Introduction

The current international situation is characterized by continued transformation towards polycentricity in which global politics takes a more confrontational and competitive approach. This is seen in the greater focus of international politics on rivalry between ‘Great Powers’, growing threats of conflict, and geopolitical fragmentation between the United States and key superpowers such as the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. Responding to current geopolitical and security environment and acknowledging future challenges of these, the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept outlines the fundamental tasks and responsibilities of the alliance. It underscores NATO's pivotal role in tackling contemporary security challenges, with a focus on reaffirming the commitment to collective defense and the principle of solidarity among member states[1].

Extensive mainstream discourse exists on the potential role NATO could have assumed following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the conclusion of the Cold War. The security landscape of the Atlantic Alliance has transformed in recent decades: it has consistently adapted its strategy and strategic concepts to meet evolving challenges, with a notable emphasis on its inherently defensive nature (Gheorghe, Ilie, 2010:51-56). Each strategic concept that NATO develops is meticulously tailored to the geopolitical context of its time, reflecting lessons learned from past conflicts and adapting to the changing nature of warfare and security threats. A notable evolution in this regard can be observed in the transition from the 2010 Strategic Concept to the 2022 version. Strategy of 2010 refers to the broad, overarching plan or approach that an organization like NATO adopts to achieve its long-term objectives. The 2010 document concentrated on three main tasks: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. It provided a comprehensive assessment of the security environment at the time, identifying key threats such as the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, terrorism, cyberattacks, and critical environmental concerns. This framework guided NATO's political and military development over the next 12 years, emphasizing international security through cooperation, bolstering efforts in arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, and maintaining an open-door policy for European nations (Demirci, 2022). The 2022 Strategic Concept, however, marks a shift towards prioritizing strategic competition and enhancing military readiness, reflecting the ongoing evolution of security challenges. These are more specific doctrines or frameworks that guide the implementation of the broader strategy. Strategic concepts translate the high-level strategy into actionable principles, methods, and guidelines.

In the wake of these events, NATO's primary challenge lies in dispelling uncertainties surrounding its strength and determination to defend each part of its territory (Larsen, 2022:7), as articulated in the recently released Strategic Concept—an authoritative document guiding the alliance's strategic course until 2030 (and beyond)[2]. The main threat to NATO allies continues to be Russia, and the most important tasks remains collective and territorial defense (Coffey and Kochis, 2020:2). Russia’s grand strategy is increasingly aggressive in nature: the annexation of Crimea in 2014, then tragic events in the territories of Ukraine from February 2022, followed by the legal recognition of Donetsk and Lugansk. These events challenged not only the architecture of European security and defense, but also the entire modern geopolitical landscape. Thus the Concept also highlights the need for a comprehensive response to a range of global threats, including conflicts and instability in the Middle East and Africa; the widespread impact of instability on civilians, cultural heritage, and the environment; China's assertive ambitions and coercive policies; the rise of cyber and hybrid threats; the development of emerging and disruptive technologies; the erosion of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation frameworks; and the security challenges posed by climate change[3]. This strategic approach ensures that NATO remains flexible and effective in addressing both traditional and emerging security threats.

This paper endeavors to analyze the gravity and significance attributed to NATO’s Strategic Concept for 2022. It seeks to assess the efficacy of the renewed strategic concepts in addressing challenges that contest the overarching concepts and rhetoric of NATO allies and provide a rationale for the alliance's transformation. Special attention is given to the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, coupled with the growing nuclear threat faced by NATO's Eastern flank members. This paper will demonstrate how the transformation of NATO's Strategic Concept from 2010 to 2022 reflects the imperative to address evolving global security landscapes, emerging threats, and technological advancements. Subsequent analysis will examine the evolution of Russia's status from potential strategic partner to aggressive opponent. NATO’s expansion to the Eastern flank serves as a consequential escalation of geopolitical tensions with Russia.

A pivotal aspect of the alliance's strategic adaptation lies in the introduction of the new NATO Force Model. New security challenges (strengthened military presence in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, and the subsequent invasion of Ukraine) signify a resurgence in strategic competition and a rekindling of great power rivalry, a significant departure from the post-Cold War.

Keywords: NATO, Annexation of Crimea, Euro-Atlantic security, Russia, geopolitical rivalry, nuclear threats.

Since its establishment, the North Atlantic Alliance has periodically revised its strategic vision for Euro-Atlantic security. Scholars typically categorize these transformations into several distinct phases: the Cold War era, the post-Cold War period, and the period following 2001, which introduced new security threats (Skripchenko, 2023). At the Brussels Summit in 2021, the Alliance unveiled its latest agenda for the period leading up to 2030, marking what can be considered the fourth stage in the evolution of its strategic approach (Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries 2014-2023).

