By Zainab Rana and Maryam Arif

With the turn of pages to the 21st Century, the world became more focused on economic development. China’s development is the embodiment of the economic progress which started in 1990 and made China one of the fastest growing economies with their strength in manufacturing overpowering other countries abilities. One initiative by China that has captured the world’s attention was ‘One Belt and Road’ initiative. A multibillion dollar project that could connect China towards west to sell their products. In the South Asian regions several countries have agreed to this project and is said to have a positive impact on countries such as Iran, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Bhutan etc.

Launched by President Xi Jinping to foster regional connectivity and corporation in regions in 2013 embarked on this one Belt and Road initiative becoming central to China’s foreign policy. With a total of six economic corridor and money lending by Chinese All Bank to strengthen their national currency Yuan. China’s six corridor include his China-Mongolia Russia economic corridor, the New Eurasia Land bridge economic corridor, the China-Central Asia-West Asia economic corridor, the China-Pakistan economic corridor, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic corridor, and the China-Indochina Peninsula economic corridor.

With more countries eager and willing to participate in the BRI initiative. Looking back at their historical motives the road had been identified in the main road for exploration with links of ancient trade routes that connect China to Europe during the Han dynasty (207BCE to 220DCE). The objectives of the BRI are quite clear as China wants influence over the countries making collaborations in such a way that BRI has been called a debt trap.

 (Chung, 2018) examines the role of South Asia in the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative, which will be determined by China's relationship with these states. This is due to South Asia's strategic geographical position that connects East/Southeast Asia and the Middle East/Europe. The successful completion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Summit held in Beijing has left India concerned because the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK), but China has ignored India's worries."

The issues raised in (Blah, 2018) analyze how India will deal with the challenges presented by OBOR and the aftermath of the initiative for India. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims to provide trillions of dollars for infrastructure such as roads and bridges to Asia, Europe, and Africa.

(Hurley et. al., 2019) assess the likelihood of debt problems in the 68 countries identified as potential BRI borrowers.   China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) seeks to build Chinese influence across the entire Eurasian landmass and adjacent waters, often at a cost to U.S. interests. China is cultivating an increasingly dependent ally in Pakistan and building a sprawling military presence across the Indian Ocean region, while India and its partners scramble to mount a counterbalance.

China has invested massively in the infrastructure with the largest credit line ever offered by India as China itself massively invests in infrastructure projects. The Asian giants: India, China, Bangladesh’s crucial balancing act engages all Asian giants (Patnaik, 2019).

 Although the failure of SAARC brings about questions of the interconnectivity both inside and outside of South Asia especially for economic development and uplifting of the people living in South Asia (Khanna et al 2021). However, according to (Ali et al 2022) suggests that for the principles of environmental impact assessments countries should adapt to the BRI project. The BRI could have potential to play a significant role in the sustainable development of South Asia if it succeed and is implemented properly.

 (Torun, 2023) says that BRI, which mainly focuses on building things like roads and energy projects, gives China more economic opportunities and makes China more powerful in the world. The author talks about how economic connections and political factors work together, using a set of ideas to explain it well.  (Aprea, 2020) looks at what BRI might mean for China's ability to make its own decisions. The ways countries work together through BRI help China become more independent by strengthening its important positions in global capital and infrastructure networks. This also lets China have more control over routes from Central Asia to Europe and the sea routes around the South China Sea.

Other important studies on this topic are by (Kohl, 2017), (Rolland, 2017), (Jacob, 2018), (Joshua, 2019), (Chakma, 2019), (Huang et. al., 2019).

