Russia-China Relations: Emerging Alliance or Eternal Rivals was recently published as a part of Springer's "Global Power Shift" series. It is the most in-depth review of the Russo-Chinese special relationship – occasionally called the “Dragon-Bear,” a colloquialism that is intended to express the community of democracies’ view that Russia and China are converging into a single geopolitical threat – that has been published, thus far. This book draws on the expertise of experts from a variety of different backgrounds, including specialists from the Center for Security Studies (CSS), the Center for European Policy Analysis, the George C. Marshall European Center for Security, and the Atlantic Council. The authors are the pre-eminent authorities within their fields, and their work has the potential to answer every outstanding question about the close partnership between Russia and China, and it should – when taken as a whole – invalidate any faddish and pseudo-intellectual Pollyanna-isms about a congenial Russia maligned by a cold or opportunistic United States.

Each of the authors featured within “Russia-China Relations” agree on two vital points: first, that the consolidation of the Russo-Chinese partnership is accelerating upon a radical, upward trajectory, and second, that this geopolitical relationship often makes its most significant advances in the wake of an event which damages one or the other’s diplomatic relationship with the United States and the broader West. This much is clear, regardless of the specific lens which the author chose to use while exploring the inner workings of the so-called “Dragon-Bear.”

Hannes Adomeit – a recently deceased, Columbia-educated, German political scientist and Soviet-studies expert, who was affiliated with numerous Western research institutes, academic institutions, and think tanks such as the RAND corporation – argued in his chapter, which broadly explored Russia’s role within the Russo-Chinese partnership, that the “even better than alliance” partnership between Russia and China is re-enforced by a number of material and social factors on Russia’s end, not least of which is Russia’s particularly aggressive, realist view of geopolitics. Adomeit states that, in the eyes of both Russia and China, their partnership is strategic and “directed against the United States.” Adomeit discerns from his research a broad framework of motivations that underpin Russia’s commitment to its partnership with China, and which motivate Russia’s broader foreign policy,

“What will serve to solidify the Russian power elite’s grip on power and resources domestically; enhance Russia’s power and influence internationally; and under the assumption that losses for the United States are gains for Russia, maximally weaken the United States and its allies?”

I would add a fourth. Since Russia's first motivator is the necessity of ensuring the “power elite's” total and absolute command of power within Russia, I would postulate that Vladimir Putin's fourth motivator is to see the destruction of the liberal world order, which continues to vex his iron-fisted rule with notions of human rights-centric accountability. Additionally, since the liberal world order is virtually synonymous with the United States’ hegemony, any action which Russia can take that will detract from the legitimacy of the global order is an action which will damage the United States’ interests, and thus, is an action which Putin views as beneficial to Russian aspirations.

Jo Inge Bekkevold, a Kings College-educated expert in War Studies and a researcher of Asian affairs, argued in his chapter that China is solely motivated, immutably, by a pursuit of its own aggrandizement. According to Bekkevold, China is conscious of the asymmetrical nature of the Russo-Chinese partnership – as in, China is acutely aware that it brings more to the table than its severely diminished Russian partner – however, Chinese leaders also view Russia as near-perfectly complementary to China's present strategic needs on the road to imperium. Put simply, it is China's view that Russia has just enough remaining virility to play the role of king-maker in the world, with its allegiance, but that it no longer has the vigor to contest for the role of king.

Of the various niche material and social constructs which the authors used to explore the nature of the motivations for the Russo-Chinese partnership, we can derive four general categories: economic factors, military factors, the influence of intra-national affairs, and international affairs or diplomatic elements. A fifth category that would typically warrant delineation, would be technological factors, however, for the purpose of this discourse that category will be subsumed by the ensuing discussion of both economic and military factors.