During the Cold War, NATO, as a military-political bloc opposing the USSR, focused primarily on deterrence and defense. After 1991, NATO adopted a broader approach incorporating "cooperation" and "security" alongside its core principles of deterrence and defense (Ibid). This period saw the emergence of the idea to reform the Alliance's strategy to promote liberal and democratic values globally, as articulated in the Rome Declaration of the NATO Council session on November 8, 1991 (Timakova, 2021). During this time, NATO released two Strategic Concepts, in 1991 and 1999.

The decade following the 1999 strategy was marked by significant events, most notably the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which highlighted the Alliance's unpreparedness new asymmetric threats. This crisis prompted NATO to reorient its strategy towards combating terrorism, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other contemporary security challenges. The idea of deploying a missile defense system in Europe, proposed during George W. Bush's presidency, also gained traction. Consequently, the need to build constructive partnerships with Russia was emphasized, as reflected in the 2010 Strategic Concept.

The adoption of the new concept in 2022 was driven by the intensifying crisis surrounding Ukraine, as well as geopolitical and technological developments. The 2010 Strategic Concept outlined three core tasks for NATO: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. These tasks signaled the Alliance's intention to shift from a solely defensive stance towards a more comprehensive global strategy. The 2010 Strategic Concept primarily aimed at maintaining NATO's existing capabilities. In contrast, the new concept emphasizes building and enhancing the Alliance's potential, particularly in cyberspace and outer space. This shift responds to the challenges posed by rapid technological advancements and their pervasive integration into all spheres of activity, necessitating countermeasures by the Alliance. Additionally, it reflects NATO's imperative, especially under U.S. leadership, to remain competitive against technologically advanced nations such as China. For NATO, it is crucial to not only sustain but also strengthen, modernize, and expand its capabilities to ensure security and maintain its global dominance.

Transformation of NATO Strategic Concept from 2010 to 2022

The importance of adopting a new Strategic Concept arises from the evolving global security landscape and changing security situation since 2010. The core tasks articulated in the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept constitute foundational principles that guide the alliance's strategic direction and operational priorities. However, amid Russia-Ukraine War and an evolving security landscape, this strategic framework is devised to address heightened challenges by fortifying collective defence mechanisms, enhancing crisis management capabilities, and refining deterrence and defence strategies. 

NATO’s “deterrence and defence” strategy has undergone significant evolution in the updated strategic concept. The alteration in the sequence of tasks from "defence and deterrence" to "deterrence and defence" signifies a nuanced approach to collective defence within the alliance (Szenes, 2023:548).  Russia has frequently threatened to use nuclear weapons, with one notable instance occurring in May 2017 when a Russian parliamentarian indicated that such weapons might be used if the United States or NATO attempted to reclaim Crimea or defend Eastern Ukraine (Coffey & Kochis, 2020:14). Russia's national security strategy has designated NATO as a threat, explicitly stating the country's intention to use all available means to achieve its strategic goals (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, 2023). These arguments were also supported by President Putin that declared reciprocal nuclear strikes as the primary strategy for the use of Russia's nuclear weapons (Valdai, 2023). Hence, the e NATO 360-degree approach centred on deterrence measures encompassing a blend of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities constitutes a strategic response to the escalating Russian nuclear threat (Ibid, para:27). The alliance's fortification of its deterrence and defence posture signifies a proactive stance aimed at safeguarding against potential adversarial actions. It underscores the alliance's determination to ensure the security of both NATO and its individual member states in light of Russia’s growing nuclear threats (Ibid, para:14). 

Russia was expected to play a significant role in the emerging European security landscape, facilitated by the signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on May 27, 1997 (NATO, 1997).  After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO and Russia committed to cooperating in the fight against terrorism. During the April 1999 Washington Summit, deliberations focused on European security, highlighting the integral role of Russia in ensuring security within the Europe. The NATO Russian Founding Act and the Joint Permanent Council were the basis for cooperation with Russia on key security issues (Ibid:542). In addition, in 2013, NATO and Russia discussed the possibilities of linking the missile defence system to threats from Iran and other rogue states. Everyday interactions laid the groundwork for robust future cooperation (Yarigin, 2022:78). Admittedly, the Strategic Concept of 2010 quickly became obsolete, given the impracticality of the envisioned strategic partnership with Russia. It became evident that the two parties did not collaborate effectively on ballistic missile defence. Meanwhile, the unlawful annexation of the “Crimean Peninsula in 2014”, along with the “destabilization of Ukraine”, resulted in a distinctly unfriendly rapport between the parties (Ibid:542-543).

