Tacit knowledge is an essential ingredient for the development of weapons of mass destruction. ‘Tacit knowledge is crucial without which the technology’s potential cannot be exploited.’[1] Its importance has been highlighted by examining nuclear and biological weapons development programs.

The threat of biological weapons gained traction post-9/11, particularly with the emergence of synthetic biology. This article argues that tacit knowledge has an instrumental role in the development of bioweapons. Furthermore, this article argues that in policy and intelligence arenas, the underlying role of tacit knowledge is overlooked and instead, focus is placed on the ease of acquisition of bioweapons. This has critical implications for counterproliferation policies, where it results in a lack of understanding of the challenges adversaries face in bioweapons development and a failure to communicate to malevolent actors that tacit knowledge is a significant barrier to proliferation.

The Scene

The threat of biological weapons has dramatically increased with the advent of ‘new wars,’ terrorism, and rapid advances in biotechnology.[2] Policy discussions on bioweapons typically refer to the easy and affordable nature of their production.[3] This stems from the premise that materials for bioweapons are easily acquired compared to the procurement of fissile material for nuclear weapons.[4] Moreover, there is an inherent assumption that production of bioweapons is simple because scientific innovations have lowered the technological threshold.[5] Discussions on bioweapons center around different frames of science and technology, which ultimately shape policy.[6] In this case, the biotech revolution frame emphasizes codified material, resources, and infrastructure but fails to consider the social dimensions that influence these technologies.[7] Resultingly, bioweapon threat assessments rely on person-person movement, material procurement, technical documents, and infrastructure.[8] They do not take into consideration the unpredictability of biological agents, knowledge base, technical skills, and social factors that shape biological projects.[9] Empirical studies demonstrate, however, that barriers to proliferation exist in the sustenance phase of bioweapons development.[10] This phase is highly dependent on the knowledge base, highlighting that an understanding of factors such as tacit knowledge can enable policies to bring about the collapse of a bioweapons program or prevent its initiation. This demonstrates that incorporating tacit knowledge in counterproliferation policies will disrupt the knowledge ‘transmission belt’ in bioweapons development.[11]

Tacit Knowledge

Tacit knowledge refers to knowledge, skills, or techniques acquired ‘by doing’ or ‘by example.’[12] It is a localized form of knowledge that cannot be readily transferred through written material or be entirely stored by impersonal means.[13] The importance of tacit knowledge was described by MacKenzie and Spinardi who examined the US, Soviet, and British nuclear weapons programs. Despite the availability of documentation and algorithmic instructions, these factors were not enough to develop a prototype nuclear weapon.[14] Instead, differences in materials, equipment, infrastructure, and personnel affected experimental variables, and necessitated the generation of new tacit knowledge.[15] In addition, judgement, or the gradual buildup of knowledge through trial and error, was found to be instrumental during the testing phases.[16] Production of nuclear weapons relied on prolonged interactions between scientists from interdisciplinary backgrounds and led to the formation of communal tacit knowledge.[17] This demonstrates that documentation and instructions are not sufficient for nuclear weapons design; tacit knowledge or ‘learning by doing’ bridges this gap.[18]

The important role played by tacit knowledge in biological weapons was exemplified by the Soviet’s development of Anthrax 836 technology.[19] Stepnogorsk Scientific and Experimental Production Base (SNOPB) was tasked with the development of large-scale manufacture of Anthrax 836 based on a Ministry of Defense (MOD) model.[20] SNOPB was provided with documentation, but it took 5 years of trial and error to develop the weapon.[21] Applying the MOD technology to new materials and infrastructure posed as challenges but this was overcome through continuous hands-on training from MOD scientists, consistent with Polanyi’s apprenticeship concept.[22] Experimental issues were overcome by ostensive tacit knowledge, where knowledge that could not be conveyed through words, was transferred through practices.[23] Furthermore, unrecognized knowledge or knowledge that inexperienced scientists would not know unless otherwise instructed, was also transferred.[24] This demonstrates that the development of Anthrax 836 relied heavily upon tacit knowledge, despite the availability of codified materials and resources.

