tens of thousands of independent manufacturers became almost entirely responsible for managing transactions. These brokers are no longer just a small group. Traffickers in WMD materials have developed into a global community that hides their activities behind front companies and agencies in an effort to evade law enforcement. Thus, proliferation networks typically operate simultaneously in multiple nations, especially in free-trade zones with transhipment centres (cargo redistribution locations) or in nations with high levels of international trade so their shipments can evade detection techniques. Proliferation networks typically operate simultaneously in multiple nations, especially in free-trade zones with transhipment centres (cargo redistribution locations) or in nations with high levels of international trade so their shipments can evade detection techniques. With these ideas in mind, it is possible to geographically profile locations that are better suited for these activities. They typically take place in nations that exhibit particular traits, such as significant challenges in implementing non-proliferation-related domestic and international legislation, ineffective export controls, or high levels of corruption. A lack of ratification of WMD-related Conventions, the presence of dual-use industries related to WMD on their territory, their proximity to a major commercial centre, and/or a lack of coordination between customs and licensing authorities or other important national stakeholders are additional indicators.

One of the most notorious examples of a proliferation network can be found in the A.Q. Khan network. Established in the 1970s, this network began to illegitimately provide materials and information from Europe to Pakistan's gas centrifuge programme, which was used to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU). As the years passed, the network grew and began to export weapons as well as gas centrifuges to a variety of different nations. The network is said to have provided sensitive information and materials to many nations, including Iran and North Korea, who received centrifuges. It also provided significant support to Libya with ten thousand centrifuges. One could estimate that the A.Q. Khan network sent more than one million centrifuge-related components from around the world, with each centrifuge containing more than hundred components.[1] From countries like Turkey, South Africa, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, or Spain, equipment was sent, purchased, or transported, usually via Dubai. The network also made an effort to investigate regions with lax export controls or with the industrial capacity to produce nuclear-related goods but outside of any nuclear export control regime. Moreover, the A.Q. Khan network also knew how to take advantage of other globalization tools, like the international financial system, as well as legal and administrative gaps in the European export control systems by constantly switching routes and end-user identities.

Unfortunately, there are many other actors involved in nuclear trafficking besides the A.Q. Khan network. These concerns were further fuelled with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, when security and intelligence services began to notice the theft of nuclear materials in Russia and other former Soviet bloc nations. Based on the information collected by the Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft, and Orphan Radiation Sources of the Salzburg University, the author Lyudmila Zaitseva was able to identify three distinctive periods. During the first recorded period between 1991 to 1995, traffickers frequently shipped radioactive goods to Central Europe in an effort to locate buyers. Germany alone recorded 75 incidents during this time period that resulted in the seizure of nuclear materials, including plutonium and HEU.[2] The second period from 1996 to 2000 saw a decline in the number of incidents, most likely as a result of traffickers' increased caution or desire to find new markets and routes for their nuclear goods. Other areas, like the Middle East, South East Asia, or even South Africa and other countries in Africa, seemed more alluring for nuclear smuggling. Additionally, this time period demonstrates how criminals chose to concentrate more on radioactive sources than on fissile material. The third and final period – starting in 2001, was characterised by the September 11 attacks and the growing focus that governments began to give to non-state actors. The available data reveals that episodes involved more radioactive sources than weapons-grade nuclear material, which made up less than 20% of the reported episodes. In order to understand the globalized and transnational nature of these organisations we can look at a 2001 nuclear trafficking episode, involving the capture of HEU. The primary reason that organised crime is involved in nuclear trafficking is the monetary gain that comes from selling the nuclear components to a third party. Another possibility is that a State or a terrorist group pays a criminal organisation to fulfil a specific request connected to nuclear trafficking.

In the 1960s, it was widely believed that by the turn of the century, there would be around 30-35 nuclear-armed states. However, it is remarkable that the number of nuclear-armed states has only risen to 9 – which is a tremendous testimony to the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its incentives both against weapons and for civil nuclear power, despite the baleful influence of the Cold War (1950s to 80s) which saw a massive build-up of nuclear weapons particularly by the USA and the Soviet Union. Nuclear weapons are obviously used for military deterrence, but the idea that having more of them in more places would reduce war is not widely accepted and is not used as a foundation for international policy. Despite the fact that the NPT is the most significant international agreement on nuclear weapons, the nuclear non-proliferation regime encompasses much more. The regime consists of treaties, conventions, and common (multilateral and bilateral) agreements pertaining to physical security and protection, export restrictions, nuclear test bans, and possibly production cut-offs for fissile materials.