Enlargement of NATO to the Eastern Flank and implementation of a new NATO force model

The expansion of NATO towards the East flank, coupled with the inclusion of new member states, has two implications. On one hand, this strategic maneuver has strained geopolitical tensions with Russia - The Kremlin perceives NATO expansion as a direct challenge to the nation’s sphere of influence. On the other hand, the "Open door policy," as delineated in Article 10, embodies the vision of fostering accessibility for all European democracies. This strategic approach aims to bolster the security and stability of the region by integrating these nations into the collective defense framework of the alliance, as articulated in NATO's strategic concept for 2022 (Ibid., para:40)..  The enlargement of NATO has been driven by several key reasons, primarily rooted in the alliance's commitment to collective security and stabilityBy including new member states, often emerging from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO seeks to promote democratic principles and reinforce a shared commitment to freedom and human rights.

As well as the Mediterranean and Baltic seas, the document highlights the strategic importance of the Black Sea region, influenced by the Russia-Ukraine conflict. TheMiddle East, North Africa, and the Sahel remain critical areas, while the Indo-Pacific has emerged as a new focus due to security issues directly affecting Euro-Atlantic security (Ibid: 553). The strategy emphasizes strengthening communication and collaboration with both partners in the Indo-Pacific to tackle challenges across multiple regions and address shared security concerns (Ibid:45-46).

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Black Sea has effectively come under significant Russian control, posing a direct threat to the security interests of both the United States and NATO. L. Coffey argues that Russia’s control desire for control in the Black Sea intertwines economic and historical motives. The Black Sea region has deep-seated roots in the Russian and Ottoman Empires, intertwined with Russia's aspirations for national survival. As the sole warm water ports available to the nation, Russia has consistently benefitted economically through the Black Sea. In the contemporary context, an oil tanker transporting Russian or Kazakh oil (while the latter transiting ensures Moscow to collect transit fees) traverses the Bosporus from the Black Sea every 15 minutes. Secondly, the annexation effectively bisected Ukraine's coastline and advanced Moscow's goal of transforming the Black Sea into a region under Russian control. Subsequently, Russia has asserted ownership over underwater resources adjacent to the Crimean Peninsula, which were originally under Ukrainian jurisdiction.

A key military development is the introduction of the new NATO Force Model, which marks a shift from the previous NRF system due to differences in the size and readiness of forces (Ibid, p. 554). The success of the Madrid Summit is tied to the adoption of this New Force Model (Szenes, 2022:77), as outlined in two crucial strategic documents: the Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area, which focuses on deploying forces for immediate deterrence and defense, and the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept, which provides a visionary framework for the Alliance's long-term military strength. The New Force Model aims to increase overall troop levels to 800,000, enhance readiness, and introduce a restructured framework for military, weapons, support, and combat service support (Ibid, 554-555). NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg suggests that this new model represents the most significant overhaul of NATO forces since the Cold War (Stoltenberg, 2022). Nevertheless, the new strategic lacks specific military requirements, with the absence of the "reform, modernisation, and transformation" section in the text. This omission raises concerns about its practical application, particularly when taking into account the preparation of regional operational plans in 2019 and the subsequent adjustments to requirements prompted by the RussIan-Ukrainian war.

Conclusion

The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept responds to the evolving global security landscape. The geopolitical dynamics of the present international situation, with a focus on the confrontational nature of global politics and the growing rivalry among Great Powers, set the stage for NATO's renewed strategic framework. The document recognizes the challenges posed by events such as the annexation of Crimea, the destabilization of Ukraine, and the escalating threats from Russia.

This paper emphasizes the alliance’s reframing of its relationship with Russia  as well as the importance of NATO's commitment to collective defence and solidarity among member states.. The document represents a strategic response to the complexities of the present international situation, reaffirming NATO's commitment to collective defence and adaptability in the face of emerging threats. The Strategic Concept offers a holistic understanding of how NATO will navigate the complex geopolitical landscape, particularly in relation to Russia, the Eastern flank, and evolving security threats.

Nozima Kholmatova is a Masters degree student at the University of Glasgow (UK) and Dublin City University (Republic of Ireland). School of Politics and Social Science. Erasmus Mundus Scholarship holder under the Programme: International Security and Strategic Studies and former Specialist at the Institute of Strategic and Regional Studies under the President Republic of Uzbekistan. And Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan Department for Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation with CIS Countries [01/11/2017-21/07/2021].

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[1] NATO Strategic Concept 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm

[2] Ibid.,

[3] Ibid.,