So Near, Yet So Far

The threat of biological weapons production has traditionally been addressed by controlling the materials required for production, but attempts have been made to limit knowledge transfer.[25] In the post-Cold War era, the US addressed proliferation threats by devising brain drain programs to divert former Soviet scientists to peaceful civilian research programs.[26] This was loosely premised on the concept that tacit knowledge, if not used or transmitted, can be lost.[27] The relative success of these programs depended on the number of former Soviet weapons experts absorbed into these programs.[28] Hymans, however, opined that this measure assumes that ‘proliferation is as good as accomplished when the former Soviet scientist’s plane touches down in Damascus or Tripoli.’[29] This indicates that this approach does not truly factor in how tacit knowledge is transferred.[30] In addition, different forms of tacit knowledge may decay faster over time, indicating that a metric is needed to detect this, facilitate its erosion, and thereby reduce the threat of knowledge transfer.[31] Furthermore, bioweapons development programs were carried out in interactive settings, where no single person possessed the entire knowledge required to develop a bioweapon.[32] The literature on the temporal decay of communal tacit knowledge and its potential reconstitution is inconclusive, showing that the potential threat of communal tacit knowledge is not known.[33] This demonstrates that there is an inability to discern aspects of tacit knowledge and measure it.[34] Another limitation is that these programs do not recruit scientists who had previously worked on Soviet bioweapons programs, indicating that their individual tacit knowledge remains a threat.[35] This poses as a challenge in determining the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ of bioweapons expertise and potentially diverts funding away from those who really possess tacit knowledge.[36] This emphasizes that counterproliferation policies have placed barriers to knowledge transfer, but the underlying role of tacit knowledge has not been definitively recognized and is underdeveloped.

Policy of Dissuasion

In the aftermath of 9/11 and the anthrax letters, advances in biotechnology triggered states to ‘grapple with the growing risks of a biological attack.’[37] The US employed the policy of dissuasion to address the threat of bioweapons.[38] Dissuasion aims to develop strong barriers to entry and to ‘deny state and non-state adversaries the benefits they seek through actual or threatened use of WMD by raising the costs and risks of such an attack.’[39]

Unknown Known

Dissuasion works under two conditions, one of which is that dissuasive actions must target key features of weapons development to create strong barriers.[40] Instead, there is a prevailing discourse in synthetic biology that downplays or ignores tacit knowledge to highlight its promissory nature.[41] Marris et al., examined the cause of this persistent narrative and attributed it to ‘unknown knowns’ or knowledge out there that is not known.[42][43] Drawing upon Rayner’s ‘social construction of ignorance,’ certain organizations employ strategies, even unconsciously, to exclude this form of knowledge because it is uncomfortable and threatens their foundational underpinnings.[44] Synthetic biology is based on the premise that its black box nature removes the need to carry out complex tasks and does not require specialized skills.[45] Therefore, acknowledging the role played by tacit knowledge would undercut the revolutionary nature of synthetic biology.[46] By emphasizing the black box nature of synthetic biology and by excluding ‘unknown knowns’, members within the community retain a version of a world that is simplified, enabling them to function.[47] Resultingly, tacit knowledge was observed as a ‘new’ and ‘alarming’ trend at the Biological Weapons Convention, indicating that it is not considered as a foundational component of scientific practice in policy circles.[48] Thus, tacit knowledge remains an ‘unknown known,’ leading to misdirected non-proliferation policies that systematically overlook its role.

Additionally, while synthetic biology purports that it breaks the barriers to biology by deskilling, it disregards the challenges to making bioweapons.[49] Scientists at Stony Brook University synthesized poliovirus by using commercially available material and publicly accessible information.[50] This led to the notion that dangerous pathogens may also be synthetized in a similar fashion by nonstate actors using ‘bulletproof protocols’ and kits, eliminating the need for tacit knowledge.[51] This myopic vision does not consider experimental challenges, such as developing awareness of crucial aspects of experiments and the development of sensory and temporal knowledge to identify potential pitfalls and successes.[52] Moreover, advances in technology, like automation, replace old skills with new ones and do not eliminate the role of tacit knowledge.[53] Thus, despite having a ‘blueprint’ of an experiment and do-it-yourself kits, tacit knowledge remains as a ‘show slower’ to bioweapons development.[54]

Furthermore, focusing how easily bioweapons can be synthesized, disregards the challenges associated with weaponization. Weaponization is considered as a rate-limiting step in the production of bioweapons and is highly dependent on tacit knowledge.[55] This indicates that synthesizing a pathogen in the laboratory is not equivalent to producing one that is capable of mass destruction.[56] Moreover, the utility of bioweapons not only lies with its potential infectivity but its ability to do psychological harm.[57] Historical evidence suggests that terrorists are more likely to carry out small-scale attacks, which create fear and panic.[58] For instance, the 2013 ricin letters were a crude preparation of the toxin but it required the optimization of techniques by unskilled persons indicating that it relied on tacit knowledge.[59] This implies that although synthetic biology aims to carry out ‘a sustained, well-funded assault on the necessity of tacit knowledge,’ the extent to which tacit knowledge is required for bioweapons development, particularly small-scale attacks, is not known.[60] Thus, the dissuasion policy overestimates the ease with which bioweapons are weaponized.

