Introduction

Populism, despite being a concept long debated, has in recent years gained special interest in academic circles due to the entire populist revolution or upsurge that has been developing in Europe over the last decade, particularly in countries like Hungary and Poland. During the last few years, populism has been especially studied in Europe since in other parts of the world it seems a bit underdeveloped or at least not as prolific. Scholars have presented various theories and approaches to different types of phenomena, from studies about how populism is rising to the analysis of political discourses and even surveys and quantitative analyses to understand how people perceive this topic. For that reason, it is crucial to first analyze and understand the concept of populism and create an appropriate framework. This will be therefore in line with the theory of Cas Mudde.

The main purpose of this article is to analyze the growth of populism in Portugal and understand the reasons behind it, covering not only the demand side but delving into the supply side by observing how the Portuguese populist party, CHEGA, has gained such popularity. This will also allow a better understanding of this party and how it can be placed in the political spectrum.

The Rise of Populism in Portugal

The concept of populism is very broad and can assume many forms depending on the framework used. Using Mude's definition, “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite,’ which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Cas Mudde, 2017), populism can be seen as a weak form of ideology, what may implicate the necessity to attached itself to other ideologies. It can be said that when combined with other ideologies such as nativism or anti-pluralism, populism can, due to its fragile and flexible nature, indeed pose a threat to democratic principles. This is precisely the situation of the Portuguese case.

In 2019, populism arrived in Portugal and has quickly and exponentially gained strength. It came through the hands of CHEGA, which means “ENOUGH” in English, a party led by André Ventura, a charismatic leader with a clear capacity to lead such a project. CHEGA is clearly a far-right party, something that is not only claimed by them but is also visible in their political program, agenda and discourse. A program that for the last elections even adopted the name “Clean Portugal.” In this same program, it is possible to observe trigger points that easily appeal to the creation of a gap between the “people” and the “corrupt elite,” with a strong focus on issues like fighting corruption, demonizing the ruling political class, and immigration issues. “End the abuse of power and the impunity of the corrupt and change the paradigm regarding nationality acquisition, to grant it to those who have a genuine connection to our country, who know its history and speak its language” (CHEGA 2024). This are only a few of the ideas presented in the party´s last electoral program. This characterization of the party as a right-wing party fits perfectly into research conducted by academics who sought to understand the motivations of voters for populist parties, both right and left. “Our results have important theoretical implications. First, material deprivation theories state that the so-called losers of globalization tend to support RWPPs; our results show that, when they compete with LWPPs, this effect is fully absorbed by LWPPs (material deprivation increases the likelihood of voting for LWPPs instead of either RWPPs or NPPs, without significant differences among the latter two). Second, the core distinction between populist and non-populist parties should relate to attitudes towards elites; our results show that when both breeds of populist parties compete, such attitudes only increase the likelihood of voting LWPPs (again, RWPPs and NPPs are indistinguishable). Third, the globalization hypothesis has been used to justify support for both types of populist parties. Our results confirm that this is true for the detachment from Europe, which increases the likelihood of voting for a populist party (RWPPs and LWPPs being indistinguishable) versus NPPs. Nevertheless, attitudes against EU unification only favor RWPPs. Finally, nativist arguments have recurrently proven to be useful to understand support for RWPPs. Interestingly, negative attitudes towards immigration, whether cultural or economic oriented, do not have a statistically significant effect when we focus on the populist ground, but the second measure of nativism (restricting immigrants of other races) increases the propensity of voting for RWPPs instead of NPPs. All in all, when the two breeds of populist parties are on the same playing field, they appear to be more similar in the eyes of their voters than what is usually assumed” (Santana 2019). Using this analysis, negative attitudes towards the EU, nativism, and opposition to immigration, normally more focused on by RWPPs, can be easily observable in the party’s guidelines.

What were the reasons for the emergence and exponential growth of populism in Portugal?

Portugal has faced various problems in recent years that facilitate the creation of a critical context for the appreciation and consolidation of populism. Since its emergence in 2019, the Portuguese populist party CHEGA has emphasized its fight against corruption, especially against a political and economic elite that, according to them, robs the Portuguese population and remains unpunished.

I believe that much of the rise of populism is due to the governmental incapacity of central parties, or parties in power. These are the ones giving populist parties space to appear and grow in the political realm, because their incapacity to deal with different problems over the years generated a lot of frustration within the different European societies.

