Since the end of British occupation in 1948, Myanmar has been mired in constant ethnic and political violence. It is believed that over fifty non-state armed groups are currently vying for power across Myanmar, leaving the country in a near permanent state of chaos. However, the historic semi-arid heartland of the country––the Dry Zone––had remained relatively untouched. That was until a 2021 military coup caused simmering frustrations to boil over into open rebellion. In response, the Tatmadaw, the current military government of Myanmar, looked for ways to quickly quell the unrest. Their solution was the formation of a paramilitary organization known as the Pyusawhti. Since its inception, the organization has been accused of inciting terror against civilians in their area of operation, dragging the last refuge from civil war in Myanmar into extreme violence.

Created from a loose coalition of Buddhist nationalists, veterans, and members of the Tatmadaw-associated Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP); the Pyusawhti was designed to combat the growing influence of anti-Tatmadaw rebel groups in the region such as the People's Defense Forces (PDF). What makes the Dry Zone conflict particularly brutal is its existential nature. Similar to how Colombian paramilitary groups have justified their violence as self-defense, so too do the Pyusawhti. Factions within the Pyusawhti fear for their lives because of PDF assassination campaigns against suspected Tatmadaw sympathizers and informants. Whether paramilitary members are in support of the military government or not, they are forced to resort to state-sponsored violence as, what they view, a means of community defense against rebel forces.

To understand the Pyusawhti as a paramilitary force, there must be an understanding of its dynamic with civilians in the Dry Zone. The creation of the Pyusawhti polarized a formerly politically diverse region. Civilians could no longer remain neutral and were forced to pick sides or potentially face political violence. This environment spurred the radicalization of civilians, many of whom were not previously hostile, toward the rebel movement. Now a majority of villages in the region support the PDF, leaving only a small number of isolated pro-regime villages. Current figures show the Pyusawhti being outnumbered by PDF forces by a ratio of nearly 23:4. Public support is so meager that on recent deployment in Yangon to suppress an anti-coup protest, Pyusawhti forces were forced to retreat and even had soldiers taken by some civilians as prisoners. This lack of civilian support and government backing identifies them as a paramilitary organization.

With only a limited number of villages under their control, the Pyusawhti have resorted to intimidation and extortion to maintain their control over an increasingly dissatisfied population. One of the most common tactics is kidnapping and murdering suspected rebel sympathizers. An example of this is the especially brutal torture and killing of PDF fundraiser Sandar Win in the Pyusawhti-controlled Pauk Township. The group has also been reportedly taking part in extortionary activities outside of its territory. A recent raid in the rebel-controlled Ye Township involved the attempted extortion of money from a small tea shop. This combination of the use of force in support of criminal activity further contextualizes the Pyusawhti as a paramilitary.

Though they do function as a paramilitary organization, the Pyusawhti are a relatively unsophisticated one. Most paramilitaries can exercise violence freely with impunity under the protection of national governments. The Tatmadaw in theory provide impunity for the Pyusawhtis and protect them from rebel retribution. However, widespread dissatisfaction with the coup has forced the Tatmadaw to spread their forces increasingly thin. Thus, it is currently unable to provide effective support to the Pyusawhti. This can be seen as paramilitary strongholds like the Pale Township are successfully attacked by PDF forces at increasing rates. While still a paramilitary, its vulnerability to civilians because of lackluster government support makes it an incredibly weak one.

Aside from this lack of sophistication and military strength, the Pyusawhti’s lack of civilian support and use of targeted violence paints a clear picture of a traditional paramilitary organization. While it is ineffective and could even be a cause for Tatmadaw losses in the future, its relationship with the civilian population in its area of operation keeps it firmly in this category.

With relations between the United States and Myanmar already strained, further funding and development of  paramilitary forces threaten to damage them further, and could potentially result in a regional power vacuum, leading to even more violence.

There are two things the United States can do to help try and stabilize the situation in Myanmar: increasing sanctions and working with international bodies like the International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute violations of international law. In terms of sanctions, the United States has already taken steps in this direction with the passage of H.R.5497 BURMA Act in 2022. But more action is needed to bring the military government into line. With South Asia playing a critical role in countering Chinese expansion, it is essential that stability is restored in the region.

Sanctions against senior members of the military junta through economic or visa restrictions can send the message that the free world is serious about the restoration of Myanmar’s democratic government. The same is true with assisting in the capture and trial of individuals accused of committing war crimes. Anything otherwise would be a failure to follow through on the goals set by the White House’s new National Security Strategy.

With conflict in Ukraine, instability in West Africa, and tensions rising in the Near East, Myanmar seems to have been forgotten. However, with China’s expanding influence, United States foreign policy seriously needs to refocus on the region and work to bring Myanmar’s democratically elected leadership back by any means necessary.

Owen Oppenheimer is a first-year student at American University’s School of International Service focused on U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security.