For almost 50 years the safeguards system established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in accordance with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), has prevented the divergence of civil uranium for military purposes. In order to ensure that civil uranium, plutonium, and associated plants are only used for peaceful purposes and do not in any way support the proliferation of nuclear weapons programs, cooperation in the development of nuclear energy has been necessary. Additionally, it has expanded to cover covert nuclear activities. The majority of nations have abandoned nuclear weapons because they understand that their proliferation would endanger rather than strengthen national security. As a result, they have embraced the NPT as a declaration that nuclear weapons and technology will only be used for peaceful purposes. The NPT currently has 189 parties. These include all five officially recognised Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) —China, France, the Russian Federation, the UK, and the USA—that produced and detonated a nuclear weapon prior to 1967. Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea are the main nations still outside the NPT, as they cannot join without renouncing and dismantling their weapons programmes, which have all advanced since 1970.

The IAEA was established in 1957 by a unanimous United Nations resolution to assist countries in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Since 1970, the administration of safeguards agreements has been a part of this role. This provides assurance to the international community that each nation is adhering to its obligations under treaties to only use nuclear resources and infrastructure for peaceful purposes. The IAEA conducts routine inspections of civil nuclear facilities to confirm the veracity of the information provided. These inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities. According to the World Nuclear Association, the system relies on:

1. Material Accountability – tracking all inward and outward transfers and the flow of materials in any nuclear facility. This includes sampling and analysis of nuclear material, on-site inspections, review and verification of operating records.
2. Physical Security – restricting access to nuclear materials at the site of use.
3. Containment and Surveillance – use of seals, automatic cameras and other instruments to detect unreported movement or tampering with nuclear materials, as well as spot checks on-site.

Furthermore, the agency checks inventories and undertakes sampling and analysis of materials. Safeguards are designed to deter diversion of nuclear material by increasing the risk of early detection. They are complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as the UK and USA through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers' Group. Safeguards are backed up by the threat of international sanctions.

Globalization has brought tremendous transformations to the international economy. While these changes have created benefits in several areas of economy, politics, and science, they have also brought significant security risks. Globalization may not be the primary cause of proliferation, but it has undoubtedly changed the nature of it as trafficking networks became more widespread, largely due to the easier availability of WMD-related materials and technology. The establishment of these networks and lack of state control gave rise to more innovative methods to transfer fissile materials from one part of the world to another. Even though, there is no definite example where non-state actors acquired nuclear weapons, the growth of their involvement has given rise to safety and security concerns.

The NPT has been a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. Permanently extending in 1995 it brought the signatories to an agreement that nuclear power should be used for peaceful purposes. Moreover, the IAEA framework provides an assurance to the international community that each nation is adhering to its obligations under treaties to only use nuclear resources and infrastructure for peaceful purposes. However, the countries that have not joined the NPT pose a significant concern to the safeguard of nuclear power. A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors under full safeguards and then subsequently opt out of the NPT. Thus, it is worth noting that there are certain limitations to these safeguard mechanisms. Therefore, it is crucial that nations comprehend the supply and demand dynamics of nuclear materials as well as how trafficking networks function rather than erecting new barriers as the world comes to terms with the ‘darker’ side of globalization. Only then will it be possible to enhance the current defences against this threat without jeopardising the prosperity concurrently made possible by globalization.

Anusua Ganguly has completed her MA in Conflict Analysis and Peace-building from Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. Her current main interests are Non-Traditional Security Issues, South Asia, as well as Gender and Conflict related issues.

References

James, H. (2002). The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression. Harvard University Press.

Gaffney, H.H. (2008). Globalization and Nuclear Proliferation. In R.A. James & W.J. James. Globalization and WMD Proliferation – Terrorism, Transnational Networks, and International Security. Routledge.

Galamas, F. & Garcia, F.P. (2015). Globalization and the Threats of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In T. Rodrigues & R.G. Perez., Globalization and International Security: An Overview, Nova Science Publishers

Zaitseva, L. (2007). Organized Crime, Terrorism and Nuclear Trafficking. Strategic Insights, 6(5). available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=477914

Safeguards to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation. (April 2021). World Nuclear Association. available at https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/non-proliferation/safeguards-to-prevent-nuclear-proliferation.aspx

[1] Galamas, F. & Garcia, F.P. (2015). Globalization and the Threats of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In Globalization and International Security: An Overview. pp 197-210.

[2] Zaitseva, L. (August 2007). Organized Crime, Terrorism and Nuclear Trafficking. Strategic Insights, 6(5).