Marcin Kaczmarski, a scholar affiliated with the Centre for Eastern Studies who has dedicated his entire career to the study of the “Dragon-Bear,” outlines the underappreciated role that domestic politics plays in encouraging the Russo-Chinese convergence. Kaczmarski argues that the oligarchical nature of Putin's inner-circle assists in perpetuating the Russo-Chinese partnership, because certain Russian corporations and their leadership receive an outsized benefit from this cooperation, and these oligarchs are eager to continue their enrichment. Kaczmarski also argues that the oligarchical nature of Russia's government enables Putin and other Russian leaders to, relatively easily, pressure any remaining Russian skeptics of the Russo-Chinese partnership. There are few moving parts within the Russian government, and ostensibly, Putin holds the puppet-strings of them all. The result of these things, according to Kaczmarski, is that there is effectively no resistance within Russia to this Russo-Chinese partnership, because “there are no major [Russian] players who would perceive China as a threat to the political and economic interests.”

Olaf Wientzek, the director of an initiative named Multilateral Dialogue Geneva of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, dedicates his chapter to a review of Russia and China's cooperation within the field of diplomacy, particularly their shared, coordinated, and strategic attempts to subvert the world's multilateral institutions. Wientzek states, “Both sides are keen to establish a counter-narrative on questions of democracy, human rights, and international law… the objective is to change the ‘hegemony’ of the Western interpretation of human rights and democracy, as well as the role of international organizations.” It is worth noting that the National Endowment for Democracy published another review of the subversive “Autocratic Alliance” within the world’s multilateral institutions, titled “Defending the Global Human Rights System from Authoritarian Assault: How Democracies Can Retake the Initiative,” and held a public conference exploring the results of that report, which together did a spectacular job of describing the magnitude of the threat posed by this aspect of the Russo-Chinese partnership. It is also worth noting that Daniel Runde, an eminent scholar of global development with the Center for Strategic and International Studies and USAID, published a recent book on the subject of the role that multilateral institutions play in the escalating geopolitical competition between the United States and China, titled The American Imperative: Reclaiming Global Leadership With Soft Power. These three sources represent the beginnings of what we can only hope will become a much further researched element of the Russo-Chinese partnership, and all of these sources concur on one crucial point, that the “Autocratic Alliance” was given its greatest chance at success by the United States’ choice to retreat from its hegemonic leadership role within these institutions. Taken along with Marcin Kaczmrski’s review of Russia’s domestic political structure within Russia-China Relations, and the shared extremity of the importance which both Putin and Jinping place upon the perpetuation of their regimes and the survival of their systems of government, there is a clear indication of one of the primary goals of the Russo-Chinese partnership — to create a world order in which human rights violations are either acceptable or ignored, and a world order which no longer views liberal and democratic governance is a Higher Good to be pursued. As Elina Sinkkonen and Jussi Lassila – two scholars at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs – point out in their contribution to this book, Russia and China's shared ideological dedication to illiberalism influences every element of their cooperation. Sinkkonen and Lassila state that digital repression is essential for the survival of the modern totalitarian state, and they argue that as China and Russia increase their use of digital repression it will – and already has – result in strain upon their relationship with Western technology companies. Sinkkonen and Lassila argue that Russia’s and China’s shared and singular focus on domestic repression as a tool for regime stability will increase the incentives for the two partners to invest in the development of domestic digital infrastructure, but more importantly, that it will increase the dependency of the two autocratic states upon one another. An excellent example of this is found in the actions of Huawei, which is presently attempting to cooperate with Russian developers to adapt the Russian “Aurora” OS (operating system), as a replacement for the Google-developed “Android” OS. Not mentioned by Sinkkonen and Lasilla, quite possibly because it was slightly outside of their essay’s remit, is China's demonstrated interest in exporting authoritarianism – under the guise of exporting technology and global development – as a method of garnering influence abroad, which was the subject of a tremendous article within Foreign Affairs.