Unintentional Persuasion

In addition, the dissuasion policy does not have a thorough understanding of the challenges that malevolent actors face. The path to the development of bioweapons by terrorists is not simple: Tacit knowledge serves as a significant roadblock to its pursuance. Despite spending an estimated $10 million on its bioweapon program over six years, Aum Shinrikyo was unable to produce bioweapons due to socio-technical and organizational challenges.[61] The group did not possess technical expertise or a knowledge base that could be applied to bioweapons.[62] A compartmentalized organizational structure restricted the flow of information which greatly hampered Aum’s attempts at weaponization.[63] Additionally, frequent disruptions impeded the advancement of the program owing to the localized nature of knowledge and the time required for adaptation to new locations.[64] Finally, the covert nature of the operation placed limitations on Aum’s ability to utilize available resources. For instance, they relied on in-house production of materials, which demanded greater levels of technical expertise.[65] This demonstrates the serious obstacles malevolent actors face in bioweapons development.

Furthermore, the dissuasion policy fails to convey a high cost of entry into bioweapons development because of its emphasis on deskilling.[66] The claim that deskilling can lead to a situation where ‘anyone can engineer biology’ overestimates the ease with which bioweapons can be made by malevolent actors. This has persuasive potential because it implies that there is a low cost of entry into bioweapons development.[67] Terrorists tend to choose programs based on their relative ‘hardness.’[68] The apparent lack of ‘hardness’ associated with bioweapon development led to Al Qaeda’s failed attempts, stating that they ‘only became aware of them when the enemy drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concern that they can be produced cheaply.’[69] This highlights the importance of framing tacit knowledge in a particular manner to convey its role as a serious barrier.[70] Therefore, by emphasizing deskilling, the policy of dissuasion failed to dissuade adversaries from bioweapons development.[71] This demonstrates that the conditions necessary for a successful policy of dissuasion have not been met. Instead, the prevailing narrative has misdirected counterproliferation policies away from tacit knowledge and fails to showcase tacit knowledge as an effective barrier to WMD proliferation.

Intelligence Gap

Intelligence forms an important component of dissuasion but it fails to take tacit knowledge into consideration.[72] Cooper points out that the intelligence community (IC) is not held together by an apprenticeship system, and this acts a challenge for it to appreciate the importance of tacit knowledge in scientific practices.[73] A recent study on H5N1 experiments showed that analysts omit tacit dimensions of scientific research, impacting their ability to identify potential threats.[74] This is attributed to limited understanding of what constitutes tacit knowledge in the IC.[75] This indicates that there is a need to communicate the importance of tacit knowledge and the difficulties associated with bioweapons development before it can be applied practically to WMD threat detection.[76] Further clarity of tacit knowledge is needed for the IC which would ultimately enable policies, like the BWC, to function more powerfully and enhance its dissuasive power.

Conclusion

This article demonstrates the importance of tacit knowledge in the sustenance phase of bioweapons development. It highlights that the policy of dissuasion is based on the narrative that bioweapons can be developed with ease and disregards the role placed by tacit knowledge. It fails to convey a high entry cost into the bioweapons development arena and does not take into consideration the challenges to development faced by malevolent actors. In addition, a lack of understanding of tacit knowledge in the IC, further impedes the development of bioweapon threat assessments. Although bioweapons experts may ‘know more than they can tell,’ the importance of tacit knowledge and its ability to act as a serious barrier to WMD proliferation must be conveyed explicitly by policymakers to have dissuasive power.[77]

Lakshmy Ramakrishnan is pursuing MA International Relations at King’s College London. She also holds a postgraduate degree in Biomedical Science and regularly writes for magazines and periodicals. Her research interests include health, security, and diplomacy. 

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[1]  Jacques E. C. Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)165.

[2]  James Revill and Catherine Jefferson, "Tacit Knowledge and the Biological Weapons Regime," Science & Public Policy 41, no. 5 (2014), 597-610. doi:10.1093/scipol/sct090.

[3]  Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Barriers to Bioweapons: The Challenges of Expertise and Organization for Weapons Development, 1st ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014)3. doi:10.7591/j.ctt1287dk2.

[4]  Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, "Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons," American Journal of Sociology 101, no. 1 (1995), 44-99. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2782506.

[5]  Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Barriers to Bioweapons: The Challenges of Expertise and Organization for Weapons Development4

[6]  Kathleen M. Vogel and Lawrence Freedman, Phantom Menace Or Looming Danger? A New Framework for Assessing Bioweapons Threats (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013)18.