Reasons explaining the rise of Populism

Corruption

Since 1989, Portugal has been the target of major corruption schemes that have, over time, increased the divide between the political and economic elite and the rest of the population. The way in which all these crimes are often committed without significant consequences has eroded the trust of the Portuguese population in the political system over the years. Cases such as Freeport, which involved the construction of a shopping center in Lisbon with public funds, the embezzlement of 500 million euros from BPP by João Rendeiro, or the more recent case of former Prime Minister António Costa suspect in crimes of corruption and influence peddling, whether justly sentenced or not, and whether true or not, ultimately contribute, as mentioned, to diminishing public trust in the functioning of the political system and its institutions. “A recent European Commission survey found that corruption is a serious concern for people in Portugal: almost all Portuguese respondents (97 per cent) think that corruption is a major problem in their country and two out of three people say that it is only getting worse.” (MEDIA ADVISORY: Corruption in Portugal: What needs fixing 2012).  Although this data is not particularly recent, it allows us to understand the discredit of the population towards the system, the institutions, and their actors.

Migration

The second aspect, which clearly follows the European trend, is the anti-immigration sentiment this party associates with its populism, feeding off the fear or anger of the Portuguese as recipients of immigration. Portugal is a country accustomed to dealing with immigration, especially from countries that share the Portuguese language. Since the regime's opening in 1974, Portugal has primarily received immigrants from countries such as Brazil, Cape Vert, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola. However, these migratory movements, also due to worsening situations in the countries of origin, have caused the migratory flow to be much greater today. In addition to these, Portugal is also receiving several immigrants from different parts of the world like India, Bangladesh, and Nepal. This situation becomes conducive to populism and its emergence and consolidation, due to the government's lack of capacity to handle the integration of these migrants and to set concrete goals and objectives in the context of migration and asylum policy.

A good example of this is how many migrants end up moving to more rural areas, especially in the south of the country, where there is a significant cultural shock. In this specific case, the theory employed by David Goodhart is extremely relevant. The author distinguishes two distinct groups: the "anywhere," who are typically more liberal, mobile, and fond of globalization, and the "somewhere," a group that is usually more attached to a community or sense of belonging and is more conservative. “He argues that the key faultline in Britain and elsewhere now separates those who come from Somewhere – rooted in a specific place or community, usually a small town or in the countryside, socially conservative, often less educated – and those who could come from Anywhere: footloose, often urban, socially liberal and university educated. He cites polling evidence to show that Somewheres make up roughly half the population, with Anywheres accounting for 20% to 25% and the rest classified as “Inbetweeners”.” (Freedland 2017). Although there is no quantitative data to analyze the percentages of anywheres vs. somewheres in Portuguese society, it is easily perceptible that especially in these environments, where migrants often integrate, they provoke a greater shock for the local population due to their tendency to be a more closed and conservative group. This plays in favor of the populist party that uses discontent as leverage to gain votes. Even in larger cities like Lisbon or Porto, where multiculturalism is typically a given, discontent is visible among a considerable part of the population.

Cultural backlash is not solely tied to ethnic issues but has deep roots in cultural matters. “The intergenerational shift toward post-materialist values generated support for movements advocating peace, environmental protection, human rights, democratization, and gender equality. These developments first manifested themselves in the politics of affluent societies around 1968, when the postwar generation became old enough to have political impact, launching an era of student protest. This cultural shift has been transforming post-industrial societies, as younger cohorts replace older ones in the population. The Silent Revolution predicted that as Postmaterialists became more numerous they would bring new issues into politics and declining social class conflict. Postmaterialists are concentrated among the more secure and better-educated strata, but they are relatively favorable to social change. Consequently, though recruited from the more secure strata that traditionally supported conservative parties, they have gravitated toward parties of the Left, supporting political and cultural change. From the start, this triggered a cultural backlash among older and less-secure people who were disoriented by the erosion of familiar values.” (Norris 2016).