Of course, as would be expected of an alliance with a singularly geopolitical impetus, the greatest area of cooperation between Russia and China is, indeed, military in source. As Sarah Kirchberger – an expert in Sinology (China Studies) with the Atlantic Council – pointed out, Russia served as China's primary source of arms after the imposition of Western sanctions following Tiananmen Square in 1989, however, this was at least equally as important a relationship for Russia ,which needed to preserve its essential defense industrial sector during and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This complementary relationship still exists today, since the defense industrial sector is just as crucial an element of the Russian economy today, as it was then. Additionally, Russia is an extremely versatile source of energy exports for China, since China's shortage of fossil fuels is, perhaps, the single greatest threat to China's continued military and economic development. Also, according to Kirchberger, the two states have reached agreements facilitating the cooperative development and production of a number of new offensive and defensive military systems. The two countries have conducted joint operations in areas of key strategic interest, obviously targeted against the United States, such as a naval operation in the South China Sea. Both Russia and China have prioritized the development of artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies, considered part of the so-called “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” as key to establishing next-gen military capabilities. Whereas China views this area of technological development as another tool for cementing its position as the world's rising hegemon, Russia sees the Fourth Industrial Revolution as an opportunity to carve out for itself a small pocket in which it can finally have supremacy, for Russia this is a desperate attempt to regain some degree of the influence on the world stage which it used to possess. Cooperation in this area is key for both nations’ success, as Russia lacks the financial or infrastructural resources that the Soviet Union once possessed, but China is still often dependent on external human capital. To this point, it is important to note that Russia is one of the most highly educated nations in the world, and is particularly adept at basic research — while China’s state-of the-art technology laboratories enable it to excel in applications of this research. Perhaps the most concerning element of the Russo-Chinese partnership, is the two states’ increased cooperation in the realm of nuclear deterrence, as was adeptly described by Brian G. Carlson – a researcher with RAND and the Center for Security Studies – in his contribution to Russia-China Relations. Russia and China have conducted joint missile defense drills and Russia has agreed to assist China in obtaining an early warning system. Both Russia and China are increasing their nuclear arsenal, although China far more precipitously, and there is at least some concern amongst the Western nations that China and Russia could develop some form of integrated missile defense system, and further pursue cooperative nuclear defense strategies. Within the United States, this possibility has led to the belief among certain defense scholars, that Russia and China should be viewed as a single nuclear threat, and that the United States’ own nuclear posture should be calibrated so as to be able to sufficiently deter the menace of such a combined arsenal.

This has only been a brief discussion of a small number of the many complex issues that are described within Russia-China Relations. This book is one of a select few sources that can lay claim to deftly addressing an urgent, truly world-changing matter, in a manner that is both as wide-reaching and comprehensive as it is thorough. This book is, therefore, indispensable reading for every scholar and government official engaged in a discussion of the world's geopolitical future. Due to the complexity of the topics addressed within, however, this book is inundated with technical jargon — and is likely only fit for an audience with veritable erudition and extensive experience within the sphere of foreign affairs.

The only major flaw with this work, an issue which the authors themselves readily admit early on in the front matter, is that the essays within were written prior to the February 24th, 2023, inception of Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. Since the book was published shortly afterwards, there was not ample time for the authors to make relevant adaptations to their work, except for the occasional aside addended to the pre-existing text of certain chapters. This is not a fatal flaw, however, instead it serves to reveal one of the greatest strengths of this book. The authors of the individual chapters and the editors worked with such extraordinary diligence and attention to minute details, that the knowledge presented within this book seems to be truly all-encompassing; regardless of whether or not it speaks directly to the present Russo-Ukrainian crisis, the research within this work offers essential multi-level analyses of the most critical geopolitical question of this century. It is truly an indispensable read for professionals attempting to grasp the complexity of the partnership which could form the next bloc in a new bipolar and Cold War-esque world.

Logan Williams is a first-generation student at the University of Connecticut studying history with concentrations in Global Affairs and Environmental Studies. As a student, he has pursued research regarding Ukrainian history and national identity, hegemonic theory, the Cold War, and international development/liberalization processes. He is now beginning a career in foreign policy research at The Center for a Free Cuba, a Washington-based human rights organization dedicated to monitoring human rights abuses within Cuba and to advocating for Cuba’s eventual liberalization. His writing has been published in The American Spectator, Geopolitics Magazine, Modern Diplomacy, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Democracy Paradox, Diario Las Américas, International Affairs Forum, Fair Observer, etc.

Kirchberger, Sarah, Svenja Sinjen et al, eds. Russia-China Relations: Emerging Alliance or Eternal Rivals?, Global Power Shift (New York, Springer Publishing Co., 2022). ACCESS HERE