By Stefan Mandic
One of the most reiterated concepts in the study of democracy is that it is not a “spectator sport”. A democracy can only function well if citizens engage and participate in the system to convey their concerns, voice their approval or disapproval of leadership, and mobilize to support or oppose laws. When concerned citizens fail to mobilize enough people and act, then leaders will have less of an incentive to govern with the sentiments of the public in mind and will subsequently act of their own will. This concept remains true especially in eastern and southern Europe, where citizens have been mobilizing to check resurgent authoritarianism. Serbia is one such nation with an active government opposition movement mobilizing around issues over corruption, economic underdevelopment, demographic decline, and authoritarian politics. Out of all these issues, government authoritarianism has aroused the strongest concerns among politically conscious citizens. These concerns are quite real, as multiple NGOs and governments have raised alarm over democracy in Serbia. In their 2024 report, Freedom House cited that the state has eroded “political rights and civil liberties, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition, and civil society organizations” (Freedom House, 2023). However, the opposition’s efforts to secure support for their supposed democratic causes have encountered issues that are not just due to the actions of state authorities. The opposition’s greatest obstacle of today is their failure to appeal to and mobilize voters outside their already secured base, such as the non-urban parts of the nation.
In the last couple of presidential and parliamentary elections, opposition parties and movements, especially large social movements such as the most recent “Serbia Against Violence” movement, have mobilized thousands to protest electoral and government corruption, authoritarianism, environmental degradation, and neglected social issues. However, even with intense opposition party activism combined with exposed state corruption, incumbent politicians and parties still succeed in elections. The opposition has failed to consider that the people they have mobilized for activism all sit within the comfortable zones of their political base, that being already galvanized activists and citizens that are already highly sympathetic to their beliefs and activities. When examining press coverage of the event, both opposition and government, the people in attendance are often opposition party members, activists, students, and their supporting acquaintances. One independent media report found that seventy seven percent of activists in the Belgrade “1 of 5 Million” movement, a popular protest movement started over assorted attacks on opposition journalists and activists by state actors, were college educated individuals or college students (N1, 2019). Not only is the common voter who was once indifferent or opposed a rare sight, but demographics outside the cities and universities as well.
Even though Serbia is a mostly ethnic Serb and Orthodox Christian, it is a nation with serious social contrasts, primarily being a rural-urban divide. The cities, most notably Belgrade, are generally liberal, cosmopolitan, pro-western, and economically well-developed. Standing in contrast is the rural “interior”, considered anywhere that’s not part of a major city, that is generally more conservative, western-skeptical, and economically underdeveloped. Opposition parties, usually pro-western, liberal, and more cosmopolitan, find greater support in the cities while the ruling party and other conservative parties, usually western-skeptical, nationalistic, and conservative, do extremely well in rural constituencies. Opposition activists are quite satisfied with staying within the cities as the urban electorate is both friendly to their activism and easier to recruit. For example, the already mentioned “One in Five Million” movement had all its activism done in major cities like Belgrade, Novi Sad, Nish, and other urban centers. The recruitment and call to action by these movements have been disproportionately made towards liberal urbanites and mostly sidelining citizens from the interior. This ideological and social divide is extremely apparent when examining the results of the 2023 parliamentary election.
During the election, the Serbian Progressive Party secured majorities in almost every municipality with the only exceptions being Belgrade and where non-Serb minorities live (Electoral Commission of the Republic of Serbia, 2023). Opinion polling conducted during the same election further demonstrates the success that SNS had in its outreach to voters as multiple polling agencies recorded a significant lead by SNS over the opposition coalition. However, it is important to note that opinion polling done in Serbia is under suspicion of unprofessional conduct, as opposition media have pointed towards the reporting of organizations such as the World Association of Public Opinion Research who have raised concerns over the neutrality of polling in Serbia (Zivanovic, 2023). But even if corruption or other illegal activities distorted election results, there is no doubt that SNS’s extensive campaigning and outreach among the extensive non-urban population has placed itself in a strong advantage. It is irrelevant how righteous and egalitarian your ideals are when your opponents can drastically outperform you in election campaigning and appeal to the population.
If the opposition wishes to secure future political success, then there must be a realization that sitting comfortably in their social bubbles that is Serbia’s cities and pursuing activism only with their fellow liberal urbanites will go nowhere. These parties must dedicate more resources and activists in campaigning in non-urban constituencies, a measure that will display that the concerns and presence of these voters are acknowledged and valued. The ruling party’s unchallenged presence in such rural electorates is not an unchallengeable certainty as the continued problems and struggles of citizens in the interior can be a potentially serious force for animating activism and change. The common citizen that lives in such neglected constituencies is not irreversibly devoted to the ruling party; it is simply that the ruling party is the only one that effectively reaches out to them. When opposition parties make the effort to mobilize and appeal to all of Serbia rather than their small and familiar social sphere, then they will see serious political change.
About the author: Stefan Mandic is a recent graduate of American University with a major in Political Science and a Concentration in Comparative Politics. During his university studies, Stefan co-founded and served as Secretary of AU’s Student Association for Slavic Studies. He also founded and conducted SASS’s Ambassador Series, inviting ambassadors from Eastern European nations to speak to students on campus. After graduation, he worked as a volunteer curator of Eastern European arms and other artifacts at the New Jersey National Guard and Militia Museum. Currently, he runs the Lighthouse Foundation that aims to donate educational material from the US to Serbia and other Balkan nations. Stefan has also written about topics in Serbian politics and society in The New Eastern Europe and The European Conservative.
Bibliography
Stanicek, Branislav. (2023, February). Situation in Serbia following the 2023 elections. European Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2024/757638/EPRS_ATA(2024)757638_EN.pdf
Freedom House. (2024, 28 February). 2023 Country Report. https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia/freedom-world/2024
N1. (2019, 15 March). Citizens in the “1 of 5 Million” protest come out due to unfree media and corruption. https://web.archive.org/web/20200131050222/http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a468449/Istrazivanje-o-protestima-1-od-5-miliona.html
Katarina, Zivanovic. (2022, 20 April). Gavrilovic: Researchers go through a "hot rabbit" when they publish results that "call" the government. Danas. https://www.danas.rs/vesti/drustvo/gavrilovic-istrazivaci-prolaze-toplog-zeca-kada-objave-rezultate-koji-zuljaju-vlast/
Electoral Commission of the Republic of Serbia. (2023). 2023 Parliamentary Elections Results. https://www.rik.parlament.gov.rs/542645/rezultati/