[7]  Ibid

[8]  Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Barriers to Bioweapons: The Challenges of Expertise and Organization for Weapons Development2

[9]  Ibid

[10] Ibid

[11]  Sonia Ben Ouagrham, "Barriers to Bioweapons: Intangible Obstacles to Proliferation," International Security 36, no. 4 (2012), 80-114. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00077.

[12]  Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1967).

[13]  MacKenzie, "Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons," , 44-99

[14]  Ibid

[15]  Sonia Ouagrham-Gormley and Kathleen M. Vogel, "The Social Context Shaping Bioweapons (Non)Proliferation," Biosecurity and Bioterrorism; Biosecur Bioterror 8, no. 1 (2010), 9-24. doi:10.1089/bsp.2009.0054.

[16]  MacKenzie, "Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons," , 44-99

[17]  Ibid

[18]  Ibid

[19]  Kathleen Vogel, "Bioweapons Proliferation: Where Science Studies and Public Policy Collide," Social Studies of Science 36, no. 5 (2006), 659-690. doi:10.1177/0306312706059460.

[20]  Ibid

[21]  Ibid

[22]  Ibid

[23]  Ibid

[24]  Harry Collins, "Bicycling on the Moon: Collective Tacit Knowledge and Somatic-Limit Tacit Knowledge," Organization Studies 28, no. 2 (2007), 257-262. doi:10.1177/0170840606073759.

[25]  Vogel, "Bioweapons Proliferation: Where Science Studies and Public Policy Collide," , 659-690

[26]   Vogel, "Bioweapons Proliferation: Where Science Studies and Public Policy Collide," , 659-690

[27]  Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension

[28]  Vogel, "Bioweapons Proliferation: Where Science Studies and Public Policy Collide," , 659-690

[29]  Ibid

[30]  Ibid

[31]  Ibid

[32]  Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Barriers to Bioweapons: The Challenges of Expertise and Organization for Weapons Development9

[33]  Laura Agnes McNamara, "Ways of Knowing about Weapons: The Cold War's End at the Los Alamos National Laboratory" ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2001), .

[34]  Vogel, "Bioweapons Proliferation: Where Science Studies and Public Policy Collide," , 659-690

[35]   Ibid

[36]   Vogel, "Bioweapons Proliferation: Where Science Studies and Public Policy Collide," , 659-690

[37]  "Secretary-General Warns of Glaring Gaps in Ability to Prevent, Respond to Catastrophic Biological Attack," last modified 7th November, https://press.un.org/en/2016/sgsm18256.doc.htm.

[38]  Sonia Ouagrham-Gormley, "Dissuading Biological Weapons Proliferation," Contemporary Security Policy 34, no. 3 (2013), 473-500. doi:10.1080/13523260.2013.842294.

[39]  Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Dissuasion Strategy ,[2008]).

[40]  Ibid

[41]  Catherine Jefferson, "Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity Challenging the “myths”," (2014).

[42]  Claire Marris, Catherine Jefferson and Filippa Lentzos, "Negotiating the Dynamics of Uncomfortable Knowledge: The Case of Dual use and Synthetic Biology," BioSocieties; Biosocieties 9, no. 4 (2014), 393-420. doi:10.1057/biosoc.2014.32.

[43]  Michael Lynch, "At the Margins of Tacit Knowledge," Philosophia Scientiae (2013), 55-73. doi:10.4000/philosophiascientiae.886.

[44]  Steve Rayner, "Uncomfortable Knowledge: The Social Construction of Ignorance in Science and Environmental Policy Discourses," Economy and Society 41, no. 1 (2012), 107-125. doi:10.1080/03085147.2011.637335.

[45]  Gautam Mukunda, Kenneth A. Oye and Scott C. Mohr, "What Rough Beast?: Synthetic Biology, Uncertainty, and the Future of Biosecurity," Politics and the Life Sciences; Politics and the Life Sciences 28, no. 2 (2009), 2-26. doi:10.2990/28_2_2.

[46]  Marris, "Negotiating the Dynamics of Uncomfortable Knowledge: The Case of Dual use and Synthetic Biology," , 393-420

[47]  Rayner, "Uncomfortable Knowledge: The Social Construction of Ignorance in Science and Environmental Policy Discourses," , 107-125

[48]  Marris, "Negotiating the Dynamics of Uncomfortable Knowledge: The Case of Dual use and Synthetic Biology," , 393-420

[49]   Marris, "Negotiating the Dynamics of Uncomfortable Knowledge: The Case of Dual use and Synthetic Biology," , 393-420