The connection between Bangladesh and South Asia and Southeast Asia is not very good, and this is making it hard for their economies to work together smoothly. (Rahman et. al., 2014) suggest ways to improve this connection and make it stronger. If we make these connections better, it can help trade and businesses in the region. If we improve the links to South Asia, it can also help the ongoing efforts to increase trade and build networks for making things in the region, according to (Chirathivat et. al., 2015). They look at how Thailand is doing in areas like trade, physical connections, making trade easier, sharing energy, and paying for new infrastructure. This is important because Thailand is a link between Southeast Asia and South Asia. Bangladesh doesn't have a lot of money to develop better roads and connections. So, it depends a lot on help from other countries and organizations like the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and International Monetary Fund. They give money to help build things even though it might mean compromising on what Bangladesh really needs and wants. In considering the earlier discussions, (Chowdhury, 2016) addresses crucial issues and challenges in the development of integrated multimodal national transportation networks, particularly focusing on enhancing regional connectivity. (Bhattacharyay et. al., 2018) propose the use of Multicurrency Infrastructure Bonds (MIBs) denominated in regional accounting units (RAUs) for financing regional infrastructure projects. They compare this approach with the European Unit of Account (EUA) created in 1975. Additionally, their work examines the nature and characteristics of both existing and new institutions, highlighting the emerging role of regional and international institutions in advancing Asian connectivity. (Baruah et. al., 2018) shed light on the Indian perspective regarding the strategic implications of the expanding Chinese economic influence in the region. Their analysis explores possibilities for fostering cooperation rather than competition between Delhi and Beijing, especially in the realm of regional infrastructure development.

The discussion of good practices as well as of policy option in order to enhance the transparency of BRI procurement process. Though international corporation among countries in the BRI they can achieve their value for money (Ghossein et. al., 2019)

  With China and Pakistan promoting CPEC, a trade and transit corridor for enhancing regional connectivity. With new opportunities provided for establishing new patterns for economic and trade corporation in the region the framework of South Asian Association for regional corporation (SAARC) provides those opportunities (Faisal, 2019). With many countries in the Asia-Pacific wanting better roads, bridges and network in order to help their economies grow. It comes under no surprise that CEPEC is one of those projects on which all have agreed upon. They work closely with banks and groups like ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nation), SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Corporation) and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

 (Sims, 2020) exploring the collaboration, competition and corporation between two of Asia’s largest development basis: Asian development bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

 The BRI aims to deepen the regional economic ties. (Dani, 2021) study investigation of the microeconomic implications of BRI analyzed China’s infrastructure investment, and conducting case studies of BRI infrastructure projects in the region. Other influential work includes (Srikanth, 2018).

China shares joint borders with four South Asian countries, making it very close and integral to the region. However, these borders pose potential dangers due to uncertainties and overlapping inhabitants in the claimed lands. The diverse cultural, religious, economic, and socio-political situation in countries along BRI routes contributes to the inevitable and inherent risks and challenges for the project, both domestically and internationally. It may mean that to implement BRI, China will have to deal with powerful global competitors and some influential regional powers, which implies a new geopolitical rivalry in Eurasia and the struggle for global influence.

South Asia vividly illustrates the political-military dimensions of BRI. China is cultivating an increasingly dependent ally in Pakistan and establishing a widespread military presence across the Indian Ocean region. Meanwhile, India and its partners are working hastily to create a counterbalance.

The mega project, referring to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), encounters significant strategic and security challenges. The evolving dynamics of South Asia raise particular concerns for CPEC's security. The region is grappling with the emergence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan, the Baloch insurgency in Baluchistan, and India's general hostility towards Pakistan and specifically CPEC.

Over the past couple of years, these threats have materialized. In 2018, a suicide attack in Mastung claimed 149 lives, with the responsibility claimed by the Islamic State. This year, Baloch insurgents attacked the PC hotel in Gwadar, resulting in the death of five people. A single incident can freeze the entire project, and foreign investors would lose their confidence. Pakistan has invested in security by establishing the Special Security Group to ensure the safety of the corridor, but there is a need to focus on improving intelligence sharing as well.

With this new dawn of economic race happening around the globe understanding China’s perspective can be as complex as understanding the fast change our world has been enveloped in BRI’s example is there. Every passage of time it completes into reality. Nevertheless, the goal of geographical connectivity still seems far-fetched with Chinese officials now raising concerns over their understanding the costs and financial funding’s required. Could BRI become the next big project over fifty or hundred years or a failed project to look back as its internal and external threats such as security concerns of nations own security such as Afghanistan’s deemed conditions, Pakistan’s political stability and SriLanka’s bankruptcy effecting the project? Foreign policy makers should ask themselves what and how they should approach projects new and alike in the future as it can have implications if deemed failure.

CITATIONS:

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