Socio-Economic Conditions

Lastly, one of the main reasons for the emergence of populism in the Portuguese nation is the socio-economic condition of the country. Portugal has always been one of the countries with the lowest income in the EU, being one of the most affected by the 2008 crisis and the subsequent recession that followed. This sank the economy, which, although today is much more stable, still has negative indicators. Low wages, precariousness, and limited opportunities for young people remain some of the most relevant aspects in this regard. “Data reveals that Portugal is the fifth country with the lowest average salary, when considering the cost of living, only above Slovakia, Greece, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In Spain, salaries are, on average, a third higher than in Portugal.” (Lusa 2024). All these indicators project fear and insecurity in the Portuguese population and are closely linked to the high emigration rates of Portuguese to foreign countries, especially qualified young professionals who find no career prospects and a solid future in their country. “The numbers may seem overwhelming, but they do not overly surprise Rui Pena Pires, one of the authors of the Atlas of Portuguese Emigration…paints a picture of the diaspora, focusing on the last twenty years. According to what is stated there, there are about 2.1 million Portuguese living in other countries, and over 1.5 million, nearly 15% of the population, have emigrated in the last twenty years. This includes more than a quarter of people born in Portugal who are between 15 and 39 years old. In terms of population proportion, this makes Portugal the country with the most emigrants in Europe and the eighth in the world.” (Carvalho 2024).

This situation is closely related to the theory of economic deprivation discussed by Rodrik, “which states that economic anxiety and redistribution difficulties are one of the foundations for the rise of populism in Europe.” (Rodrik 2018). Although the populist party in Portugal does not have the economic situation of the country as its main objective and source of discourse, this issue is also mentioned several times by the party, which has already talked about salary increases for public employees, especially in the military, security forces, and education, as well as increases for pensioners and better opportunities for young people.

This also shows that populism in Portugal breaks the mold a bit. According to researchers, populist parties in Southern Europe tend to have greater prominence on economic topics, using it as the main focus of their agenda. According to Rama e Santana, this is more common in left-wing populist parties. (Santana 2019).  However, just like Meloni’s party in Italy, Fratelli d'Italia, this RWPP emerged in a context more conducive to left-wing parties. “Our results have important theoretical implications. First, material deprivation theories state that the so-called losers of globalization tend to support RWPPs; our results show that, when they compete with LWPPs, this effect is fully absorbed by LWPPs (material deprivation increases the likelihood of voting for LWPPs instead of either RWPPs or NPPs, without significant differences among the latter two).” (Santana 2019). The losers of globalization are typically described as a group of people disadvantaged by the phenomenon of globalization, usually older individuals, essentially blue-collar workers, who may have been harmed by new waves of immigration and technological advances. Chega, in Portugal, predominantly consists of elements usually associated to populist parties from Northern Europe, as migration, ethnic, and cultural issues that play a vital role in its actions.

All the reasons mentioned erode many of the principles of a liberal democracy. Despite democratic ideology still being quite present in Portuguese memory, there are increasing numbers of people who feel the need for a capable and strong leader to guide them. “Among young people, appreciation for democracy is higher, as in this age group, 96% agree that the best form of government is a democratic system. However, almost half of these participants also believe that an executive made up of ‘technocrats’ would be advantageous for the country. Despite both percentages being very high, the research team emphasizes that 47% of respondents admit to supporting ‘a strong leader,’ even without recourse to an electoral act. This proportion, combined with the 70% who agree with an executive composed of specialists or technocrats, leads researchers to conclude that ‘today, the preference for democracy coexists with preferences for autocratic forms of government.” (Esteves 2024)

Using only one framework to explain populism’s emergence in Portugal would be insufficient and partial. In this context, both the cultural backlash theory developed by Inglehart & Norris and Rodrik's theory of economic anxiety are cumulatively important drivers for this. The emergence in Portugal, and also in the rest of Europe, shows a transition of voters who have shifted from more central parties to more radical parties, primarily due to the incapacity of traditional parties to provide populations with solutions they deem appropriate and effective.

Conclusion

Populism in Portugal has very specific characteristics and, despite being carried out by a RWPP country, Southern Europe is generally more conducive to LWPP parties. In addition to the recurring corruption crises, the socio-economic condition of the country, and increasing anti-immigration feeling are the main factors for the development of populism in the Portuguese nation, something that allows for the association with important theories already developed in this area, such as the theory of the losers of globalization and economic deprivation.

Diogo Carneiro is currently enrolled in the Master´s Degree program in International Relations at the University of Groningen.

Bibliography

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